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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE ECONOMICS OF TRADEMARKS 
by 
Jorge Victor Ramos 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mira Wilkins, Major Professor 
There is extensive literature in several areas of academic study (marketing, 
international business, law, business finance, etc.) regarding brand names and trademarks. 
Different fields of study have analyzed the nature, applications and effects of brands and 
trademarks on firms and societies through their own unique perspective. But although 
brands and trademarks play a crucial and vital role in economic matters related to firms 
and societies, there does not exist a strong literature from the economic field approaching 
important issues related to them. Of special interest to us are the effects brands have on the 
strategies firms create and follow in order to address competition and get an advantage in 
specific markets, the role trademark creation plays in the economic development of a 
country and the spillover effects such development has on the aggregate world economy, 
and the protection patterns and strategies firms use in order to maximize the value of 
trademarks as economic assets and the economic benefit derived from the use of this form 
of intellectual property (and other brand related activities). With this dissertation we seek 
to contribute to the existing literature and to the better understanding of brands and 
trademarks from an economic point of view.  In order to address the questions above, we 
formulated an economic model, used econometric tools and also performed an in-depth 
viii 
 
analysis of empirical data related to brands and trademarks. From our research we found 
that brands and trademarks play a major role in different aspects of the economic spectrum; 
they could give the firm an upper hand in a market, they could be a vehicle for economic 
advancement of societies when trademark protection is fostered and lastly that firms follow 
an idiosyncratic pattern of IP protection in order to generate and defend the value of these 
assets and in order to maximize the economic benefit of activities that are related to brands 
and trademarks. From our overall research we conclude that brands and trademarks are a 
powerful duality of tremendous potential for firms and countries that need to be protected 
and fostered and that additional research from the economic field is needed. 
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CHAPTER I 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITIVE POWER IN 
THE FRESH PRODUCE RETAIL INDUSTRY 
 
 
i. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to Cook (2014)1, the estimated value of the fresh produce industry in the 
U.S. as of 2010 (excluding nuts and pulses2) was a whopping $122.13 billion and retailers 
accounted for $69.18 billion of that amount. Each of these two figures represents a 
significant portion of the overall U.S. economy on their own yet serious economic literature 
dealing with this important industry is still very limited. As the human population grows 
and healthy eating habits continue to increase in relevance, the market for fresh produce is 
very promising and some study from the economic perspective is much needed. Critical to 
a proper analysis of this industry will be the correct identification and understanding of 
overall unique characteristics of the fresh produce market in order to recognize what makes 
it different from other industries in the world. So a key question to be addressed is what 
makes the fresh produce industry fundamentally different from other industries? The 
answer is straight forward and has to do with the nature of the products themselves, because 
of the peculiarities of the industry, without the intervention of trademarks and brands, the 
                                                            
1 “Trends in the Marketing of Fresh Produce and Fresh-Cut/ Value-added Produce” UC DAVIS, September 
25, 2014. 
 
2 According to the USDA a pulse (crop) is a term used in North American agriculture that commonly refers 
to dry (mature) peas, lentils and small and large chickpeas (garbanzo beans) used as food for humans or 
feed crops for animals (http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-
policy/glossary.aspx). 
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production of every single produce company in the market will be completely 
undifferentiated, which creates quite a problem for all players in the marketplace. 
Immediately another related question comes to our mind, what gives these intellectual 
property/intangible assets such a tremendous power in the fresh produce industry? Two 
things: a legal framework that gives them protection and exclusivity, and the lack of perfect 
information. Without these two key elements, brands will be absolutely worthless 
regardless of the industry. In this trade, brands not only have a major effect on the products 
but also characterize and determine the fresh produce industry.  
 
One of our first objectives in this paper is to provide some clarification that will 
allow us to define properly the relationship that exists between trademarks and brands. We 
will then examine the importance of these intangible assets as exclusive property of the 
firm, especially in the fresh produce industry. Later in this essay we will examine the 
factors determining the monopolistic competitive powers fresh produce companies could 
enjoy at the retail level by the proper usage of their brands. We will seek to understand and 
define properly the peculiarities of the industry in order to bundle the theory with the real 
world business dynamics and be able to finally answer key questions such as, what gives 
these produce companies control of certain markets, how this control is related to their 
trademarks and brands, and also what kind of role does reputation play in the mix. Lack of 
information will play a central role in our paper as it forms the cornerstone of our analysis. 
We will also seek to analyze and explain the path all firms in the industry must follow in 
order to become a monopolistic competitive firm in a market, we will aim to determine the 
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strategies and price structure that will allow them to maximize their revenues and we will 
offer some interpretation.  
 
It is important that we briefly address and clarify a few conceptual ideas in order to 
have a productive analysis. The current literature that exists on trademarks and brands in 
the field of economics fails repeatedly to explicitly make a clear distinction between these 
two terms (as they are clearly not the same), and many scholars are just satisfied with using 
them interchangeably, which later tends to lead to some confusion. Key to understanding 
the difference between the two terms is to identify the relationship of one to the other. In 
this regard, Wilkins (unpublished) suggests that the relationship that exists between 
trademarks and brands may be the same that exists between patents and inventions. The 
explicit relationship suggested by Wilkins allows us to understand trademarks as the legal 
protected entity while brands are the commercial representation of such legal entity. In 
other words, trademarks give brands a legal status and by doing so create a set of property 
rights; furthermore those property rights that come to exist because of the trademarks can 
be legally defended in the courts (Wilkins, 1992). Therefore, we argue that brands, not 
trademarks, are the connections that allow consumers to interact with the firm’s products. 
These seemingly trivial definitions will be fundamental to our research later on. Moving 
forward, we intend to make a strict distinction between both terms and differentiate 
between the legal entity and the commercial device. 
 
Regardless of the industry we choose to analyze, we will find that there is a need 
for a profound and comprehensive study of the economic impact of trademarks and brands 
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on firms. The overall lack of a detailed study in the economic field does not seem to occur 
with another type of intangible asset, the omnipresent patent. For example, a quick review 
of the IP/IA economic related literature will show that, economist have used extensively 
patent citation data primarily as a proxy for the value of the underlying innovation and 
knowledge flows (Illing and Peitz, 2006). Therefore, it is evident that there seems to be a 
much deeper concern in the economic literature for the “limited life” patent than for the 
“long term” trademark. The neglect that has existed in the study has occurred even though 
unlike patents, which are only protected for a restricted period of time, trademarks could 
be exclusive assets of the firm for an unlimited period of time and in many cases the value 
of a firm’s trademark could be much larger than the combined value of all other tangible 
and intangible assets the firm might own. Through different mechanisms, trademarks and 
brands’ contribution to the economic performance of the firm is vast and a more detailed 
and profound study of them could help scholars better understand certain empirical 
economic observations that otherwise are hard to explain. Specifically, in the fresh produce 
industry, brands could help us understand why firms are able to charge premium prices for 
products that are otherwise identical (same product, same variety, same PLU, same count 
and same quality) but that come from different market suppliers. We claim and emphasize 
that key issues such as monopolistic competitive power, imperfect information, and 
reputation will be critical in our study. 
 
Central to our paper will be the issue of product differentiation in an industry where 
almost the totality of commercial varieties across different categories of produce in the 
market are openly available to anyone who is willing to grow and commercialize them; 
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hence product differentiation because of product characteristics is simply null given that 
all products in the market are identical to each other down to their very genetic essence 
(clones), as we will address later on. Although some patented cultivars do exist in the 
industry, their market share represents a negligible portion of the overall market of fresh 
produce in the world, and these “boutique” niche markets are not the interest of our research 
nor influence the overall dynamics of the mainstream fresh produce market; our interest is 
in the mainstream/economies-of-scale fresh produce industry. Furthermore, perception is 
key, so if differences are not obvious to consumers then they will assume that all products 
are identical. 
 
 
 
 
ii. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Let us start by emphasizing that when it comes to agricultural products we can 
consider all growers of a specific cultivar to be producers of the very same undifferentiated 
variety across the entire industry and for all practical purposes, because of the lack of 
differentiation, we can consider products of that cultivar as coming from the very same 
orchard and the very same plant. In order to further clarify this idea, let us consider the 
following hypothetical case. Consider two neighboring growers, grower A and grower B, 
both producing the same cultivar, let us say clementines. If we could reach across the 
groves and harvest clementines from grower A’s trees and pack them in boxes as 
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clementines from grower B, ceteris paribus (product characteristics: variety, PLU, count, 
quality specification), nobody would be able to really tell the difference as there is none 
(also and without any loss of generality, provided that both growers use the same growing 
methods and techniques, such as conventional, organic, greenhouse, hydroponics, etc.). 
But in other industries, products that come from different producers almost always have an 
attribute that makes them different (a material, a shape, a design, etc.) for the purpose of 
easy product differentiation and suppliers go to great lengths to make sure that there is 
indeed true product differentiation to maximize market recognition. Clearly in the fresh 
produce industry, as in any other industry, there is a real necessity from producers to attain 
product differentiation to achieve control of a market, and brands play a pivotal role at 
allowing firms to do this, not the product themselves. In this regard, there is extensive 
literature in the field of IO related to monopolistic competition, product differentiation and 
brands, and although not all scholars explicitly agree or elaborate on the role brands play, 
some of them in one way or another, have tried to address the issue of brands and their 
relationship to product differentiation.   
 
Authors such as Bain (1968), Bethel (1971), Jacquemin (1987), Coase (1988), 
Fisher (1991), Fraysse and Grimaud (1991), Chakravarty (1995), address extensively 
product differentiation but do not explicitly pinpoint brands as a source of it. For example, 
Bain (1968) talks at large about five sources of product differentiation but he does not 
mention brands as a source of it. Bethel (1971) merely writes without elaboration that 
product diversification affects materials, components, and manufacturing methods and 
processes. Fisher (1991) also affirms that firms produce different varieties of the same 
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product “with the marginal cost of production just equal to its price, and each varying from 
the other in the sense that the cost of converting production from one variety to another 
just reflects at the margin what consumers would be willing to pay to make that change”, 
but again there is no mention of brands as a source of product differentiation. 
 
But some other scholars have tried to go beyond weak and timid connections 
between brands and product differentiation, and, for example, George and Joll (1981) assert 
that there is a dimension of subjectivity in product differentiation and that different brands 
are different if consumers think they are. Hay and Morris (1979) address product 
differentiation as an issue of characteristics of the product and talk about brand loyalty as 
the disutility of consumers of moving from their preferred position in quality space which 
is related to product differentiation. Shy (1995) divides product differentiation into Non-
address (non-location) and Address (locational) approaches, and within the non-address 
subcategory he asserts that brands are said to be highly differentiated if consumers find the 
products to be very different. Shepherd (1990) addressing monopolistic competition 
mentions that there is product differentiation when products differ physically or in brand 
images or because of seller’s location; but his connection of brands with product 
differentiation comes only through subjective brand preference because certain qualities of 
products are preferred over others by consumers. So we find that all these scholars mainly 
link brands to subjective preferences and physical attributes but fail to address properly 
and explicitly differentiation through branding when information is a crucial factor to 
consider. 
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The ability of brands to convey and provide information is well known and some 
scholars like Geer (1992) have already identified imperfect information as a source of 
product differentiation, but overall there is not much that has been said specifically and 
exclusively regarding this topic as most of the literature centers on the topics previously 
mentioned above (subjective preferences and physical attributes). Cabral (2000) talks 
about imperfect information related to prices, as customers do not have access to all the 
prices of a product in a market. Clarkson and Miller (1982) recognize that brands impart 
more than just information about the manufacturer (such as quality and reliability) but they 
fail to make the connection between information and product differentiation, as they 
indicate that one of the sources of product differentiation are “brands names, trademarks, 
or company names derived from sales promotion activities of sellers, particularly 
advertising and services” with no mention of information whatsoever. Furthermore, they 
seem not to make a proper distinction between brands and trademarks when they state that 
“brand names (including trademarks) allow buyers to determine which firm has made a 
given product”. Tirole (1988) indicates that consumers will prefer to buy a brand because 
it is available at a local store, can be delivered sooner, comes with superior post–sale 
service, they are unaware of the existence of other brands, or brands do not have the same 
quality or will not satisfy their preferences (objectively all “produce” should satisfy the 
same preferences); and although he does not specifically and explicitly talk about 
information we can certainly assume that consumers do have to make decisions under 
imperfect information when they are unaware of the existence of competitors’ brands in 
the market. When dealing with advertisement, Tirole goes a bit further when he states that 
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for experience goods, informational differentiation may also arise from the consumer’s 
imperfect knowledge of the product’s quality or fit with their preferences. 
 
During the review of the literature for our research we found four papers 
[Schmalensee (1982), Wiggins and Raboy (1996), Clement (1984) and, Hens and Webster 
(2006)] that deserved special mention and some additional analysis and attention in order 
to draw clear differences with our study and also to debunk, clarify or rectify some 
assumptions (many times incorrect) regarding the fresh produce industry. In evaluating this 
literature, we draw on our dozen years of experience in the fresh produce industry. 
 
The Wiggins and Raboy (1996) study of the banana industry was particularly 
interesting because it tried to deal with the fresh produce industry. The problem with this 
paper is that even by the time it was published in 1996, it was already outdated, and lacked 
precise understanding and appreciation of the fundamental dynamics of the fresh banana 
industry as most of its assertions regarding this specific category of produce and its market 
were not valid and therefore this paper constitutes an unreliable source of information. 
Furthermore, it seems from the footnotes in the paper that Wiggins and Raboy’s main 
source of information about the industry’s dynamics (at least on the retailers’ side) was 
obtained from an interview with some Safeway Corp. executives in Landover, MD in April 
1991, which greatly biased their view and understanding of the industry. 
 
The Wiggins and Raboy paper wrongfully asserts, that there are branded and 
unbranded bananas in the North America market; and specifically states that Turbana, a 
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major brand of bananas in the North America market is “unbranded”. Turbana is actually 
a brand owned by C.I. UNION de BANANEROS de URABA, S.A. (Uniban) and was long 
time a brand by the time this paper was finalized and later published. Having been a major 
supplier of bananas to the U.S. market for many many years with the Turbana brand, 
Uniban finally filed for trademark registration on May 22, 1992 (trademarks do not need 
to be registered in order to be entitled to the full protection of the law). In actuality, and 
contrary to the claims made by the Wiggins and Raboy in this paper, we assert, that there 
are no bananas in the North America market that are sold “unbranded” at the retail level 
(at least to the best of knowledge of this researcher). Turbana brand in recent years has 
even diversified to commercialize other fresh produce products. 
 
Wiggins and Raboy also assert in their paper that regional supermarket buyers 
purchase bananas in the open market at different prices from several suppliers and that it 
is in this pre-retail market where price variability is evident, but the truth is that by 1996 a 
system of contracts was already being implemented across the banana industry and all 
around the U.S., where produce companies would bid for year round contracts with 
retailers, locking prices and removing the uncertainty and variability of prices in the 
market. This system of contracts has been the industry standard ever since it was 
implemented. Furthermore, given the homogeneity of the product and the size of the market 
(bananas are the most traded fruit in the US and in the world), in this specific produce 
category, purchasing is mainly centralized at the corporate level in order to achieve 
corporate prices and discounts. 
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This system of contracts had several major implications for the industry: 
1) Unlike the Wiggins and Raboy’s assertions about retailers selling bananas from 
different suppliers within the same region, retailers would not be able to carry 
several brands in a specific region (at least not by design), but just one; this also 
meant that they would only be able to carry one brand at the store level. 
2) Retail companies would not necessarily award business to produce companies 
based on just pricing, but they would consider the overall “value” of the product to 
them and could (and would) assign business even if the price bid was not the lowest. 
An important fact to consider is that different retailers assess (and assign) value in 
different ways. Under these conditions brands (and their reputation) play a major 
role influencing the retailers’ business decisions. 
3) Unlike the authors’ claims, the product is not bought anymore en route from the 
tropics, and this helped remove the uncertainty the produce firms face on the 
production side. 
4) Wiggins and Raboy specified that there existed a West-East difference in the price 
retailers would pay, but this system of contracts when implemented at the national 
level for major retailers has effectively invalidated this assertion. 
 
The cornerstone of this paper was derived from the assumption that the difference 
between the quality of bananas shipped under ship decks and the quality of the bananas 
shipped in refrigerated containers is significant enough that retailers are willing to pay a 
premium for fruit transported in refrigerated containers from the tropics. But, even by the 
time this paper was published this assertion had already lost most of its validity, if not all. 
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For example, Chiquita, a firm that is by definition synonymous with “banana company” in 
the market, heavily relied on containerized fruit shipped to the U.S. market from the tropics 
and used this type of “ship mode” to entice some retailers to pay a premium for the fruit, 
but as better handling practices were put in place for under deck shipments and new 
technologies entered the scene (new vessels that allow unloading of product through side 
doors through a system on elevators minimizing handling, better refrigerating systems, 
better deck insulation, etc.) basically any real and perceptible advantage that could exist 
between the two systems was effectively eliminated. This better handling practices and 
new technologies, together with the system of contracts that we described above, gave 
Chiquita the final blows; in 2001, five years after the Wiggins and Raboy paper was 
published Chiquita was filling for Chapter 11; the inefficiencies of this system together 
with the lack of ability to charge a premium for this fruit, were some of the reasons to 
blame for this company demise and the need to file for bankruptcy protection. Nowadays, 
produce companies still use both systems, mainly to maximize usage of ships and also 
because of logistics issues. For example, during the winter, produce companies will try to 
maximize the amount of fruit that is sent in containers to ports in the north of the country 
to prevent bananas from getting any chill damage as would occur if the fruit were exposed 
for long periods of winter temperatures when the hatches of the ship are opened or while 
the fruit is being unloaded.   
  
The authors also affirm that brands are a marker for higher quality and that 
purchasers pay a price premium for a quality guarantee; but the truth is, ceteris paribus, 
fresh produce products are homogenous in their attributes and also in their quality, which 
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is actually guaranteed by a USDA grade system. So, even in the event the purchaser is not 
satisfied with the quality of the fruit, the produce company can “force” the purchaser to 
accept the fruit if it passes a USDA Federal Inspection with the appropriate grade and 
demand payment for the product (premia and all) within certain amount of time by PACA.  
Also, the authors wrongly state that fruit that is shipped under deck is not refrigerated while 
in route to the ports from the farms, and as well, as a side note, they do not seem to make 
a proper distinction between brands and trademarks. 
 
Another interesting paper that some readers could easily mistake as a study dealing 
with the fresh produce industry is the one by Clement (1984). But the truth is that this study 
does not deal with fresh produce products but with a complete different industry (and 
market setting) which is the processed food industry (processed lemon juice). Processed 
products are of course not fresh products and therefore many of their organoleptic qualities 
have been lost during processing and are not necessarily considered perishables anymore. 
Because of the different characteristics of the products and industry, the dynamics of the 
processed food market barely has any resemblance to the fresh food market (shelf life, 
shipping methods, cold chains, vertical integration, etc.). To start with, these are products 
that are not homogenous (product presentations are characteristically different from each 
other in order to represent the manufacturer’s identity) and are sold side-by-side with 
competitors’ products with almost always true price differentiation.  This is dramatically 
opposed to the nature of the fresh produce industry and certainly represents a completely 
different industry with properly delimited and not overlapping boundaries between each 
other. Case example, Del Monte Fresh Produce and Del Monte Foods in the U.S. market; 
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one is a fresh produce company and the other is a processed food company, their industries 
are so different and the boundaries of their industries are so clear that both companies 
coexist within the same national market without overstepping into each other’s business. 
And whenever any doubts or conflicts have arisen about the boundaries of their legal usage 
of the brand and trademark for certain business the companies have been known to seek 
the help of the courts to provide clarification. 
 
Other differences include: 
1) This case study deals with a different type of entry barriers and with the possibility 
of compulsory franchising. 
2) The end consumer has a choice at the time of purchase at the retail store. 
3) Several brands compete in the same shelf for business (ReaLemon, Seneca, Golden 
Crown, Vita-Pakt, Minute Maid, etc.) 
4) There are quality determination incentives for end consumers to search for a brand. 
In our paper end consumers do not do any kind of search. 
5) In this paper, processed food firms with a product with a quality equal or above the 
market average are encouraged to provide evidence of this fact in order to reduce 
the risk associated with the purchase. In our fresh produce industry setting, this is 
not possible and end customers rely on the relationship they have with their retailer 
for it to provide them with the best quality product that will satisfy their needs. 
 
 Next, the Hensen and Webster (2006) empirical paper examines the groceries 
market in Australia for a specific period of time (2002 to 2005). The main goal of the 
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authors was to answer the following question: how might the increased intensity of brand 
and trade mark usage be associated with the increase in real expenditure on grocery items? 
In our paper we will not seek to investigate such a concern and in actuality we assert that 
even though it is widely regarded within the produce industry that brand loyalty from end 
users do exist, it might be more realistic and practical to assume that there are some 
practical limitations to loyalty and that consumers will just settle for what they are able to 
find at their local retailer, because of this fact a study in this regard will not make much 
sense and will not be very productive. Furthermore, out of the 12 categories of groceries 
studied in this paper none of them is fresh produce (bread, canned fruit, tea, tomato sauce, 
rice, pasta, pasta sauce, milk, toilet paper, frozen chips, laundry liquid, and salad dressing) 
therefore none of the specific hypotheses presented in this paper is relevant to our paper or 
helps us better understand the fresh produce industry. Furthermore, in their conclusions the 
authors state “that firms are able to affect their demand curves through product 
differentiation strategies” which is not possible in an industry where product homogeneity 
is its main characteristic. 
 
Lastly it was very fascinating to analyze Schamalensee (1982) in detail. Even 
though this paper does not deal with fresh produce products nor does it give any insight 
into this industry, it is very interesting because the author tried to address several of the 
same issues that are essential to our paper such as product differentiation, imperfect 
information, entry to market, competition and brands. Now, before we continue with the 
analysis of this paper, it is important to point out to the reader so we avoid confusion later 
on, that there exist a published version from 1982 and a working paper version from 1980 
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which are different in content and in some key assumptions. During our research and for 
the purpose of drawing similarities or differences we reviewed the published version from 
1982. In the 1982 paper, key assumptions that were made by the author in the 1980 version 
were dropped and not considered for this last final version. For example, in the 1980 
version Schmalensee states that “the first brand might be expected to find optimal to charge 
a low introductory price to induce trial and then raise the price once consumers have 
verified that the brand does work”. In the 1982 published version he drops this statement 
completely and only says “it is assumed that the first brand actually works for all buyers 
and that it is assumed that the first brand does not change prices in response to entry”. So 
in his paper, Schmalensee deals with a leader and follower “brand” competing against each 
other in order to position themselves within the very same market to later interact as a 
duopoly; and as such this paper addresses the benefits of being a pioneer “brand” in a 
market and also “brand’s order-of-entry disadvantage” issues. Our approach is of a single 
firm looking to introduce its product in a specific market seeking to become a monopolistic 
competitor.  
 
Regarding imperfect information, Schmalensee claims in his paper that there is 
imperfect information in the market and that the source is related to the quality of the 
product which “can give long-lived advantages to pioneering brands”. In our study we do 
not assume imperfect information about the quality of a product as we can certainly identify 
and determine the quality of the produce if it has passed or not a USDA inspection with a 
specific grade. Furthermore Schmalensee says that “uncertainty about quality can make a 
profitable pioneering brand immune to subsequent entry”. In our paper, quality will not be 
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a barrier for entry given the fact that if a competitor’s fruit passes an inspection with a 
USDA #1 grade, then both qualities are effectively the same in the market. Furthermore 
we acknowledge that, specifically to the produce industry, brands (not quality) could be 
used as barrier for entry and we assert that a trademark owner is guaranteed the exclusive 
use of his brand on products or services for as long as his trademark registration is still in 
effect; this basically represents a monopolistic usage of the asset and an effective entry 
barrier. 
 
Related to product differentiation Schmalensee, explaining the motivations for his 
research (and based on Bain’s empirical study) points out that “Bain’s study  did not 
explicitly describe any mechanism by which product differentiation advantages might be 
created, but a number of his remarks pointed toward buyer uncertainty about product 
quality as centrally involved”. In our paper product quality will not be our product 
differentiation attribute, and we have already emphasized that we are dealing with identical 
“products”, meaning same product, same variety, same PLU, same count and same quality. 
Schmalensee also claims that (on the basis of studies done by Bond and Lean) important 
and long-lived advantages can be overcome by later entrants only if their products offer 
distinct benefits; implying product differentiation based on new attributes of the product 
itself; something that is ruled out in our paper, given that a Cavendish banana and a Hass 
avocado will always be just that, a Cavendish banana and a Hass avocado. In the fresh 
produce industry, product homogeneity is the norm, as there is an industry wide incentive 
to take advantage of well established market preferences (and therefore of economies of 
scale). Furthermore, Schmalensee considers “a distinctly new product” but in our paper we 
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deal with products that are identical and where commercial varieties across different 
categories of produce in the market are openly available to anybody to grow and 
commercialize. In this specific matter we have also pointed out that, although some 
patented cultivars do exist in the fresh produce industry, the market share for these cultivars 
compared with the total fresh produce market is negligible, and that these “boutique” niche 
markets are not the interest of our research nor do they influence the overall dynamics of 
the mainstream fresh produce market. 
 
When it comes to brands there are some clear distinctions between our work and 
Schamelensee’s. For example, Schmalensee assumes that initially the second brand is 
subjectively identical to the first brand. We assert that brands are our product 
differentiating attribute and that they are exclusive intangible assets of the firm so, while 
products could be (and in our case are) identical, brands can never be identical, not even 
subjectively since they are the base for product differentiation in the fresh produce industry. 
Also Schmalensee seems to use brands indistinctively to refer to both products and brand 
names and this is clear when he writes “Consider a narrowly defined product class…  It is 
assumed for simplicity that brands in this class either ‘work’ or ‘don't work’; they either 
perform as a brand in this class should, or they fail to perform acceptably. This makes it 
possible to describe uncertainty about the quality of a new brand by a single parameter, the 
subjective probability that it won't work”. Schmalensee assumes that “that these products 
are what Phillip Nelson (1970) christened ‘experience goods’ so that the only way a 
consumer can resolve uncertainty about quality is to purchase a brand and try it. One trial 
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is both necessary and sufficient to determine whether or not any single brand works. 
Consumers differ in their valuation of products in this class”.  
 
Some other differences with Schmalensee’s paper are that:  
1) In Schmalensee’s paper consumers are said to be risk neutral. Given the nature of 
our industry, we claim that produce buyers are risk adverse by essence since they 
do not want to risk the health of their customers or the profitability of their 
companies. 
2) In the Schmalensee’s paper the newcomer could undercut (price wise) the leader in 
order to steal customers. Furthermore he states that there is a relationship between 
the leader and the follower’s demand curves, “with the second brand’s curve 
depending on the first brand’s price”. In our paper a newcomer does not set its price 
based on the price of another firm in the industry nor even intends to undercut it, 
nor does its demand depend on it. In regard to pricing, in our model there are no 
“restrictions” on the price of the product other than on the upper boundary of it, 
based on “value” of the product itself; a newcomer might charge even more money 
for the same product (than other competitors in other markets) and produce buyers 
will only buy the product if the net estimated value is never lower than the price 
they have to pay for the product. 
3) In our model there is no benefit from being a pioneer in a market. 
4) Schmalensee’s paper deals with end consumers as main customers of the firms. In 
our paper, end consumers are not direct customers of produce firms but produce 
buyers at the retail level are; so the “targeted” customers are different in each paper. 
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5) Furthermore in this paper there seems not to be a direct relationship between the 
quality of the product and the reputation of the brand; on the contrary we will state 
that brands will only be as good as the products they represent and therefore it will 
be crucial for the success and future of the brand that the intangible asset (brand) is 
backed by the tangible and intangible assets it represents or it is associated with. 
So, a reputable brand has to be backed by a quality product. 
 
So after some careful, meticulous, extensive and detailed research it is clear that the 
current literature has not addressed industries with true homogenous products (like the 
fresh produce industry) where real differentiation is achieved through branding. So in this 
paper we aim to argue that trademarks and brands (and their reputation) can give firms in 
the fresh produce industry monopolistic competitive powers (at the “retail level”) not only 
because they give a produce company an exclusive control of the use of a brand but because 
they also allow firms to differentiate their many times genetically identical products from 
those offered by competitors. We will show that for the fresh produce firm, the ultimate 
source behind the brand-based monopolistic competitive power in the market is the lack of 
perfect information that exists in the marketplace and therefore the necessity of those who 
purchase the product to solve uncertainties and minimize the risk associated with the 
transaction. Furthermore, we will address the influence that brands and reputation have in 
the way firms maximize the extraction of revenue from the market for their products in the 
form of prices. Like others (Capozza and Van Order, 1982; Lane 1988) we will address 
our problem as a locational one, where firms will need to position themselves to service an 
unattended sector of the market. Given that the monopolistic competitive status firms could 
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enjoy in the fresh produce market derives from a combination of brand, reputation and 
information, it will not be the norm for firms to just become monopolistic competitors from 
the start, but they must follow a certain path in order to achieve that status. This process is 
especially true when we are dealing with experience goods like fresh produce where there 
must exist room for learning. We will present a two period model with spatial 
characteristics to achieve these goals. It is good to mention at this point that ours is not a 
traditional monopolistic competition model since we will assume long-run economic 
profits for the firm; we will provide justification for our assumptions later in our paper.  
 
 
 
 
iii. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND IMPERFECT INFORMATION 
 
A brand’s success cannot be easily imitated nor its effects can be readily or 
effortlessly duplicated, therefore substitutability of brands is low according to Capron and 
Hulland (1999). Furthermore, Foxall (1990) argued that functional equivalence cannot be 
just the only basis for brand substitutability, otherwise consumers will either just purchase 
a single brand or will allocate their purchasing equally amongst all brands. As distinct, 
unique and exclusive devices firms use to differentiate their product in the market, brands 
have the capacity of turning two otherwise identical products into two very imperfect 
substitutes of one another. In this regard, Demsetz (1964) asserted that the most plausible 
source of product differentiation to be found in the market comes from the laws of 
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trademarks, copyrights and patents, as these laws are clearly barriers to imitative entry. 
According to him, these barriers provide a trademark owner the requisites needed to 
establish a trademark based monopoly since there is no free entry into the production of 
that specific brand.  
 
It is well known in the literature the widespread dispute that exists amongst scholars 
in different fields regarding the social and economic repercussions of trademarks. Some 
scholars have argued that trademarks are beneficial to society and the economy, as they 
allow for efficiencies of scale and lower costs, and therefore lower prices. Demsetz (1964) 
asserts that brands are effective barriers that are socially justified as they bring incentives 
to new product development (just like patents do) and reduce information costs to market 
agents. To consumers, trademarks are huge informational tools that allow them use the 
knowledge they already own to make purchase decisions and avoid wasting time in 
expensive and sometimes fruitless searches. Gains to society from trademark infringement 
might not even come close to compensate the losses created to said society by such 
infringement. Lack of legal protection or trademark infringement might imply cheaper 
prices in the short run, but also will imply the destruction of value, information, reputation 
and incentives for R&D that are strongly associated with trademarks. And as with any other 
kind of property, trademark owners have the right to prevent others to use their property 
without their express consent and to avoid the destruction of it. 
 
On the other hand, some have argued that trademarks are not beneficial because of 
the possibly unjustified economies of scale that producers could enjoy and detriment to fair 
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competition (because of  the lack of access to the trademark and brand, network effects as 
stated by Weinberg [2005], incentives to consumers not to search for substitutes and stick 
to the status-quo and the overall negative impact on the competitors’ brands) which could 
lead to a monopoly in the market and prices that would be higher than the ones that would 
existed in perfect competition and therefore not socially optimal. Although it could be 
argued that brands could give a trademark owner an upper hand in the market (with various 
degrees of power), that is far from being able to claim that a trademark could make a 
trademark owner enjoy a full monopoly over an entire market. Market forces such as 
consumer sovereignty will ensure that brands (and the products they represent) that are not 
to the liking of consumers will exit the market. Furthermore, the OHIM claims that 
trademarks limit monopolies.3 It is good to point out here the symbiosis that exists between 
brands and the product they represent because it is crucial that the intangible is backed by 
a tangible that properly addressed the needs of the market, otherwise their reputation will 
suffer and both will fail to survive in the market.  
 
Because of anti-monopoly laws and regulations imposed by governments in 
markets around the globe, it is clear that the only possible “monopoly” a monopolistic 
competitive firm could be entitled to, is the one created by the rightful exclusive usage of 
their own proprietary assets (such as trademarks, patents, copyrights, etc.) to produce 
differentiated products and in the process, build reputation and create strategies that allow 
firms to survive in the market. In their 1982 paper, Capozza and Van Order stated that 
                                                            
3 https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/evolution 
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product differentiation is a basis for monopolistic competition and in this fashion, brands 
are powerful tools used by firms to differentiate their products with respect to the products 
of their competitors. And it is through the use of these exclusive brands that firms achieve 
monopolistic competitive powers in the market. Under these circumstances, firms are able 
to produce products that are no longer homogenous and avoid becoming mere price-taking, 
zero-profit, selling-just-to-cover-cost organizations.  
 
Unlike traditional monopolistic competition literature, we argue that in the long 
run, even with free entry to the market, firms continue to make economic profits since there 
is no possible perfect substitute for their products, and this is backed by empirical evidence 
as companies all around the world, even those that operate in the most open and competitive 
economies generate millions or billions of dollars in profits a year. Regarding the previous 
topic, Demsetz (1964) asserts that if a firm produces a profitable brand, “entry” need not 
to eliminate profits because there is no free entry into the production of that brand, which 
in our case is our product differentiating attribute. Firms accomplish their profitability 
goals by adding markups to their final costs to come up with market prices and generate 
revenues and profits through the sale of their products. According to Boulhol (2008), the 
markup level over marginal cost provides an indication of the degree of imperfect 
competition (monopolistic competition) in the market and that the extent of the markup is 
closely related to the industry each firm operates in.  
 
All things being equal, when we are comparing “apples to apples”; i.e., products 
that are otherwise identical to one another (same attributes, characteristics, functions, 
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specifications, quality, etc.; where basically the only true difference between the products 
is the print on the labeling sticker), the monopolistic competitive power that the trademark 
owner enjoys in the market exists because the trademark owner is able to “capture” a 
market solely based on the brand (and the brand’s reputation) and that the firm (trademark 
owner) is the only legal entity allowed to produce or authorize the production of products 
with this specific brand. But as we said before, it is crucial that good brands are backed by 
good quality products otherwise the grasp a producer enjoys of a market will be nothing 
but flimsy and ephemeral.  
 
As the only producer of the differentiated product that satisfies a consumer’s needs, 
the trademark owner enjoys certain room to extract as much value as possible in the form 
of monetary compensation for its product, that he would not be able to do if he will compete 
in a competitive market with a homogenous product. In a mature market, the monopoly 
enjoyed by the trademark owner is likely to persist for as long as the expected value of the 
product it offers to its “captive” market is never inferior to the price loyal consumers are 
willing to pay for it. Furthermore in these cases, where firms exert monopolistic control of 
a market, the degree of control (elasticity of demand) must be related to the expected value 
of the brand and the associated reputation, since a worthless brand without any reputation 
cannot effectively be expected to exert any control over any market since there will be no 
loyalty from consumers. 
 
 We claim that the monopolistic competitive power a firm uses to control a market 
and that arises from the exclusive use of a brand is ultimately based on the fact that there 
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exists imperfect information in the market. Martin (1994) states that “a consumer will 
collect information from various sources until the marginal cost of collecting additional 
information equals the expected marginal benefit, in terms of increased utility, of collecting 
additional information”. On this topic Lane (1988) asserts that trademarks are an important 
source of information that help consumers lower their search related costs and provide 
sellers with incentives to produce quality products. In the market consumers have a 
necessity to solve uncertainties and they completely or partially remove those uncertainties 
with the information they get swiftly and extract by interacting with a brand. The ability to 
provide swiftly and conveniently information makes a brand powerful in the eyes of 
consumers. Furthermore, we claim that if two independent/unaffiliated firms were to use 
the same brand, then the brand is destined to lose its ability to transmit any useful or 
valuable information as the situation will create confusion in the market (and will increase 
the consumer’s search related costs). 
 
Brands in a perfect information environment will be worthless to the consumer 
because there will be no uncertainty they can help minimize or resolve, nor is there any 
need for the consumer to feel reassured, nor is there a need for a personal and intimate 
relationship between a consumer and a brand in particular. For all practical purposes, under 
perfect information and depending on the underlying quality of a specific product, all 
brands in the market will be deemed identical. The concept of imperfect information in the 
market is central to our analysis. 
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Studying product differentiation Greer (1992) points out that there are three 
categories of differentiation to be known that could help explain the ability of firms to 
charge prices above their marginal cost: Product Attributes (horizontal and vertical 
differentiation), Subjective Desires (Personal Preferences) and Imperfect Information. 
Brands seem to work well defining and encircling all these categories as they directly relate 
to the characteristic of the product, the subjective preferences of consumers and moreover 
to the concept of costly access to information; therefore it is clear that we need a holistic 
approach to address and comprehend thoroughly the full impact of trademarks on the 
organization.  
 
Depending on the industry, different levels of product attributes, personal 
preferences and asymmetric information play a pivotal role determining market prices. 
Specifically in our study, information plays a strategic role to the advantage or 
disadvantage of the firm. Verifiability of information is essential, as rational customers are 
more willing to pay if they can “easily” validate or corroborate certain information about 
the product they want to buy to diminish the risk associated with the transaction and feel 
reassured that they are not being taken advantage of. Overall, customers have some limited 
ways to validate certain key information about a product; for example, when the cost of 
production is not openly revealed to the market, Barsky et al. (2001) proposed a simple and 
logical approach to allow customers to identify at least part of this information when 
dealing with “national” and “private” (generic) brands. They argued that the price of an 
equivalent or near-equivalent “private” brand product offers precious information about 
the marginal cost of the “national” brand product. Because the private label version would 
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not sell at a price lower than its marginal cost, its price serves as a lower bound on the 
markup ratio. The higher relative price of national brands compared to private labels thus 
indicates substantial markups over marginal cost. This condition will be true of course if 
we assume that national brand firms have access to at least the same technology and 
processes as any other player in the market. Better technologies or procedures should allow 
the firm to produce their products cheaper and therefore charge less or at least the same as 
its competitors.  This approach might be useful for products such as over-the-counter 
(OTC) drugs, cereal, bagged salads, etc., where we see national brands competing in the 
same shelf with private ones; but in the retail fresh produce world, it is not a practice at all 
for retailers to brand fresh produce with their own private labels to compete against national 
brands, so Barsky’s approach does not really help consumers reduce the imperfection of 
information in our fresh produce case. 
 
It is very important to understand that the fundamental aspects of each industry are 
as wide and varied as the products that are offered in the market even within the same 
industry, and the specifics of each product’s market could vary widely from other products 
within the same category. The production and logistic processes needed to produce and 
bring products to customers and, consumer’s product specific purchasing patterns are 
essential to define the peculiarities of each market. But in general, in cases where a brand 
exists and positive reputation has been established for it, brands help tremendously on 
minimizing the cost and investment related to access and verification of certain kind of 
information. Firms know this and they use the protection of their trademarks to their 
advantage to compete in the market by investing and properly taking care of their brands 
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and reputation, developing strategies to add more value to their brands and proactively 
protecting these intangible assets by using any legal tool at their disposal. Capron and 
Hulland (1999) point out that in order to achieve strong consumer awareness and a superior 
consumer attitude toward a brand, a substantial and often expensive investment needs to 
take place. Without a constant renewal of such investments, brands face the possibility of 
losing their capability to generate such economic value and to keep their hold of the market. 
 
 
 
 
iv. TRADEMARKS AND THE FRESH PRODUCE INDUSTRY 
 
From our previous discussions, we understand trademarks to be private goods; they 
are excludable and rivalrous, no one can use a trademark without proper consent from the 
owner without infringing the law. The unauthorized simultaneous and arbitrary use of a 
trademark by any other but the trademark owner will hinder the owner’s ability to fully 
benefit from it and will bring negative effects to society (confusion, higher research costs, 
destruction of information/reputation, etc.).  Economically speaking, unlike public goods, 
the usage of trademarks by multiple unrelated producing units (entities that do not fall 
under the same corporate umbrella or franchisor) will be inefficient and will only increase 
the consumer’s costs of searching for adequate goods.  
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Franchising allows the trademark owners to authorize the simultaneous and 
uniform usage of a brand by others while fully benefiting from it by collecting licensing 
fees and royalty payments. In this fashion, the trademark owner still maintains control of 
the asset and this arrangement allows franchisor and franchisees to work in harmony as 
one single unit. The negative aspect of licensing a trademark is that if the franchisor fails 
to exert adequate control over the use of the asset, the production of goods under the same 
trademark by several autonomous independent units could lead to the destruction of the 
reputation of the brand. In many industries, franchising of a trademark is extremely hard 
to enforce because it is extremely difficult to provide “shortsighted” franchisees real 
incentives not to deviate from the norm, as deviation from it could allow them to minimize 
costs and maximize revenues, but only in the short run. 
 
Although packing agreements (contracts) are common practices in the fresh 
produce industry, franchising of trademarks are not. In packing agreements, trademark 
owners will contract the packing services of third party companies to pack in the owner’s 
brand, but unlike most franchising arrangements, the trademark owner always keeps 
control of the exclusive rights to the trademark and normally of all the fruit packed under 
his brand. The third party packer (toll packer) is paid for his services and does not get to 
directly commercialize any “branded” packout without proper authorization by the 
trademark owner. The contracted services may include the harvesting and/or procurement 
of the produce, storing and later distribution. It would be good to note that that in some of 
these cases the produce itself does not even “belong” to the packer or the trademark owner 
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but to another third party grower, but the moment you place the brand on that (otherwise) 
generic product you achieve true product differentiation. 
 
There are a few good reasons why fresh produce companies might not be interested 
in franchising their trademarks and keep for themselves the monopoly of their intangible 
asset. First of all, given the unprocessed nature of the product, packing of fresh produce is 
always a constant liability to the firm and strict sanitation and food safety guidelines must 
always be enforced. Moreover, adequate traceability procedures that will help locate, 
identify and recall the product in the event of an illness or disease outbreak as a result of 
food contamination need to be in place at all times. Pathogens such as E. coli, salmonella, 
and listeria are some of the most common infections associated with the food industry in 
general. Use of non-certified pesticides is another issue that could put at risk the life of 
consumers. All sanitation, food safety and pesticide-related issues are regulated by the 
FDA. A bad reputation arising from issues related to illness, diseases or even death of end 
consumers, could deliver blows a brand might never be able to recuperate from. Also, given 
that produce items are goods that can be transported with ease from one place to another, 
franchising of a produce brand could lead franchisees to compete against each other (even 
against the very same franchisor) with the same label in the same market. This competition 
would void the exclusivity of the brand they are intended to enjoy and could lead to price 
wars that could in turn lead to the destruction of the value and reputation of the brand. 
Related to the issues mentioned above is the difficulty in the fresh produce industry to 
enforce proper controls that could ensure that the name of the brand is not abused and that 
the reputation of it is not destroyed. Chestek (2001) affirms that the licensing of trademarks 
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is riskier than licensing other IP assets, as trademark law requires trademark owners to 
control properly the quality of the goods or services bearing the licensed trademark; failure 
to control adequately the use of its mark by others may result in a court ruling the 
abandonment of the trademark.  
 
In modern fresh produce industry there is an obvious and an almost necessary 
separation between produce growers and end consumers, with many intermediaries 
(packers, shippers, marketers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, etc.) filling the gap. The 
separation is more than just physical and almost unavoidable as there are multiple (some 
of them mandatory) steps required before a product could reach the end customer for 
consumption; steps that require a certain degree of investment, knowledge and physical 
and human infrastructure (vertical integration) not always feasible from every grower down 
to consumers. Also, in modern day farming, produce production tends to be concentrated 
in certain geographical regions to take advantage of favorable soil and weather conditions 
and therefore enhance productivity. Of course we are not claiming that the physical 
separation between producers and end consumers is exclusive to the fresh produce industry, 
but because of the unavoidability of the physical separation, the industry heavily relies on 
an uninterrupted cold chain in order to deliver sound products to the markets, which 
requires a certain degree of investment, knowledge and physical and human infrastructure 
(vertical integration). 
 
Wilkins (1992) and Ramello (2006) argue that when a physical separation exists 
between producers and buyers, there is a lack of intimacy of personal familiarity between 
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them which is replaced by the familiarity a buyer gets from a brand. Amongst many things, 
brands could signal origin (source), quality, authenticity, wholesomeness, reputation, etc., 
and this is what draws customers back to a company’s product rather than to the offerings 
of other players in the market. Brands help consumers and other market agents to answer 
swiftly and immediately questions regarding the qualities and properties of a product that 
otherwise would have been gotten from a direct and familiar relation with the producer. 
 
Every industry has its own peculiarities and the modern fresh produce industry is 
no exception. A very important difference to note is that in this industry, in many cases, 
there is no difference whatsoever between one producer’s product and another’s (as we 
mentioned earlier, given that product, variety, PLU number and count are the same; we do 
not consider the country of origin labeling (COOL) to be a real factor of differentiation). 
For example, nowadays in the banana industry the most common and most important 
cultivar in the world is the Cavendish variety. Just by itself this variety accounts for almost 
the totality of bananas exported all around the globe. Because of the farming reproduction 
practices used in this and many other produce industries, all Cavendish bananas around the 
world are just clones of one another and therefore genetically identical.4 
 
Unfortunately, by sticking to a single gene pool the banana industry prevents the 
evolution of disease resistance which is a huge risk for the overall industry as a one disease 
has the potential to wipe out the world’s entire population of commercial bananas in a 
                                                            
4 http://www.economist.com/blogs/feastandfamine/2014/02/bananas 
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matter of years. This situation has happened before when the production of the previously 
prevalent commercial variety, the Gros Michel, was obliterated by the Panama disease (a 
fungus infestation) during the 1950’s and as a consequence by 1960 this variety was almost 
extinct. But on the other hand, industry concentration around a single variety brings 
benefits related to economies of scale that arise from unified production, harvesting, 
packing, shipping, storing and distribution practices, and also of concerted R&D and 
collective know-how on one single cultivar. It is very important to note is that, because the 
genetics of the products are identical, different weather or soil conditions do not translate 
into any major difference or “new” exclusive characteristics between the bananas produced 
in different parts of the world, and therefore is not considered a source of product 
differentiation in this or any other produce category. 
But perhaps the most important peculiarity is that the purchase of fresh produce by 
the end consumers is not “direct”, as they trust produce buyers at the retail level to 
consolidate purchasing and offer them quality and reliable products at the best price and 
value. Without any loss of generality we assert that produce buyers do this and offer the 
consumer one choice of brand (by design) per category of produce (bananas, pineapples, 
melons, avocados) at a time, so the consumer’s options are effectively limited to what the 
produce buyer puts in the shelves, so for practical purposes, the produce buyer acts as like 
“benevolent dictator”. The setup in the fresh produce industry is fundamentally different 
from other industries where retail buyers do the purchasing and offer customers several 
options to choose from (like when buying a TV, cereal, shoes, etc.). The reason why end 
consumers rely on produce buyers at the retail level to do the purchasing for them is 
because of the physical separation that exists between farms and them, and the necessity 
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that exists to always maintain an uninterrupted cold chain from packing shed to display 
shelf, which is essential to maintain the integrity of the product, extend shelf life, minimize 
handling and keep at bay the reproduction of bacteria, fungi and other pathogens that could 
jeopardize the health or the life of consumers. 
Douglas (2002) pointed out that in many industries, the name of the company owner 
of a trademark is many times primarily and only used as an endorsement rather than an 
identifier of the product, as in the cases of Nestlé, General Mills, Procter and Gamble, 
Hormel, Nabisco (which is also a subsidiary of Kraft Foods), etc. All these MNE own more 
than just one brand and many times the consumer is not aware at all of who the parent 
company of the product they are buying is (and they might not even care whatsoever); all 
they care about is the intimate relationship they have with the brand itself. And this is 
definitively true in the fresh produce industry. Produce firms usually have more than just 
one brand that they use to pack different standards of quality (the USDA AMS gives fruits 
a grade of U.S. 1, 2 or 3, and sometimes Fancy, with U.S. 1 or Fancy representing the 
highest grade), in order to target different sectors of the market and maximize production 
yields.  
 
Another key difference that we must note is that in the fresh produce industry, the 
relationship of the produce buyer is not with the produce firm and its entire repertoire of 
brands, but just with the one specific brand that satisfies his specific needs and the needs 
of his customers. The great difference between the fresh produce industry and other 
industries is that, when it comes to other industries, “product” buyers can effectively have 
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relationships with several brands (from several suppliers); but in the produce industry, the 
produce buyer has a relationship with a single brand, which is the one that he will carry at 
the store level. If it is a premium quality customer nothing but the highest quality brand 
will do. If it is a second tier customer, a third tier brand will not make it for him and because 
of cost factors a produce firm will not be willing to upgrade him to a higher quality brand. 
The third tier brand customer is forced by default to his only choice too. The relationship 
of a produce buyer with a specific brand is so strong that he does not even need to have a 
direct relationship with the produce company, as he can always find a way to access the 
brand through a third party company (produce broker). 
 
Purchasing perishables could be a risky business and produce buyers know that 
there is a strong relationship between reputable brands and quality products; therefore they 
strive to buy the best brands for their customers in order to minimize their own exposure 
in different fronts. First, poor quality products translate into poor floor sales, slow rotation 
of inventories, high shrink levels, underperforming categories and therefore they hamper 
the ability of the firm to maximize revenues (they might even generate losses) as a 
consequence of a bad purchase decision. Certainly, the last thing a retailer wants to do is 
to fill out donation slips or dump certificates to get rid of bad merchandise as this will 
directly affect the bottom line. Reputable brands minimize this kind of exposure as there is 
a historical pattern of delivering products that will comply and satisfy the client’s 
specifications. In the fresh produce industry it is well know that some labels are created to 
be “trashed”, there is always a “bottom feeder” that will find some value on a “rock bottom” 
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quality product. Even though well trained produce inspectors can detect most quality and 
condition problems with a product, there are some issues that might not be apparent upon 
arrival and, unlike other industries where the product could be sent back to the supplier, in 
the fresh produce industry the retailer might not be able to do that since the supplier can 
always argue that the fruit was delivered in good conditions under PACA and that it was 
later abused while it was in the possession of the retailer (wrong temperatures, exposure to 
ethylene or even food cross contamination). Secondly, dealing with perishables implies 
dealing with items that will be used ultimately for human consumption and this represents 
a huge liability for any organization. Produce buyers certainly do not want to deal with 
brands that do not have an established reputation in the market as this will only increase 
their risk. Thirdly, major retail chains know they are under constant public scrutiny and are 
being held accountable for the business they do and by the business partners they have. As 
a result they are putting more and more emphasis on dealing with suppliers that comply 
with good social and environmental practices. Proper health and safety standards, fair 
working conditions, fair trade practices, responsible environmental procedures and 
community involvement are becoming essential to do business in the modern fresh produce 
industry. To reinforce the good reputation of their brands, produce companies invest large 
amount of resources in order to achieve and be compliant with different certifications on 
good food safety and agricultural practices (BRC, SQF, HACCP, IFS, ISO 22000, etc.), 
good social practices (SA8000, FLO-CERT, etc.) and good environmental practices ( ISO 
14001, GLOBAL GAP, etc.). Well known, established and reputable brands with many 
years of history under their belts and long term involvement in their industries provide 
produce buyers the best choice for minimizing their exposure and liability against the issues 
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mentioned above. Furthermore, the more vertically integrated a produce company is in a 
specific industry, the better the level of control it has over the production and logistic issues 
of the products it commercializes, further minimizing the risks associated with doing 
business.  
 
There are several large companies in the fresh produce industry, but the three main 
brands (companies) in the US market (all of them are already in their second century of 
existence) are Dole Foods (1851), Chiquita Brands (1871) and Del Monte (Fresh Produce 
and Foods – 1886). Depending on the category of produce (pineapples, bananas, melons, 
deciduous, etc.) these labels together control a significant percentage of the respective 
market and enjoy brand recognition and established reputation. Whether or not all end 
consumers’ purchases are finally determined or influenced by their loyalty to a specific 
brand in the fresh produce industry is unknown to this researcher and it is not our final 
interest. And even though it is widely regarded within the produce industry that brand 
loyalty from end users do exist, it might be more realistic and practical to assume that there 
are some practical limitations to loyalty and that unless consumers have very strong 
feelings towards a brand, something that Roberts (2004) defines as Lovemarks (brands that 
inspire loyalty beyond reason), then they will just settle for what they are able to find at 
their local retailer (once again, as long as the product satisfies their needs).  
 
But the truth is that for the companies mentioned above, there is no real need to 
identify themselves in the produce market, not even to a novice produce buyer, and entry 
into a retailer’s product/brand mix for these firms is relatively easy as they have the 
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financial means, the know-how, the adequate logistics and infrastructure and, most 
importantly the reputation of their brands to back their products. In the fresh produce 
industry there is no question that brands and reputation could become effective barriers to 
entry for newcomers or could be used as leverage tools by established reputable brands to 
acquire new business. In the produce industry, brands will be meaningless, this time as 
deterrents to entry, if complete information about the industry (market players, costs, 
logistics, product, food safety, etc.) is readily available. The cost and access to information 
in this case could be the most fundamental and essential barrier to entry as there must be a 
real cost of resolving uncertainties related to the product. Together with the cost of 
information there exists a benefit related to brand history and reputation as produce buyers 
are better off relying on their relationship with the history and the reputation of a well-
known brand. In this regard, Martin (1988) states that brands also deter consumers from 
switching suppliers as it would be costly for them to scout the market searching for a new 
and reliable supplier. Hence, newcomers to the industry will face an uphill battle to try to 
take customers away from reputable produce companies that have been profitably doing 
business in the market and in many cases lowering the price of their products will not be 
enough as the risk of switching suppliers could be too high for produce buyer as the risk 
could outweigh the benefits. Lower prices in the fresh produce industry might not 
necessarily signal a strategy from a newcomer to gain the trust and business of a retailer, 
but it might end up signaling low quality of products or lack of commitment to remain a 
trustworthy and stable supplier in the industry; not to mention that prices that are too low 
could be prohibited and even penalized by anti-trust or anti-dumping legislation. 
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Also new entrants to the market might need to invest more resources in industry 
specific assets and other related costs to attract customers than companies that are already 
established in the industry. In this regard, Stigler (1968) defined a barrier to entry as a cost 
of “production” which must be borne by a newcomer to an industry but is not borne by 
firms already in the industry. Infrastructure and vertical integration is without debate very 
important in the produce industry as they add value to the organization and its brands. 
Investment in industry specific infrastructure signals the commitment of a produce 
company to being a committed market player. Moreover, the fact that a produce company 
could have control of the produce from the moment it is planted to the moment it is 
delivered at the retailer’s unloading dock using along the way the firm’s very own logistics 
and exclusive infrastructure, not only could greatly affect the perception and value of a 
brand but also places direct responsibility and liability on the produce company, which 
further minimizes the overall risk associated with the purchase. Furthermore, Demsetz 
(1982) asserts that the combination of information costs, the creation of a reputable history 
and the commitment of industry-specific investment constitute barriers to entry.  
 
  
 
 
v. TWO PERIOD MODEL 
 
As we have pointed out before, fresh produce products are experience goods as 
their true condition and quality attributes are difficult to observe before consumption; 
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because of these characteristics there is an inherent risk and uncertainty associated with 
their purchase. Reputable brands in the fresh produce industry help minimize the negative 
impact of these adverse factors and allow produce companies to maximize the return for 
their products in the form of price. In the absence of brand recognition and reputation, 
produce companies would have to fight an uphill battle in order to position their brands in 
certain markets as produce buyers (retailers) are basically risk adverse individuals who do 
not want to put at risk the health of their customers nor the profitability of their companies 
and will not be readily willing to gamble with the uncertainty of dealing with a supplier of 
unknown product quality and brand reputation investing costly time and resources and even 
facing the possibility of jeopardizing established relations with other suppliers. 
Furthermore, produce companies that do not have the backing of a reputable brand already 
established in the market, might need to entice (as it does happen in the real business world) 
produce buyers with some attractive pricing in order to get a purchase order, and therefore 
might need to survive with slim margins until the true value of their brand and product is 
finally established/revealed and they are able to price their products appropriately. 
 
Our goal in this part of the paper is to identify and analyze formally the approach a 
produce company, trading an industry “homogenous product” that is only differentiated 
through branding, must follow in order to achieve a monopolistic competitor status; we 
will also aim to find the optimal strategies that will lead the produce company to find the 
profit maximizing equilibrium prices that will in turn allow it to exert, in the long run, a 
monopolistic competitive control over its targeted market. Furthermore we want to state 
the effects of brand reputation on these equilibrium prices and on the company’s strategies. 
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As “wannabes” monopolistic competitors in an “unattended” market, the goal of a produce 
company is not to leave “any money” on the table, and in order to do that, it must find the 
perfect balance between the output it offers and the pricing that will allow the firm to 
achieve that monopolistic control. The reason we will work with a two period model is 
because it will allow the produce company to build reputation for its brand from one period 
to the other and will also allow produce buyers to learn in the process. When we say that 
the market is “unattended”, we are not necessarily implying that there is no company 
currently servicing that market, but that maybe we are in front of a market that is 
underperforming as a consequence of the lack of a supplier with a quality oriented and 
reliable brand that is a better fit to the needs of that specific market (this market could be 
itself a subset of a much larger market; let us say a well off socioeconomic group/high end 
retailers). A good example but in a different industry, could be the Coca Cola Co. 
expanding its operations in China where it is aggressively growing in an effort to develop 
and maximize the potential of new “unattended” markets, displace incumbent competitors 
and achieve dominance for several of its brands.   When we say that there is not an 
“established” reputation we are not necessarily implying that there is none at all, but that 
perhaps it is not known to the targeted market (since that market has never been exposed 
to the brand); like when we have well-established companies with reputable brands in 
certain markets that are trying to venture to new markets where their brands and products 
are not well known. For example, KIA Motors in the automobile industry. Kia Motors is 
still developing a brand reputation with consumers in the US market but has been in 
business in South Korea for almost 70 years. In South Korea, Kia Motors is a household 
brand name that enjoys of good reputation in the market. 
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In the model that follows, the total number of produce buyers (and therefore of 
retailers) in the targeted market is fixed and will remain constant for both periods. It is not 
unrealistic to assume that an increase in the number of end consumers will just be matched 
by and expansion of operations of the current retailers in the market. Also it is safe to 
assume that there is a single produce buyer per category as it would be very inefficient for 
a retailer to have several buyers in the market “cutting” their own independent deals; so at 
least there should be a “senior” produce buyer (Manager, Director, VP, etc.) with the power 
to validate or override the deal of a “lower” buyer or with the authority to allocate all the 
business “at will”. Given that a cherry is not a direct and perfect substitute for an avocado, 
we will treat each product category’s market as independent from each other (the same way 
we will treat the markets for cars, mopeds or skateboards). In period one, where there is 
not yet a reputation established for the produce company’s brand, the firm will introduce 
its product to the already identified “unattended” market; if a produce buyer decides to buy 
the product he will purchase one unit of it. In this first period in order to entice produce 
buyers to buy the product, the produce company will offer them a price that will meet 
certain requisites and that will be considered attractive by some produce buyers, as we will 
see later on. Reputation is specific to each retailer; a brand might be well know in the 
industry but not might be “known” to the retailer. In the second period, after we have 
allowed the produce company to build reputation for its brand and produce buyers to learn 
more about the brand and the product, the reputation of the brand as a source of good 
quality products is established and the true value of the now fully differentiated product is 
finally revealed to the produce buyer; as we will formulate later on (and in a simplified 
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way), the true value of the differentiated product will be a function of its natural attributes 
and the reputation of the brand. In both periods the attributes that are natural to the product 
will be the same (a Champagne mango will continue to be a Champagne mango) except 
that in the second period the product will be backed and associated with the reputation of 
the brand.  
 
The produce firm is a profit seeker entity that wants to maximize earnings setting a 
price structure that will change depending on the period we are in ( ଵܲ, ଶܲ); furthermore, the 
firm will discount future earnings at a rate ܴ = 	 ଵଵା௥ 	 , ݎ > 0. Let us remember that ours is 
not a traditional monopolistic competition model since we will assume long run economics 
profits, furthermore we have already pointed out that that in the long run the firm will 
continue to make economic profits since there is no possible perfect substitute for their 
product. In order to keep our study straightforward and because (as it has been pointed out 
before) a specific fresh produce product is not a direct and perfect substitute for another; 
we will deal with just one product category in our analysis. 
 
Given that in the first period produce buyers will be working under uncertainty 
regarding the true value of the product, the price they are willing to pay in the first period 
could not be higher than the one they will want to pay in period two once the true value of 
the product has already been revealed, the produce firm on the other hand anticipates this 
and might be willing to offer an introductory price in order to entice produce buyers to buy, 
so we have that ଵܲ ≤ ଶܲ. The produce company knows that of its targeted audience there 
are some produce buyers that are the most likely to buy (and of this very same group, some 
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will buy and some will not, depending on their specific level of risk aversion, as we will 
see later on), so in order to increase efficiencies and its likelihood of succeeding, the firm 
will introduce its product in the first period targeting certain customers ℎଵ in the market 
(those who have the highest likelihood of buying) and, on the second period (after it has 
have been able to capture a share of the initial market), the firm will explore to broaden its 
customer base and more customers, which we will identify as  ℎଶ, will be targeted. We can 
interpret this strategy of market segregation as an effort from the produce firm not to waste 
resources and focus first on those produce buyers the firm knows it can reach easier and 
more reliably thanks to its distribution network or perhaps those that seem to be more in 
line with the quality of the product the produce company offers and that are not just looking 
for a “cheap” buy but that actually would consider start carrying the product (if they are 
currently not doing it) or switching suppliers if they are. For example, let us assume a new 
produce company has identified, let us say, South Florida as a target market; out of the 
many potential retail customers, at first it will tackle those produce buyers (retailers) in the 
region that it has identified as being the most likely to buy from it; let us say Sweetbay, 
Sedano’s, Wholefoods, Publix, Winn-Dixie, Milam’s, Aldi, Albertsons, Save-A-Lot (the 
last two are subsidiaries of SuperValu). But of course, the produce company knows that it 
will not necessarily succeed achieving a purchase order from all of these potential produce 
buyers (but just some of them), as some will not be interested on the product or will rather 
stick with their current suppliers. The assertion that some produce buyers will remain with 
their current suppliers or will decide not to carry the product is a realistic representation of 
real business decisions retailers will have to make; and it is not that these retailers are not 
reacting to the newcomer but more than anything, they are happy with the current status 
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quo and there is no incentive right now for them to “move”. So in general, retailers evaluate 
the newcomer’s offer and react by switching suppliers, not switching suppliers or simply 
not carrying the produce product. We will impose the restriction in the model that ܴℎଵ >
ℎଶ, which does not decrease the validity of our analysis but that will prove very helpful 
later when determining our equilibrium prices. 
 
As we mentioned before, when dealing with experience goods like perishable 
products and faced with uncertainty, produce buyers behave as risk adverse individuals 
with a certain level of risk aversion ߩ. We will assume that  ߩ will be uniformly distributed 
over the interval [0,1] and that the continuum of our population (in this case produce 
buyers) is also distributed with respect to their level of risk aversion ߩ, this will allow 
demand to be uniformly distributed with respect to ߩ.  
 
Also, because of the natural characteristics of most economic activities there is 
always an inherent degree of risk associated with the purchase of a particular product, and 
this is especially true for experience goods because of the uncertainty and lack of 
information that exist before the purchase. In this paper, the product specific degree of risk 
that exists when purchasing the fresh produce product will be defined as	ߜ. So we will have 
that in the first period of our model, when brand reputation has not been established yet for 
the produce company’s brand (with a specific retailer), produce firms will have an 
incentive and will be more willing to “hold the hand” of a produce buyer to entice this 
buyer to buy its produce; this policy of working with them in the event there is something 
wrong with the product, will help attenuate the risk of the transaction. By the second period 
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as the market has matured and the firm has established a loyal clientele, these incentives 
will decline or even disappear as it will make no sense for a firm to offer incentives on 
perpetuity, especially after it has achieved a solid reputation in the market (and has 
established brand loyalty). To one extreme, we can see these incentives as a “no questions 
asked” return policy from the produce company in the first period, but by the second period 
this policy is completely dropped; we can clearly see that by having such a policy in the 
first period the produce company basically eliminates the associated risk of the purchase; 
but of course in real life we do not have such generous policies in place perpetually, as 
produce companies will go bankrupt. So to summarize, “I will hold your hand” type of 
policies, are incentives for produce buyers; they are policies designed to entice produce 
buyers to purchase the firm’s product, but they are not the reason why a produce buyer will 
buy at the end the fresh produce company’s product. The idea behind these real world 
policies (that produce companies put in place when they want to lure new customers), is to 
let them try the product and find out if it satisfies their needs, and also in the process create 
good reputation for the brand so in the future produce buyers will associate the brand with 
a good quality product and do not hesitate buying it. Later they can use the information 
(reputation) they have stored in the brand to remove uncertainties. Produce buyers as the 
forward-looking rational individuals they are; do not expect these policies to remain always 
as beneficial or even to remain in place, since they know these are just meant to be 
incentives, but even if they disappear in the future they will be ok buying the produce 
company’s product as long as they are not paying more than the true value of the produce. 
Then we have that ߜଵ < ߜଶ.  
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The perishable good in question has a true monetary value of ߝ, which represents 
the upper boundary of a buyer’s willingness to pay for a one unit of good. Given that the 
produce buyers have to make decisions under incomplete information (no reputation), ߝ is 
unknown to them, but instead they work with the ex-ante estimation ߝ̂	with a true mean of 
ߝ. The value of ߝ becomes known to a buyer after he receives the product at his warehouse.  
Even though the ultimate evaluation of the product will be upon consumption, a thorough 
in-house (or federal inspection) by a seasoned inspector could detect most quality and 
conditions problems (PSI levels, Brix levels, mechanical damage, misshapen product, 
sunburn, sugar spots, hallowed hearts, loosed seeds, chill damage, discoloration, 
anthracnose, decomposition, over ripe, wrong stage/color, insect damage, etc.), so it is safe 
to assume that if quality and condition is good upon receiving, it will also be good upon 
shipping to the stores (given that there exist in place adequate handling procedures and 
rotation of inventories practices at the produce buyer’s cold storage). It will be in the best 
interest of the produce buyer to ensure that proper handling and rotation of inventories is 
done after the perishables are received as changing suppliers will not solve these internal 
problems (and needless to say that this could put them “on the hook” for some heavy 
losses). 
 
In general and given the uncertainty as a result of the imperfect information in the 
market, “identical” products will be valued differently on the basis of the known reputation 
of their brands. Products branded with reputable brands will be considered more valuable 
than those branded with brands that have low, nonexistent or even questionable reputations. 
Because of the special relationship that produce buyers have with specific brands, we claim 
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that brands are not used to “reveal” information, but are used to “store” information. In this 
regard, we have stated earlier that brands could be used by produce buyers to store 
information that later could be used to remove uncertainties and minimize risk and that 
brands are basic firm and social devices where information accumulates. Produce buyers 
store information that answer questions such as: Is this a reliable brand? Is this a brand that 
consistently offers good quality products? Is the value of the products associated with this 
brand above the industry average? Is this a reputable brand?  
 
As we said before, different retailers assess (and assign) value in different ways. As 
a result, we have that certain retailers will pay more money for a pineapple from Del Monte 
than for a pineapple from Royal Coast because of the higher value theses retailers assign 
to the product that carries the Del Monte brand (even though both pineapples are basically 
the same). Additionally, even though all conventional bananas (i.e., not organic) are the 
same, Publix will only carry Chiquita brand bananas in their stores, and this has nothing to 
do with Chiquita’s distribution network alone (as there are suppliers in their geographical 
area that have a better distribution network than Chiquita) or with competitive pricing (as 
other suppliers have tried unsuccessfully many times in the past to lure Publix with low 
prices in order to get their business) but with the value they assign to bananas that feature 
that Chiquita brand. We see this “value” effects in different produce categories across the 
board. As we also pointed out before, the beauty of the fresh produce industry is that, given 
the fact that there exists true homogeneity amongst the products of different suppliers, a 
great deal of standardization (at the federal level in the U.S.) has been put in place 
throughout different categories of fresh produce, and produce companies are effectively 
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limited on what they can pack in a box if they want to meet a product specific quality 
standard (for example, USDA #1). We said earlier that reputable brands need to be backed 
by a good quality product, otherwise the information that is stored in them will be destroyed 
or will not be reliable (and therefore their ability to signal any kind of quality will be 
worthless). In the fresh produce industry brands do not just simply signal continued quality, 
as quality is efficiently and effectively “enforced” by an unbiased, factual and universal 
system of grading, brands go beyond just that. 
 
So, we define ߝ to be a function of brand reputation ߮ and all other attributes	ߠ 
natural to the product, which implies that even if there is no reputation established yet, 
there will always be value that is inherent to the product itself. The relationship of ߝ with 
߮ is defined as being direct and positive. In the unlikely event that the effect of a brand’s 
reputation becomes negative and erodes the value created by the other attributes of the 
product then, the produce firm will be better off retiring the brand of the market and start 
marketing its products under a new brand; this is a common PR strategy and practice in 
many industries. So we have ߝ(߮, ߠ), where ࣸߝ(߮)/ࣸ߮ > 0 and ࣸߝ(ߠ)/ࣸߠ > 0.  
 
Similar to Lane (1988) and given the level of risk aversion of the consumer and 
riskiness of the transaction (although in our case ߝ is a function of brand reputation and 
other attributes that are natural to the product), we define price as: 
 
            																												ܲ ≤ 	 ߝ̂(߮, ߠ) − ߩߜ																																																																			(1)                         
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where ߩߜ represents the total value subtracted from the perceived value because of the risk 
associated with the product transaction. Consumers will only buy the product if the net 
estimated value is never lower than the price they have to pay, if this condition is fulfilled, 
then each produce buyer buys his one unit of the product. Before the transaction the 
transaction occurs (ex-ante) information is imperfect and therefore ߜூ > 0. But ex-post, 
after the buyer has received the product, information is “perfect” (complete) and ߜ஼ = 0, 
so buyers are willing to pay	ܲ ≤ ߝ(߮, ߠ), i.e., buyers will be willing to pay up to the full 
amount of their valuation of the product.  
 
From equation (1) we find that the proportion of buyers that will buy in period 1 
and 2 are: 
 
																						ߩଵ ≡ 	
ߝ̂(߮ଵ, ߠ)−	 ଵܲ
ߜଵ 																	ߩଶ ≡ 	
ߝ̂(߮ଶ, ߠ)−	 ଶܲ	
ߜଶ 																																				(2)		(3) 
 
From equations (2)  and  (3)  and given that ଵܲ ≤ ଶܲ  and  ߜଵ < ߜଶ  (less or no 
“holding hands” in period two) we have that 	ߩଵ > ߩଶ. So we have that the firm will try to 
approach as many produce buyers as it can in period 1 by targeting a wider spectrum of 
individuals based on their risk aversion level than in period two. So, in the first period only 
produce buyers whose level of risk aversion is lower than ߩଵ  (ߩଵ,௜ ≤ ߩଵ) will actually 
purchase the product. In the same fashion only produce buyers with ߩଶ,௜ ≤ ߩଶwill buy the 
product in the second period. 
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Let us remember that produce buyers’ level of risk aversion ߩ  is uniformly 
distributed over the interval [0,1]. So, the total number of produce buyers that will buy in 
period 1 is given by: 
 
																																																																	 ଵܺ = ℎଵߩଵ																																																																								(4) 
 
Because 	ߩଵ > ߩଶ , none of the ℎଵ(1 − ߩଵ) produce buyers that did not buy on 
period 1 will buy on period 2 (since their ߩ is higher than ߩଶ), so we have that the total 
number of produce buyers that do buy in period 2 is given by: 
 
																																														ܺଶ = ℎଵߩଵ +	ℎଶߩଶ																																																																												(5) 
 
It is good to note that because each customer purchases one unit of the item; ଵܺ and 
ܺଶ also represent the demand for the product in each respective period. 
 
The cost the produce firm faces is given by: 
 
																																																ܥ(ܺ௧) = 	ܿܺ௧ + 	߬ܺ௧ + ௧݂																																																														(6) 
 
Where the total cost for each period is given by the total variable unit cost of 
production, a transportation cost per unit (Capozza and Van Order, 1982) and some fixed 
cost in each period. Then we have that the produce firm seeks to maximize: 
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																										ܯܽݔ௉ଵ,௉ଶ	ߨ = ( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬) ଵܺ + 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ	 − ߬)ܺଶ −	෍ ௧݂
ଶ
ଵ
																				(7) 
ݏ. ݐ.																												 ଵܲ ≤ 	ߤ																																			 
ଶܲ ≤ 	ߤ 
ߨ, ଵܺ, ܺଶ ≥ 	0 
 
From (2), (3), (4), (5) , (7) and remembering that ߝ̂ = ߝ: 
 
	ܯܽݔ௉ଵ,௉ଶ	ߨ 
																	= ℎଵߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ	 − ߬)(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) ൤
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) +
ℎଶ
ߜଶ (ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)൨
−	෍ ௧݂
ଶ
ଵ
																																																																																																																	(8) 
ଵܲ ≤ 	ߤ 
ଶܲ ≤ 	ߤ 
 
ℒ = ℎଵߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬)(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) ൤
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) +
ℎଶ
ߜଶ (ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)൨ −	෍ ௧݂
ଶ
ଵ
							
+ 	෍ߣ௧
ଶ
ଵ
(ߤ − ௧ܲ)																																																																																																	(9) 
                          
After some calculus we get that (see Appendix for detailed steps): 
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	 ଵܲ =
(ߝ − ܴ ଶܲ) + (1 + ܴ)(ܿ + ߬)	
2  
 
and  
 
ଶܲ =
ߝ(ℎଵߜଶ + 2ℎଶߜଵ) + (ܿ + ߬)[2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ]
(4ℎଶߜଵ − ܴℎଵߜଶ) 										ݏ݋	݂݅	 ଶܲ < ߝ 
(ߝ − ܿ − ߬)		(2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ] > 0 
 
The first term of the equitation above is positive since it the value of the good has 
to be higher than the associated costs otherwise the firm is better off not 
producing/commercializing the good. Recalling that ߜଵ < ߜଶ  and ܴℎଵ > ℎଶ the second 
term is negative, which is a contradiction. Therefore ଶܲ = ߝ 
So we have that: 
																																					 ଵܲ =
(1 − ܴ)ߝ(߮ଵ, ߠ) + (1 + ܴ)(ܿ + ߬)	
2 																																								(10)	 
																																																															 ଶܲ = ߝ(߮ଶ, ߠ)																																																																	(11) 
 
So, in conclusion, we have shown that in period one the produce company’s 
strategy is to charge a price that is less than true value of its product in order to entice 
produce buyers to buy from it. From (2)	we note that by charging this lower price, the 
produce firm allows ߩଵ  to increase and by doing this from (4)	we see that the firms 
expands its consumer base in period one, boosting the likelihood of succeeding in the 
market. Produce buyers that bought in period 1 will come back to buy again in period 2 if 
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the price is adequate, developing brand loyalty.  In period two, after the produce firm has 
established a loyal clientele and the true value of the product has been revealed to them, 
the strategy the firm chooses to maximize revenues is to charge a price that is equal to the 
true monetary value of the product which is represented by ߝ. So the produce company, 
after it has allowed produce buyers to “learn”, decides not to leave any monies on the table 
and produce buyers will be willing to pay the “new” set price as long as it is never higher 
than the true value of the product. The fact that in our model no new produce buyer joins 
the consumer base in the second period does not mean that a produce company itself cannot 
grow anymore and this is one of the reasons why savvy produce companies own more than 
just one label (brand) and also explore other unattended markets. The produce company 
will look to address the rest of the market through other brand/pricing strategies if it decides 
to do so. In the second period the produce firm will enjoy of the monopolistic competitive 
power it has achieved and that arises from the fact that its brand is able to remove the 
uncertainty and associated risk of the purchasing transaction and provides the produce 
buyer with crucial information about the product and its quality.  Produce buyers that were 
previously “not properly attended” (but that now are) will not have an incentive to stop 
being a loyal consumer of the (now incumbent) produce company’s product as long as they 
do not have to pay more for the produce than what it is worth to them or as long as no other 
produce company offers them an identical product that has a perceived higher value 
(perhaps the reputation of the brand is much higher as a result of new technologies or a 
higher level of vertical integration, etc.) at  the same or even lower price. Even though the 
time length of both periods is not defined in the model, it is reasonable to assume that at 
least the first period of the model will last long enough that it would allow the produce 
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company to consolidate its presence and to capture all the customers that exist in the 
specific market that find value in its product and that are willing to buy from it. Our initial 
condition that ܴℎଵ > ℎଶ, implies also that ௛భ௛మ > 1; which means that a produce company 
must target markets where the proportion of produce buyers it considers that are most likely 
to buy its product be larger than those that are not likely to buy it, as it will make no sense 
for the produce company to invest resources to enter a market where there is no real 
potential consumer base for its brand; this goes along pretty well with real world business 
decisions produce companies make. For example, it might not be a good business decision 
to try to penetrate a market that is not quality conscious with a premium brand as produce 
buyers will not be willing to pay the price for the product. This is the reason is why produce 
companies have more than just one brand (and price) in order to tackle diverse markets. 
 
At the start of the first period, we assumed that the firm’s brand reputation ߮ଵ is 
unknown to the specific market and therefore it will not be a factor adding value to the 
fresh produce product; all the value will come from the natural attributes of the product, 
i.e., ߝ(0, ߠ) = ߝ(ߠ). But from (10)	we see that if we would allow ߮ଵto increase, ଵܲ it will 
also increase, but on the flip side the number of produce buyers that will purchase the 
product will decrease. In the second period after brand reputation has been established (or 
revealed), we have found that the price ଶܲ is essentially and directly determined by the 
combination of the natural attributes of the product and the reputation of the brand, and we 
expect reputation to effectively influence the returns firms are able to get for their products 
in the long run.  As a rule of thumb we can say that, the higher the reputation of a brand, 
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the higher the value of the products it “endorses” and positive shocks in brand reputation 
will positively increase the value of a product. Produce firms in the industry know this and 
work hard and invest a lot of resources in order to increase the reputation of their brands 
(and protect their trademarks) in order to be able to extract a higher monetary return for 
their product. In the fresh produce industry, that we can argue that once a product has 
passed a federal inspection as a USDA #1 product, then there is no difference with another 
product with the very same PLU and same count that has also passed inspection as USDA 
#1 product, but still we can see certain firms being able to charge more money for the same 
USDA #1 product when the only true difference is the brand stamped on the sides of the 
boxes and of the stickers that go on the product and the reputation that backs that brand. 
We can see these effects in other industries also, where consumers are willing to pay higher 
prices for certain products with “identical” (but imperfect) substitutes in the market.  
 
 
 
 
vi. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the present paper we started by taking a look at trademarks and brands as 
exclusive intangible assets of the firm and we concluded that in order to finally understand 
the difference between them, it is critical that we first clearly identify the relationship that 
exists between one another. In this regard, we presented the reader with the unequivocal 
relationship that exists between both entities and with succinct but proper definitions of 
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that relationship. We also aimed to show that even though the IO literature deals 
extensively with monopolistic competition, product differentiation and brands, there is no 
study known to this researcher that directly deals with the fact that in certain cases, like the 
fresh produce industry, when brands become the only product differentiating attribute, the 
ultimate source behind the brand-based monopolistic competitive power enjoyed by the 
firm is a result of the lack of information that exists in the marketplace and the ability of 
brands to store information that later could be used by produce buyers to remove 
uncertainties and minimize risk. So in this paper we have intended to fill the gap that 
existed in the literature regarding this topic. We discussed also that brands in a perfect 
information environment will be nothing but useless and will not be a real source of value 
to society or the firm as there are no unanswered questions in the market they can provide 
us answers for. 
 
Specifically to the retail produce industry, we showed that a produce company will 
use the exclusivity of its brands to turn homogenous produce products into exclusive 
differentiated tangible assets and as the only supplier of those exclusive assets in the market 
it will seek to become a monopolistic competitive firm. Product differentiation will allow 
the produce company to maximize the revenues that otherwise would have been forgone 
as it would have not been possible for the firm to generate economic profits should it have 
to engage in perfect competition with other suppliers of the same undifferentiated product. 
Our model, provided the basis for a formal analysis of how produce companies will 
formulate certain strategies designed to maximize revenues and lead them to become in the 
long run, monopolistic competitors in the retail fresh produce industry; we made this 
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possible by allowing brand reputation to accumulate and also learning from produce 
buyers, and by doing this we set the bases for brand loyalty. We also claimed produce 
buyers “store” information in the brands and therefore brands become information tools.  
Then the reputation of the brand could be used by produce buyers as a proxy for 
information (as it could signal price, food safety, quality/condition, supply chain/logistics, 
etc.). 
 
In this research we have begun to explore the importance of trademarks and brands 
in the produce industry and their crucial impact as intangible assets in the life of the produce 
firm, but clearly this is just a start and there is more study to be done in this area as the 
specific topic is basically unexplored. Even though there exist some broad literature on 
brands in the general economics field, there is so much more yet to be said when it comes 
to extend the research on brands and their crucial relationship with trademarks. We have 
found valuable in this respect the research done in the Law and Economics field. So, the 
story behind property rights of these intangible assets from an economic perspective is 
granted and needed, and we hope researchers pursue a deeper research on brands and 
trademarks.  Also, to the surprise of many readers, the fresh produce industry is a state-of-
the-art industry and we are convinced that new technologies already in use and to be used 
in the future (Radio Frequency Identification [RIDF], Modified Controlled Atmospheres 
Technologies, GS1 Databar, Social Media, etc.) could provide us with a better 
understanding of how the value of brands and impact of trademarks will evolve in the 
future, so some study in this issue will be of great interest.  
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CHAPTER II 
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TRADEMARKS 
 
i. INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite the well-known fact that countries and blocks of countries around the world 
go to great lengths to protect the property rights and economic value of trademarks, not 
much has been said in the economic literature regarding this intangible asset (IA). Certainly 
not nearly enough has been said when compared to other types of intellectual property (IP) 
such as patents, even though as we will argue later on in this paper, the economic impact 
of trademarks is longer lasting and it could be far more profitable and valuable than the 
economic impact produced by patents and copyrights. During our extensive research on 
this topic it was evident to us that a study of trademarks at a macroeconomic level was 
lacking, so we aim to contribute to the literature with the present research and also we also 
attempt to answer a few important questions concerning the effects of these intangible 
assets at the macroeconomic level.  
 
Crucial to our study will be the assertion that from an economic perspective, 
trademarks are vital and exclusive intangible assets and at the same time they are important 
intellectual property of firms and countries that need to be protected to preserve and 
develop their economic value and significance. Without any loss of generality and for the 
purpose of this paper, even if a single individual is a trademark owner we will consider it 
a “firm” as it is reasonable to assume that he/she would act like one for the purpose of 
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commercializing, licensing or defending their trademark. In 2000, in an essay that 
essentially dealt with tangible assets, De Soto claimed that for countries to develop there 
should be a legal framework that would help them turn dead, undervalued or underused 
assets into liquid or more valuable capital; we understand that this same argument also 
applies to intangible assets, such as trademarks. Furthermore a simple empirical 
observation validates that no country could develop its economy if there are no proper 
institutions and tools to protect basic rights, such as the right to protect and benefit from 
intellectual property, as there would be no incentives for creativity, entrepreneurship, 
investment, R&D, invention or innovation which are vital for this kind of development to 
take place. Lin and Nugent (1995) define institutions as "a set of humanly devised 
behavioral rules that govern and shape the interactions of human beings, in part by helping 
them to form expectations of what other people will do”. According to Rodrik (2007) 
markets require institutions because of their “not self-creating, self-regulating, self-
stabilizing, or self-legitimizing” characteristics. Furthermore, Rodrik claims that there exist 
five types of market supporting institutions to be known: “property rights, regulatory 
institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance, 
and institutions of conflict management”, and this institutions help markets to become more 
efficient. So provided that there exist such institutions and tools, it is not factors such as 
religion, culture, race, etc., that impede societies from developing their economies, but the 
lack of deep rooted and established processes for making the overall institutional systems 
work effectively and efficiently. Specifically to the property rights institution, Rodrik also 
claims that today’s prosperous economies have all been built on the basis of private 
property.  Specifically in the US, because of its IP system of protection, American 
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industries have flourished, new products have been invented, new uses for old ones 
discovered, and employment opportunities have been created for millions of Americans 
according to the USPTO. 
 
In this essay we will claim that trademarks, as valuable IP, are a crucial and 
important part of a major and complex economic development puzzle and that they have 
been essential to promote the creation and development of capital in developed countries 
and could help countries that are not yet developed achieve a high level of creation and 
development of capital if these underdeveloped countries are able to nurture and encourage 
the accumulation/creating of trademarks. Regarding the vital contribution of IP (patents 
and trademarks) the USTPO says: “The strength and vitality of the U.S. economy depends 
directly on effective mechanisms that protect new ideas and investments in innovation and 
creativity”.5 Concerning the institutions needed for an IP system to work, the OHIM says 
that countries create “their own trade mark registration offices, recognizing that trade mark 
law and registers would facilitate trade by defining rights, limiting monopolies and 
clarifying the boundaries between marks and that trademark registers were designed to 
enhance business confidence and provide businesses with a fast and efficient way of 
resolving disputes. Trade mark registration was not mandatory (and still isn't), but for 
companies who wanted to expand, a registered trade mark became an indispensable way 
of guaranteeing quality and building brands”.6  
 
                                                            
5 http://www.uspto.gov/about/ 
 
6 https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/evolution 
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So in this research we were especially motivated to determine if trademarks have 
any effects on the level of GDP of a country and if so, we wanted to go a step ahead and 
investigate if such effects are the same for all types of economies. We will attempt to 
provide explanations for our findings and we hope that this work would serve as a stepping 
stone for future research on this topic. 
 
 
 
ii. BRANDS AND TRADEMARKS 
 
There is an old relationship between brands, ownership and value. From the early 
start of civilization, as humans began to live in societies, a need to clearly identify 
“valuable” possessions amongst different members of a group and therefore to establish 
ownership became evident and necessary. Branding was the only reliable device ancient 
humans had to identify and claim ownership to their most valuable possession; livestock. 
The earliest known and properly documented form of brands date back to almost 5,000 
years ago in Egypt where scholars have found paintings in tombs from around 2700 B.C. 
depicting humans branding oxen.7 As civilizations evolved so did brands together with 
their social and economic significance. Trademarks will be an invention that would not 
come until several millennia later. 
 
                                                            
7 http://agr.wa.gov/foodanimal/livestock/ 
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It seemed somehow natural that with the passage of time and the increase in 
distance separating humans, that they would find creative ways to harness the power of 
more complex types of branding. So brands evolved and they were eventually used not 
only as a way to indicated ownership but way far more importantly, they were used to 
indicate origin, which was a pivotal and key development for brands as it set the base for 
what nowadays constitutes the modern concept of a brand (and trademarks, as there was a 
greater need to protect intellectual property and regulate commerce as civilization also 
evolved). Wilkins (1992) and Ramello (2006) argued that the separation that existed 
between a producer and a buyer and the lack of intimacy of personal familiarity between 
them, was basically replaced by the familiarity the buyer would get from a brand. On the 
consumer side, brands promised the buyer product and quality consistency paired with an 
almost effortless decision making process at the time of purchase as buyers (individually 
or collectively) were able to  “store” within the brand knowledge and information regarding 
their past experiences and the perceived characteristics of the product. On the 
producer/brand-owner side, brands offered them an enhanced control over a specific 
market as they were the solely supplier of a “differentiated” product and also gave them 
the incentives needed to develop and expand such markets. For the overall society, brands 
created market efficiencies, welfare and economic development. 
 
But it was not until the development of modern trademarks and trademark systems 
that the potential of brands was truly and fully unleashed and really took off, giving a huge 
boost to commerce and therefore to the economic development of societies. Suddenly 
brand owners did not just have a mere promotional and marketing tool, but they had an 
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asset; real property they could capitalize on and defend in a court of law if needed. 
Trademarks granted brands the “birth certificate” that they were lacking and thus, gave 
them a legal status, a set of rights and a true economic value. In modern times, in the late 
19th century, countries and territories around the world, such as the U.S., U.K. France, 
Hong Kong, etc., realized that with an adequate trademark system they were not only able 
to regulate commerce but also to improve it and promote economic development and social 
welfare.  
 
As an initial step to try to understand that importance of trademarks, it is imperative 
that we first understand the social and economic importance of brands, as these seem to be 
more evident to the general reader. And before we move forward, it is essential that we 
properly provide a definition for brands and trademarks and how they interact from an 
economic perspective. A brand is any device (such as a name, a design, a symbol, etc.) that 
identifies the source of a product or service and that renders any other comparable product 
or service in the market an imperfect substitute. A trademark on the other hand is a legal 
entity, in essence it is a set of property rights granted to and assumed by a brand-owner. 
Trademarks are concrete but intangible assets that are regulated by local, national and 
international laws and treaties. Trademarks protect brands; you can trademark a brand, but 
you cannot “brand” a trademark. Brands are commercial representations of trademarks, 
and Wilkins (unpublished) suggested that brands are to trademarks what inventions are to 
patents. Key to our definition of brands is the fact that brands can turn two otherwise similar 
or identical products into imperfect substitutes of each other.  
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Brands (their success and reputation) cannot easily be imitated and their effects 
cannot readily or effortlessly be duplicated thus substitutability is low according to Capron 
and Hulland (1999). Furthermore, we argue that imitation is highly unlikely to succeed 
because of the stochastic nature full of causal ambiguity about becoming a successful 
brand. Certainly social and economic value could not be imitated as it is not endogenous 
to the firm (brand-owner). Foster (2007) claims that the creation of value is a process of 
cooperation between producers and customers; in other words a process of value co-
creation. He defines this creation of value process as an intimate and respectful long-term 
cooperative, enduring and evolving matter between equal partners. Capron and Hulland 
(1999) point out that in order to achieve strong consumer awareness and a superior 
consumer attitude toward a brand, a substantial and often expensive investment needs to 
take place. Without a constant renewal of such investments, brands face the possibility of 
losing their capability to generate economic value. Thus when we brand a good or service 
we add the ultimate layer of product differentiation. Foxall (1990) argues that if product 
functional equivalence was the only basis for brand substitutability, then consumers will 
either just purchase a single brand or, they will allocate their purchasing equally amongst 
all brands in the market and it would be expected that all brands enjoy the same market 
share. The problem with arguing that equal product functionality is enough for a consumer 
to substitute brands is that consumers do not buy all the brands available in the market and 
certainly the market share of brands varies widely. These empirical facts reinforce the idea 
that competing branded products from different producers are, at best, imperfect 
substitutes.  
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Scholars, such as Capron and Hulland (1999), Foxall (1990), Demsetz (1964), 
Capozza and Van Order (1982), Weinberg (2005), etc., have debated extensively the social 
and economic implications of brands and trademarks even analyzing theories that assert 
that brands and trademarks are not beneficial to society or to the economy. These theories 
against trademark and brands claim that aside from the obvious enjoyment of economies 
of scale derived from being the only producer of a differentiated good, when brands are 
used to differentiate a producer’s product from those of other competitors, the lack of 
access to that brand by these competitors may cause consumers to perceive the competing 
products as inferior substitutes thus reducing competition. The reduction in competition 
could lead the brand owner to achieve monopolistic powers and charge a price that is higher 
than the one that would exist should competitors gain access to the brand. Another 
pervasive side of brands analyzed in the literature, is that when a brand is highly attached 
in a consumer’s mind it could prevent them from searching for possible substitutes because 
their time would be wasted should the competing product will not provide them with at 
least the same level of utility as their preferred branded product. Roberts (2004) calls these 
types of brands, Lovemarks, brands to which consumers show loyalty beyond reason.  
 
On the other hand, we have those who argue that brands are beneficial to society 
and the economy and they might even help limiting monopolies.8 A protected brand could 
allow a producer to increase output through efficiencies of scale (and even scope) and 
therefore achieve lower costs that would translate in to lower prices. To consumers, brands 
                                                            
8 https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/evolution 
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allow them to use “brand familiarity” and past experiences to make purchase decisions so 
they get the products they need and avoid wasting time in expensive and sometimes 
fruitless searches. Specifically regarding brand familiarity, Weinberg (2005) talked about 
the “network effects” which he defined as the increased benefit that a consumer derives 
from using a product when there are a large number of consumers in society using the same 
product. We can see these network effects in action when individuals buy certain specific 
products and brands because they are common in their immediate surroundings.  
 
Although it is plausible that a brand could give a producer certain market 
advantages, there seems to be no solid evidence, that just a protected brand by itself could 
give a producer a clear upper hand in or a monopoly of an entire market. Certainly it will 
be a weak argument to assert that a firm can keep a market captive on the basis of its brands 
and trademarks alone. Consumer sovereignty and therefore market forces will make sure 
that brands that are related to products that do not satisfy consumer requirements get 
flushed out of the system. Brands will only enjoy good reputation in the market as long as 
the products they are associated with succeed to address and satisfy properly the 
requirements and expectation of a broad-enough base of consumers. In sum, the value of a 
brand (and their reputation) arises from the interaction between the properties and 
characteristics of their products and services and the holistic appreciation that consumers 
and society have about them. Similar to Fombrun’s (1996) work on corporate reputation, 
we suggest that brand reputation relates to the overall knowledge and appreciation of a 
brand by the public. In the long run, brands are just as good as the product they represent; 
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therefore it is crucial for the success and future of a brand that the intangible asset is backed 
by the tangible one (or intangible in the case of a service). 
 
From a commercial and social standpoint, brands (and their reputation) are 
important because they signal origin, quality, authenticity; they help draw customers back 
to a product, facilitate market agents to answer swiftly and immediately questions 
regarding the qualities and properties of a product, they can be used as endorsements for 
other brands (Douglas, 2002) and overall they help maximize the common welfare of 
producers and consumers. Each market agent will interpret the signals in different ways 
and therefore assign value to the brands (and reputation) differently. In an analogous way, 
Newburry and Soleimani (2011) have also addressed the signaling properties of certain 
firm level factors that are interpreted differently by individuals when making reputation 
evaluations. A world without the brands we have become so used to and that we so heavily 
rely on to make purchasing decisions would certainly be a chaotic environment with 
immeasurable loss of economic value to firms and society. Furthermore, if no brand names 
were to exist, society would completely lack one of the most important tools of collective 
knowledge and value accumulation. There would be no way for a firm to lead consumers 
back to purchase their products and any incentives for R&D and innovation will disappear. 
With every purchase, individuals will have to invest vast amounts of time searching and 
still after that tedious search, there will be no way for them to accumulate their knowledge, 
their experiences and assess value. The impact on society will be catastrophic.  
 
 
70 
 
iii. TRADEMARKS AS INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
  
Caves (2007, p.3) suggests that firms possess exclusive assets that allow consumers 
to differentiate the firm’s products from those of their competitors. Such assets must be 
private and their use must be exclusive in order for the firm to have revenue productivity. 
These assets signify and represent the willingness of a consumer to pay a premium for the 
company’s products. Trademarks fit the profile of this type of assets, as they allow firms 
to charge a premium for their products and also to differentiate them from the products of 
other competitors in the market through the use of exclusive brands. All things equal within 
an industry, the premium paid for a company’s product is the surplus the company is 
entitled for owning certain assets, such as trademarks. Furthermore, according to Foster 
(2007) unique product experiences with a brand are a source of surplus value that the firm 
extracts by charging the consumer a premium for their products. 
 
Intangible Assets (IA) could be any form of Intellectual Property such as patents, 
copyrights, trademarks, etc., that by their nature lack any physical manifestation (see Table 
1 for USTPO definitions). The worth of IA to the firm and society, arises from their (often) 
exclusive usage, by the continue accumulation of value through the years, and moreover, 
from the protection that they are entitled by local, national and international laws (see Table 
2 for IP protection in the US). Depending on their lifespan, which is determined by the 
maximum amount of time IA owners are granted exclusive use of the asset by the law, they 
are classified as a Limited-life asset like patents and copyrights or an Unlimited-life asset 
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like trademarks. Unlike patents and copyrights that legally protect processes and creation; 
trademarks protect the source of the goods (Greenhut, 1957).  
 
Essential and at the center of our future discussion will be the fact that by virtue of 
law, a trademark owner is guaranteed the exclusive use of the trademark on products or 
services for as long as the registration is still in effect, which essentially represents the 
monopolistic usage of the asset and an effective entry barrier to the industry. Ramello 
(2006) asserts that trademarks receive legal protection from Intellectual Property laws and 
treaties because they are industrial properties that convey information and facilitate 
purchase decision. Wilkins (1992) points out that when there exists a spatial separation 
between buyers and sellers, the need for legal protection of these intangible assets becomes 
imperative. The legal protection is especially needed in economies of scale industries 
where massive production is concentrated in few places and the complex logistics that are 
involved to bring these products to the market imply that there is no direct connection 
between producers and end customers.  The need for legal protection has never been more 
evident than in the context of the modern MNE and the global economy because of the 
physical separation that exists between producers and buyers. In the U.S., the Lanham 
(Trademark) Act of 1946 (and the amendments to it) contains the federal statutes governing 
trademark law. The 1946 Act forbids activities such as trademark infringement, trademark 
dilution and false advertising amongst other things. However, the Lanham Act is not the 
only body of law governing trademark regulations within the U.S., as Common Law and 
State Statutes also control some aspects of trademark protection. 
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Even though trademarks do not need to be registered in order to be entitled to the 
full protection of the law, lack of registration may sometimes jeopardize the value and legal 
protection of a trademark outside a certain geographical area and therefore of the market 
power it could enjoy otherwise. Registration of a trademark can be done at a regional, 
national or international level. The OHIM states that a registered trademark “identifies you 
to your customers, protect you against unfair competition and turn your brand into an 
asset”.9 Specifically in the U.S., the registration of trademarks is governed by the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office which is an agency of the Department of Commerce. 
Technically, the lifetime of a Trademark in the U.S. is unlimited, as each registration 
remains in force for ten years according to the provisions in the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1058(a) but it can be renewed for additional periods of ten years at the end of each 
successive ten-year term following the initial date of registration. These unlimited renewals 
and therefore the permanent protection they receive from the legal system is what make 
trademarks so valuable. 
 
In the U.S., the exclusive usage of a trademark by the asset owner could cease, if 
the registration is cancelled by the Commissioner for Trademarks or a Federal Court under 
certain circumstances such as abandonment, fraud or the brand protected by the trademark 
becomes generic in a process referred as genericide. According to Ramello (2006), 
genericide occurs when the specific information-transmitting effect of a brand lapses in 
favor of a general connotation denoting the entire category of products. In these situations, 
                                                            
9 https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/evolution 
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maintaining the legal protection of a trademark is no longer economically efficient because 
it will increase the communication cost between the producers and consumers in the 
market, offsetting any other benefits to society. Genericide is a hot topic for companies that 
heavily rely on the power and popularity of their brands to promote the sale of certain 
products. These companies actively fight the generic use of their brands in the market in 
order to protect their property rights and avoid the genericide of their brands. Examples of 
brands that ended up “genericided” are aspirin, kerosene and thermos; while Kleenex, 
Band-Aid and Xerox have come very close to become generic descriptions in the market. 
 
Capron and Hulland (1999) assert that firms seek to neutralize disadvantages 
through acquisition, imitation, substitution or major innovation. According to them, 
substitution and innovation occur rarely and imitation is hard to implement (as we have 
previously discussed), which is why many firms turn to acquisition to achieve certain 
competitive market advantage. When it comes to trademarks, the acquisition of these type 
of IA/IP allows the firm to capture assets that otherwise would be too difficult or impossible 
to develop internally. When venturing across borders and overseas, firms sometimes prefer 
to acquire local trademarks in order to assimilate more rapidly the host country’s culture 
and to try to overcome local resistance sometimes associated with FDI.  In the 2005 
acquisition of US Airways by America West, the deal not only allowed America West to 
benefit from expanding its operations nationally and internationally, capture new markets 
and improve cost related efficiencies, but gave them the ownership of a far more valuable 
asset, the US Airways trademarks and thus the brand’s national and worldwide recognition 
and reputation. After the merger the combined airline kept the name US Airways (in recent 
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times US Airways has merged with American Airlines under the American Airlines brand). 
Also recently Facebook agreed to pay $19 billion for WhatsApp, a company with no major 
assets except a powerful brand with millions of active users daily (as of May 2014 
WhatsApp had two active trademarks with USTPO and two others with the OHIM, all four 
dating back just to 2011). 
 
Intangible assets, such as copyrights, patents and trademarks, can generate 
enormous amounts of value, revenue/profits and also market power for the firm. According 
to the OHIM a registered trademark “is a way of representing the investment you make in 
your brand. This value can rise and fall, depending on market forces and the success of 
your company and its products. Your trade mark can be audited; its value is part of your 
company's assets. Trade marks can be licensed, sold or developed as collateral”.10 The 
story behind the economic characteristics of trademarks (value, revenues, profits, market 
power, etc.) is one of the reasons why some scholars have studied the links of trademarks 
with low tax regimes and Tax Havens (Table 03) around the world (Hines 2010, Gellman 
2007). The concentration of intangible assets in these financial centers is because of the 
low or no taxes applied to the income generated by the assets (such as licensing fees and 
royalty payments). Closely related to the concept of intangible assets are IP holding 
corporations. Intellectual Property (IP) holdings are companies incorporated in low tax 
jurisdictions as wholly-owned subsidiaries of a parent company, which owns a substantial 
amount of IP, in an effort to better manage its intellectual property, reduce tax burden on 
                                                            
10 https://oami.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/value 
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licensing revenues and maximize earnings related to its IP assets. In this arrangement, the 
parent company transfers ownership of its intellectual property to its IP Holding subsidiary 
and then the IP holding subsidiary licenses back the right to use the intellectual property to 
the parent company. In many industries, including the Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
(FMCG) industry it is common for companies to own many trademarks and brands and 
some of these companies are true brand powerhouses. Companies such as Nestlé, Unilever, 
Sara Lee, Procter & Gamble, Coca-Cola, General Mills, Pepsi and Mars, etc., each own 
dozens of world renowned brands.  
 
 
 
 
iv. MODEL 
 
Do trademarks have any impact at a macroeconomic level? That is the overall 
question that we aim to address with this research. As we discussed earlier in this paper 
trademarks are the legal representations of brands and as such, these intangible assets are 
intellectual property (IP) that could be defended in a court of law. Unlike patents or 
copyrights though, the strategic and economic value of trademarks is long lasting. The legal 
protection of trademarks could be renewed over and over and therefore all granted rights 
and benefits related to trademarks remain in full force for as long as its registration is 
current and valid. In many cases, trademarks may be worth more than all the tangible assets 
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(and other intangible assets) a firm could own and given their protected status, they could 
provide the firm certain strategic market advantages that arise from the exclusive usage 
and control of this IP. Without trademarks and without being able to differentiate 
themselves, firms would find it nearly impossible to become successful and profitable 
agent in the marketplace as any other competitors could operate or produce “identical” 
goods and services under the same brand (free riders), wiping off any incentives for 
investment, entrepreneurship, invention and innovation. Furthermore, trademarks not only 
enhance and promote markets efficiencies at the firm level but also at the consumer level 
allowing consumers to make purchasing decisions without delay and allowing hem too to 
have a more intimate relationship with the products and services they require and acquire.   
 
Before we start our analysis it is important that we lay out some of the fundamental 
and specific questions that we aim to find answers for with our study. Questions such as: 
do trademarks have any effects on GDP? If any, are the effects the same for all types of 
economies or are there differences across different types of economies? Are some types of 
economies better suited than others to maximize or minimize the positive or negative 
effects of trademark formation (application)?  If there are differences, why do they exist? 
What are the mechanisms that allow trademarks to affect GDP? 
 
For our analysis and the construction of our OLS model we identified a country 
pool of 59 world economies selected at random (Table 04). Although there is no standard 
or universal convention established for the designation of the level of development of a 
country, for our study countries have been categorized following UN/IMF criteria on 
77 
 
economic and social development. So we have that the countries in our study were 
categorized as follows: developed, emerging, less developed and least developed 
economies. To conduct our study and in order to construct our explanatory variables panel, 
we obtained our data from well-known and reputable sources (World Bank and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization - WIPO) using the latest data sets available. Our dataset 
encompasses 11 years, from 2000 to 2010.  
 
Our variable of interest, Trademarks, measures the number of trademarks 
applications per year within a specific country. These trademark applications show the 
intent of economic agents to seek protection for their IP and gives them the incentives 
needed to proceed with their investments and development of business. Also, as part of our 
model we included the following explanatory variables: patent applications, royalty and 
licensing payments for intangible assets and inward foreign direct investment. We also 
controlled for R&D expenditures and net secondary education rate but these latter variables 
were later dropped to allow more observations to enter the model. Please refer to Table 5 
for a proper definition of each variable. We also added other basic controls such as 
population size, governance and as needed, year and country specific fixed effects.  
 
To control by population was very important as we needed to remove the effect of 
population on the level of GDP of a country. Although a priori, it could have been argued 
that there was a relationship between population size and the amount of trademarks 
applications within country our research found out that this is not quite necessarily true and 
that aggregate number of applications for a single country could be deceiving. For example, 
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China has seen in the last decade an explosion of trademarks applications as corroborated 
by the data we obtained and tabulated from WIPO. Furthermore, since 2001 China has 
been by far the number one destination for trademark applications around the word (Table 
6). But if we look at the number of trademark applications per 1,000 individuals, then China 
does not top the list of countries with higher concentration of trademarks per population. 
Countries like Switzerland, Chile, South Korea, Japan, United States and even Peru have a 
higher ratio of trademarks applications per population than China. We should make at this 
point a special mention of a very Sui Generis case that seem to validate Hines (2010) and 
Gellman (2007) theories regarding Tax Havens and IP. Although Monaco is not part of our 
study, during our research we found that the concentration of trademarks per 1,000 
individuals in the Principality was the highest of any other country in the world, according 
to the data we obtained from WIPO (Table 7).  
 
Upon an initial and simple vis-à-vis inspection of our dependent variable and our 
variable of interest, there seemed to exist some sort of correlation between trademarks and 
the GDP (level and growth), as seen in Figures 01 and 02, but of course a simple one-on-
one correlation between two variables does not tell us much about a cause-effect 
relationship nor it is the proper way to address our issue, so we proceeded to test different 
model specifications that would allow us to undertake and validate properly our theories. 
In order to avoid obvious problems of simultaneity, all our explanatory variables in our 
model were lagged one period with respect to our dependent variable, GDP. Also, 
whenever possible our variables were transformed by taking logs. Depending on the 
specification and the analysis to be undertaken, we incorporated dummies for each category 
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of development to control for category-specific effects. In total we had four distinct 
categories as follows: category 4, developed; category 3, emerging; category 2, less 
developed and category 1, least developed economies; for a total of 14 developed countries, 
14 emerging countries, 14 less developed countries and 17 least developed countries for 
each category. Furthermore, in order to address an omitted variable problem, our main 
model was separately controlled by country characteristic effects (Table 10). 
 
In a first step using our entire sample population, we examined the overall net 
impact of trademarks in the world economy (selected countries), controlling amongst other 
things for category specific effects and year effects. We tried different specifications as 
controls and to show the robustness of our model (Table 8). We found that trademarks, at 
all times, had a positive and highly significant effect on GDP. In our final specification, we 
observed that the coefficient for trademarks for all the selected economies together is .190 
and that it is significant at the .99 level, i.e., a one percent change in trademark applications 
could lead to a .190 percent increase in overall GDP. So from our model we might have 
enough evidence to propose that overall the world economy is better off and benefits from 
trademark formation. 
 
But the previous analysis does not tell us anything about the impact of trademarks 
on specific types of economies and how differently or not this IA affect countries 
depending on their overall set of particular characteristics.  For that and in order to 
undertake properly this endeavor we developed a new model that permitted us to look into 
those different set of issues. In our new model it was important for us to develop a 
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specification that would allow for the interaction of all country specific trademark data 
clustered per categories. In a modern globalized economy it is fair to assume that in order 
to appropriately analyze the true impact of trademarks on a specific category of countries 
we should allow for the proper and full interaction of the overall set of the variable of 
interest (trademarks) in the model. After we ran our model we were able to examine the 
impact of trademarks for each individual country category (Table 9) noticing that across 
the board, all trademark coefficients for each individual type of category were positive and 
significant at the .99 level. But more importantly we also found that for each individual 
case the coefficients varied depending on the country category; that is, trademark formation 
(application) had a different effect on GDP depending on country specific characteristics. 
 We found that the more developed a country is, the higher the trademark 
coefficient was and therefore the higher the impact of trademarks on GDP. In summary we 
found that for category 1 or least developed countries we obtained a .122 coefficient for 
trademarks. It was closely followed by category 2 or less developed countries with a 
coefficient of .125. For category 3 or emerging countries the coefficient was .182. And at 
the other end of the spectrum, category 4 or developed countries we got a .289 coefficient 
and as a category it was the group that better took advantage of overall trademark 
formation. Rodrik (2007) proposes a possible explanation for the differences in the 
coefficients (the impact of trademarks on GDP) between the different types of economies 
when he claims that intellectual property rights “are protected assiduously in the United 
States and most advanced societies, but not in many developing countries. On the other 
hand, zoning and environmental legislation restricts the ability of households and 
enterprises in the rich countries to do as they please with their ‘property’ to a much greater 
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extent than is the case in developing countries. All societies recognize that private property 
rights can be curbed if doing so serves a greater public purpose. It is the definition of what 
constitutes ‘greater public purpose’ that varies”.  So it is clear to us that the institutional 
differences between developed and non-developed countries play a major role in how 
efficiently societies are able to harness the economic power of trademarks “creation”. The 
ultimate magnitude of the effect of trademarks creation in an economy will greatly depend 
on the overall country related characteristics. Rodrik also help us understand why least 
developed, less developed and emerging countries fare poorer than developed countries in 
our research when he argues that a “clearly delineated system of property rights; a 
regulatory apparatus curbing the worst forms of fraud, anticompetitive behavior, and moral 
hazard; a moderately cohesive society exhibiting trust and social cooperation; social and 
political institutions that mitigate risk and manage social conflicts; the rule of law and clean 
government—these are social arrangements that economists usually take for granted, but 
which are conspicuous by their absence in poor countries”. 
 
 
 
 
v. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Unarguably, firms trademark their brands because they want to have their 
investments, business and overall IP assets protected and also because they want to reap 
the legal and economic benefits entitled to them by doing it so. Moreover, firms will 
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trademark when the benefits of trademark protection offset all the cost associated with the 
ownership of the trademark itself (application, renewals, defense, etc.). As we discussed 
earlier, without this type of protection there are no incentives for important business related 
activities such as investment and innovation which greatly hinders economic development 
in a country.  
 
Trademarks allow for each unit of investment to be more valuable, productive and 
efficient than they would have otherwise been in the absence of them as trademark 
protection minimizes the risks and maximizes the returns of doing business to the firm. But 
far more importantly and as we also discussed earlier, trademarks “formalize” the creation 
and development of real property that could be invested on; an asset that could appreciate 
over time and could use as a collateral, that could be used to develop and shape an entire 
business segment and that could be used create other trademarks in order to protect an 
develop new business, etc.; so here is where the true potential for trademarks lays.  
 
Depending on country specific characteristics, countries are better or worse at 
harnessing the power of the “creation’ of trademarks. Trademarks help countries develop 
economically as these countries develop also their institutions develop; and as their 
institutions develop they become better suited to maximize the positive externalities that 
arise from the formation of trademarks.  So as we said previously, the ultimate magnitude 
of the effect of trademarks in an economy will greatly depend on the overall country related 
characteristics (which are represented in our model by the four development categories) 
and therefore on how well suited a country is to maximize the benefits of one additional 
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unit of trademarks. In general, we can argue that the more developed a country is, the better 
their overall institutions and the greater the impact each additional unit of trademarks will 
have in the economy. But regardless of the development level of the country, we argue that 
trademarks provide economic agents an incentive to bring new products and services to the 
marketplace and thus promote the creation and development of new markets and generate 
the overall expansion of the economy. Trademarks also prevent existing markets from 
going into disarray and their economic value from disappearing in thin air by ensuring that 
investments and assets are legally protected and furthermore by protecting the economic 
system of the country. By being able to legally defend their trademarks, firms are also able 
to “defend” certain markets and each trademark application by itself is the possibility of a 
new market expansion or development.  
 
Although their effects are smaller, trademarks offer countries that are not 
“developed” the possibility of boosting their GDP to levels that will not be possible without 
trademarks, partially helping them achieve the next level of development.  In recent times 
we have seen upper middle-income and Asian economies experience a rapid increase on 
the amount of trademark formation (Figure 3 and 4) that is unquestionably contributing to 
the development of their economies. Trademarks give economic potential and significance 
to intellectual property so these intangible assets could then be used by market agents to 
generate more value and surplus in the economy. Without trademarks the possibilities of 
harnessing this potential are basically negligible because of the free rider problem. The role 
of trademarks as an engine of economic progress has been greatly overlooked in the 
economics literature. Governments of any type of countries, whether they are developed, 
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emerging, less developed and least developed should encourage the formation of 
trademarks as a way to create and protect value by establishing clear property rights that 
later could be defended in a court of law and that could provide any markets agents the 
potential to use their IP to create new markets and boost economic progress. 
 
We understand that the trademark-economic development story and relationship 
that we propose in our paper might be hard to grasp by most economists as it might 
challenge the conventional economic wisdom. Most economic scholars may have a hard 
time accepting that trademarks could actually have an impact on economic development, 
as they will be more comfortable assuming that the formation of trademarks is exclusively 
a consequence of economic development. But we disagree. It would be easier for these 
scholars to be convinced that the creation of patents actually has an impact on economic 
development. But trademarks are real property that are protected by law and that have a 
true economic value. From an economic perspective, in the same manner a piece of real 
estate without a deed would be basically worthless to market agents (as it will be “no man’s 
land”), a brand without the protection of trademarks will be in the public domain and will 
have negligible economic value. But if we can formalize property rights over real estate 
and generate economic value and development (as suggested by De Soto [2001]), then in 
the same fashion we also can formalize other types of property rights and generate 
economic value and development as well. In our view, adequate formalization of property 
rights, regardless if this happens by means of a patent, a trademark, a real estate deed, etc., 
will have an actual impact on economic development. It is not that countries formalize 
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property rights because they develop; it is that countries develop because (amongst other 
things) they are able to formalize property rights. This idea is more evident if we look at 
recent newcomers to the marketplace, for example FIVE GUYS (Burgers and Fries). Some 
people might argue that there is nothing special about making burgers (and fries) and they 
might be right. Copycats can imitate a “secret” recipe or even “improve” it to make it more 
appealing to certain demographic groups. Copycats can even create a name that is similar 
to FIVE GUYS, maybe SIX GUYS (if they are able to register it at all since it is likely to 
be challenged), but there will not be free access to the brand FIVE GUYS. The legal 
protection conferred to brands by a trademarks, has allowed the FIVE GUYS brand owners 
to use their brand/trademarks to create economic progress in the communities and in the 
countries they operate. In summary, by means of their exclusive rights to the utilization of 
the brand and trademarks (economic assets), they can franchise their brand name and allow 
others to start a business or they can use their trademark as a collateral if needed, generating 
this way economic development not only at the local level but also at the macro aggregate 
level. 
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FIGURE  1 - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP AND TRADEMARKS 
(NATURAL LOGS) 
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FIGURE  2 - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDP AND TRADEMARKS 
(GROWTH RATE) 
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FIGURE  3 - TOTAL TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS - DIRECT AND VIA THE 
MADRID SYSTEM (%) – PER REGION 
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FIGURE  4 - TOTAL TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS - DIRECT AND VIA THE 
MADRID SYSTEM (%) – PER COUNTRY INCOME 
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TABLE 1 – USPTO DEFINITIONS 
  Trademarks Copyrights Patents 
A
C
O
O
R
D
IN
G
 T
O
 T
H
E
 U
SP
TO
 W
H
A
T
 A
R
E
: 
A trademark is a 
word, name, symbol 
or device which is 
used in trade with 
goods to indicate the 
source of the goods 
and to distinguish 
them from the goods 
of others. The terms 
"trademark" and 
"mark" are commonly 
used to refer to both 
trademarks and 
servicemarks. 
Trademark rights may 
be used to prevent 
others from using a 
confusingly similar 
mark, but not to 
prevent others from 
making the same 
goods or from selling 
the same goods or 
services under a 
clearly different mark. 
Trademarks which are 
used in interstate or 
foreign commerce 
may be registered with 
the Patent and 
Trademark Office.  
Copyright is a form of 
protection provided to the 
authors of "original 
works of authorship" 
including literary, 
dramatic, musical, 
artistic, and certain other 
intellectual works, both 
published and 
unpublished. The law 
generally gives the owner 
of copyright the 
exclusive right to 
reproduce the 
copyrighted work, to 
prepare derivative works, 
to distribute copies or 
phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work, to 
perform the copyrighted 
work publicly, or to 
display the copyrighted 
work publicly. 
The copyright protects 
the form of expression 
rather than the subject 
matter of the writing. . 
Copyrights are registered 
by the Copyright Office 
of the Library of 
Congress.  
A patent for an 
invention is the grant 
of a property right to 
the inventor, issued 
by the Patent and 
Trademark Office. 
US patent grants are 
effective only within 
the US, US 
territories, and US 
possessions. 
In the US, the right 
conferred by the 
patent grant is, in the 
language of the 
statute and of the 
grant itself, "the right 
to exclude others 
from making, using, 
offering for sale, or 
selling" the invention 
in the United States 
or "importing" the 
invention into the 
United States. What 
is granted is not the 
right to make, use, 
offer for sale, sell or 
import, but the right 
to exclude others 
from making, using, 
offering for sale, 
selling or importing 
the invention.  
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TABLE 2 – IP PROTECTION IN THE US 
  Trademarks Copyrights Patents 
Current Law 1946* 1976 1952 
Amended Yes Yes Yes 
Constitutional 
Base 
Commerce Clause 
Article I, Section 
8, Clause 3 
Patent and Copyright 
Clause               
Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 
Patent and 
Copyright Clause     
Article I, Section 8,   
Clause 8 
       
What does the 
US 
Constitution 
say? 
The Congress shall 
have Power … To 
regulate 
Commerce with 
foreign Nations, 
and among the 
several States, and 
with the Indian 
Tribes 
The Congress shall 
have Power… To 
promote the Progress 
of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to 
their respective 
Writings and 
Discoveries 
The Congress shall 
have Power… To 
promote the 
Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited 
Times to Authors 
and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to 
their respective 
Writings and 
Discoveries 
US CODE 
Title 15, 
CHAPTER 22 - 
(§§ 1051—1141n) 
Title 17 Title 35 
Length of 
Protection 10 years 
For the life of the 
author plus an 
additional 70 years 
(after January 1, 
1978)** 
Utility and Plant 
patents 20 years/ 
Design patents 14 
years (on or after 
June 8, 1995)***, 
**** 
Renewal 
Period 
Yes (10 years, 
unlimited) No No 
* A first attempt by Congress to regulate trademarks was The Federal Trade-Mark Act of 1870 but this Act failed when 
it was struck down by the United States Supreme Court in 1879 because of the fact that the Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution gave Congress no power to protect or regulate trademarks. In the court's opinion a trademark was neither an 
invention, a discovery, nor a writing within the meaning of the eighth clause of the eighth section of the first article of 
the Constitution, which confers on Congress power to secure for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries. Furthermore the Court hinted that if an act of Congress could in any 
case regulate trademarks, it must be limited to their use in "commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, 
and with the Indian tribes." Congress responded by enacting the Trademark Act of 1881. 
**For an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years 
from the year of its first publication or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. For 
works first published prior to 1978, the term will vary depending on several factors.   
***For Utility and Plant patents protection starts when the patent is granted but the 20 years period start the date the 
patent was filed. For the 14 year protection period starts the date the patent is granted. 
**** Patents in force on June 8 and patents issued thereafter on applications filed prior to June 8, 1995 automatically 
have a term that is the greater of the twenty year term discussed above or seventeen years from the patent grant. 
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TABLE 3 – TAX HAVENS11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 Hines, James H. (2010): “Treasure Island.” 
Andorra Grenada Monaco
Anguilla Guernsey Montserrat
Antigua and Barbuda Hong Kong Nauru
Aruba Ireland Netherlands Antilles
Bahamas Isle of Man Niue
Bahrain Jersey Panama
Barbados Jordan Samoa
Belize Lebanon San Marino
Bermuda Liberia Seychelles
British Virgin Islands Liechtenstein Singapore
Cayman Islands Luxembourg St. Kitts and Nevis
Cook Island Macao St. Lucia
Costa Rica Maldives St. Martin
Cyprus Malta St. Vin. and the Gran.
Djibouti Marshall Islands Switzerland
Dominica Mauritius Tonga
Gibraltar Micronesia Turks and Caicos Is.
Vanuatu
TAX HAVENS
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TABLE 4 - LIST OF COUNTRIES 
Classification Country   Classification Country 
Developed Canada   
Less 
Developed Bulgaria 
  Denmark     Colombia 
  Finland     Egypt 
  France     Indonesia 
  Germany     Kenya 
  Ireland     Malaysia 
  Italy     Pakistan 
  Japan     Peru 
  Netherlands     Philippines 
  Spain     Romania 
  Sweden     Tunisia 
  Switzerland     Ukraine 
  United Kingdom     Uruguay 
  United States     Vietnam 
Emerging Argentina   
Least 
Developed Afghanistan 
  Brazil     Bangladesh 
  Chile     Cambodia 
  China     
Central African 
Republic 
  Hungary     Congo, Dem. Rep. 
  India     Congo, Rep. 
  Mexico     Eritrea 
  Poland     Ethiopia 
  Republic of Korea     Haiti 
  Russian Federation     Laos 
  South Africa     Lesotho 
  Taiwan     Liberia 
  Thailand     Myanmar 
  Turkey     Nepal 
        Sudan 
        Uganda 
        Yemen 
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TABLE 5 – DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable  Description 
GDP 
(Gross Domestic 
Product) 
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added 
by all resident producers in the economy plus any product 
taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. 
dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using single year official exchange 
rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate 
does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign 
exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is 
used. 
  
Independent Variables Description 
Royalties and Licensing 
Payments 
Royalty and license fees are payments and receipts between 
residents and nonresidents for the authorized use of 
intangible, nonproduced, nonfinancial assets and 
proprietary rights (such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
industrial processes, and franchises) and for the use, 
through licensing agreements, of produced originals of 
prototypes (such as films and manuscripts). Data are in 
current U.S. dollars. 
Inward FDI 
Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment 
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or 
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an 
economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of 
equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of 
payments. This series shows net inflows (new investment 
inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy from 
foreign investors. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
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TABLE 5 (Cont’d) – DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
Independent Variables Description 
R&D 
Expenditures for R&D (Research and Development) are 
current and capital expenditures (both public and private) 
on creative work undertaken systematically to increase 
knowledge, including knowledge of humanity, culture, and 
society, and the use of knowledge for new applications. 
R&D covers basic research, applied research, and 
experimental development. 
Education 
Net enrolment rate. Secondary. All programmes. Total is 
the ratio of children of the official secondary school age 
who are enrolled in secondary school to the population of 
the official secondary school age. 
Trademarks Trademark Applications 
Patents Patent Applications 
Population 
Population, total refers to the total population. Several 
sources: (1) United Nations Population Division. World 
Population Prospects, (2) United Nations Statistical 
Division. Population and Vital Statistics Reprot (various 
years), (3) Census reports and other statistical publications 
from national statistical offices, (4) Eurostat: Demographic 
Statistics, (5) Secretariat of the Pacific Community: 
Statistics and Demography Programme, and (6) U.S. 
Census Bureau: International Database. 
Governance 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e. ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. 
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TABLE 6 - TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS BY SELECTED IP OFFICE 
 
 
 
Office 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
China 212,602 259,924 364,948 446,654 581,805 659,148 741,942 681,358 669,088 808,546 1,057,480
United States 292,464 216,308 212,637 220,965 248,406 264,510 277,579 304,129 294,070 266,845 281,867
Korea 110,073 107,137 107,876 110,611 113,320 123,064 130,738 141,289 137,461 134,211 129,486
Brazil 108,231 101,617 94,312 95,580 94,039 99,310 95,724 104,125 121,712 112,661 125,654
Japan 145,834 123,788 117,472 123,393 128,851 136,050 135,865 143,236 119,448 110,622 124,726
Mexico 59,721 61,488 56,237 53,724 58,553 63,899 69,781 83,216 84,287 81,937 94,457
France 111,792 74,837 70,809 69,410 73,654 75,564 77,166 80,034 79,206 84,213 93,187
Germany 97,337 77,880 66,644 70,446 74,197 80,091 80,481 83,352 80,865 74,676 74,339
Argentina 61,847 40,583 42,812 81,216 76,431 78,172 79,139 58,389 62,074 59,403 69,565
Russian Federation 42,814 53,096 43,494 35,091 40,611 47,222 52,867 57,346 57,165 49,189 56,856
Indonesia 38,648 30,004 36,340 49,311 40,816 52,649 43,259 47,606 42,777 47,794
Spain 98,751 89,200 78,931 63,029 62,706 64,699 65,884 64,136 55,586 46,711 47,120
Canada 46,252 39,092 36,732 38,712 39,888 41,832 45,031 47,758 45,619 40,956 45,220
Chile 34,388 30,381 29,122 29,034 29,744 33,757 31,577 32,081 33,026 39,935 45,104
Thailand 27,055 26,119 30,109 33,049 36,968 36,423 33,947 33,555 35,422 36,087 37,656
United Kingdom 42,531 37,454 35,994 34,451 35,564 36,998 39,111 40,484 35,705 34,253 36,484
Vietnam 8,192 8,767 10,747 14,203 17,175 20,663 26,140 31,497 32,684 32,864 32,289
South Africa 25,678 21,901 20,367 22,768 23,826 27,835 31,795 35,001 29,907 26,494 30,549
Ukraine 11,316 14,174 16,607 20,048 20,330 24,653 29,885 33,512 33,019 26,434 28,915
Switzerland 28,147 24,806 22,188 22,009 23,642 27,088 28,589 30,939 31,514 28,945 27,972
Malaysia 18,803 16,603 16,446 17,766 20,743 22,147 24,049 25,894 26,034 24,070 26,370
Colombia 16,610 14,904 15,296 16,365 16,930 19,937 21,670 23,994 23,464 21,099 25,990
Peru 15,955 13,903 14,085 13,888 14,976 18,821 19,596 21,645 24,825 20,945 23,120
Poland 28,207 25,792 23,962 24,611 22,536 21,654 21,462 20,614 20,609 17,877 18,251
Philippines 10,623 9,661 11,021 11,816 12,142 12,728 14,492 15,078 15,847 14,912 16,838
Sweden 16,669 15,161 14,325 13,326 13,800 14,812 14,269 15,030 14,998 12,706 12,662
Romania 11,335 12,621 12,511 14,008 17,622 20,991 22,596 17,531 15,578 12,977 12,063
Bangladesh 5,519 4,744 4,840 5,395 5,807 4,624 6,451 8,232 9,306 10,231
Turkey 29,532 28,917 36,245 38,577 47,195 60,697 67,300 72,034 74,685 71,466 8,241
Bulgaria 9,218 9,402 9,619 11,610 12,473 14,618 16,087 12,539 10,853 7,904 7,140
Hungary 15,854 15,428 13,862 13,701 11,637 10,102 9,285 8,785 7,903 6,671 6,298
Denmark 12,433 11,984 10,662 10,040 10,057 10,600 9,226 8,583 8,019 6,075 5,788
Uruguay 15,698 14,904 12,272 11,035 12,908 12,764 12,216 12,795 11,501 9,603 5,730
Finland 10,475 10,244 8,934 7,989 7,801 7,736 7,533 7,400 7,328 5,564 5,504
Monaco 5,361 5,069 4,056 3,676 3,521 4,412 4,649 4,413 4,474 3,324 4,956
Italy 59,662 56,406 54,681 54,161 56,846 59,297 58,688 61,715 60,344 40,702 4,387
Kenya 1,548 2,803 2,706 2,528 2,609 3,197 3,486 3,746 3,854 3,883 4,321
Yemen 1,943 1,757 1,934 2,088 2,381 2,590 3,604 4,375 4,518 3,730 4,165
Egypt 3,159 3,216 2,496 2,404 2,505 2,947 3,208 3,146 3,340 2,828 3,955
Ireland 4,781 3,956 5,744 6,184 6,367 6,326 6,033 5,918 5,183 4,091 3,769
Sudan 2,485 1,868 4,150 2,469 2,733 3,389 4,318 4,369 1,075 743 1,026
Liberia 1,227 1,018 760 665 716 766 740 724 781 489 612
Lesotho 1,083 990 774 668 771 981 900 931 910 634 566
India 84,275 90,236 94,120 92,251 78,996 85,669 103,419 123,514 130,172 141,943
Pakistan 8,320 7,244 6,902 8,471 13,592 12,554 14,040 13,985 14,872 15,734
Cambodia 1,939 1,519 1,650 1,854 2,077 2,376 2,565 2,866
Nepal 1,175 1,361 1,651 1,516 1,174 1,004 723 1,132
Ethiopia 659 588 753 520 510 574 546 719
Laos 701 577 681 1,024
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TABLE 7 - NUMBERS OF TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS PER THOUSAND PEOPLE IN 
SELECTED ECONOMIES 
 
 
 
Office 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Monaco 152.622 143.6466 114.7676 104.0682 99.79593 125.1276 131.823 125.0319 126.6131 93.95935 139.9723
Switzerland 3.917876 3.431051 3.045814 2.99891 3.19935 3.642273 3.82005 4.097275 4.12073 3.737814 3.57417
Chile 2.230117 1.946976 1.845034 1.819197 1.843765 2.070762 1.917397 1.928727 1.966349 2.35525 2.635551
Korea 2.34158 2.262327 2.265256 2.311185 2.358917 2.556483 2.702762 2.907301 2.808249 2.728864 2.620644
Argentina 1.674677 1.087954 1.136883 2.137193 1.993465 2.020931 2.027965 1.483156 1.563014 1.482759 1.721379
Uruguay 4.755748 4.504956 3.709204 3.340357 3.909463 3.861183 3.685662 3.849387 3.449556 2.870905 1.707093
France 1.835336 1.219726 1.14572 1.115159 1.17467 1.196088 1.212967 1.250296 1.23047 1.301185 1.431981
Sweden 1.878809 1.704257 1.60505 1.487571 1.534436 1.640388 1.571388 1.642966 1.626745 1.366455 1.350163
Canada 1.503167 1.257709 1.171226 1.222124 1.246695 1.294627 1.382334 1.4503 1.369155 1.214242 1.325082
Denmark 2.328445 2.236329 1.983284 1.86251 1.860849 1.955925 1.696807 1.571564 1.459693 1.099927 1.043318
Finland 2.023682 1.974554 1.717879 1.532511 1.492109 1.47462 1.430425 1.399204 1.379155 1.042168 1.026224
Spain 2.452636 2.190544 1.910516 1.500529 1.46881 1.490824 1.493411 1.429089 1.220176 1.017478 1.02277
Japan 1.149476 0.973566 0.921747 0.966136 1.008532 1.064779 1.063473 1.121039 0.93535 0.867229 0.978623
Bulgaria 1.12825 1.172278 1.222474 1.48398 1.602974 1.888655 2.089487 1.636996 1.423644 1.042039 0.947667
Malaysia 0.803035 0.692813 0.670846 0.708933 0.810576 0.848536 0.904564 0.957224 0.946622 0.861199 0.928488
United States 1.036509 0.759058 0.739285 0.761665 0.848366 0.895077 0.930287 1.00962 0.967037 0.869849 0.91116
Germany 1.183983 0.94572 0.807919 0.853537 0.89918 0.97116 0.97699 1.013196 0.984836 0.911769 0.909046
Ireland 1.256447 1.023216 1.460854 1.547346 1.564273 1.520705 1.416084 1.358296 1.171119 0.917482 0.842356
Mexico 0.597451 0.606812 0.547937 0.517061 0.556715 0.600082 0.647107 0.761906 0.761902 0.731362 0.832785
Peru 0.616931 0.530077 0.529925 0.515969 0.549739 0.682941 0.703213 0.768478 0.872175 0.728138 0.795144
China 0.168378 0.204367 0.285027 0.346673 0.448898 0.50559 0.565927 0.517009 0.505104 0.607299 0.790447
Brazil 0.6205 0.574506 0.526033 0.526226 0.511433 0.533962 0.509283 0.548609 0.635428 0.582991 0.644556
Ukraine 0.230113 0.291144 0.344526 0.419301 0.428437 0.523361 0.638736 0.720543 0.713798 0.573987 0.630359
Hungary 1.552644 1.514394 1.364557 1.352577 1.151364 1.001481 0.92192 0.873627 0.787293 0.665592 0.629799
South Africa 0.583591 0.487667 0.447299 0.493706 0.510578 0.589744 0.66613 0.7253 0.612936 0.537184 0.611086
United Kingdom 0.72218 0.633654 0.606717 0.578364 0.594042 0.614337 0.645443 0.663817 0.581576 0.554157 0.586264
Romania 0.505058 0.570261 0.573817 0.644283 0.81264 0.970262 1.046709 0.813622 0.724099 0.604132 0.562692
Colombia 0.417713 0.368705 0.372364 0.392146 0.399427 0.463214 0.49592 0.540986 0.521355 0.46215 0.561402
Thailand 0.42839 0.408755 0.465774 0.505566 0.559609 0.546084 0.50459 0.494937 0.518867 0.525237 0.544774
Poland 0.73353 0.674335 0.626779 0.64419 0.590222 0.567372 0.562698 0.540758 0.540553 0.468578 0.477979
Russian Federation 0.292639 0.363797 0.29934 0.242677 0.282316 0.329878 0.370996 0.403561 0.402712 0.346621 0.40062
Vietnam 0.105525 0.11151 0.135117 0.176504 0.210897 0.250784 0.313757 0.37398 0.383965 0.382028 0.371447
Lesotho 0.55146 0.497742 0.385025 0.32923 0.376648 0.474888 0.431539 0.442043 0.42775 0.294993 0.260671
Indonesia 0.178758 0.136988 0.163812 0.219544 0.179566 0.22899 0.186091 0.202621 0.180179 0.199249
Philippines 0.137408 0.122346 0.136685 0.143583 0.144657 0.148785 0.166352 0.17008 0.17574 0.162612 0.180547
Yemen 0.10963 0.09619 0.102699 0.10752 0.118895 0.125432 0.169297 0.199344 0.199677 0.159892 0.173163
Liberia 0.430936 0.346341 0.253665 0.218936 0.231511 0.240688 0.223314 0.208214 0.213478 0.127479 0.153225
Turkey 0.464136 0.448014 0.553814 0.581509 0.701931 0.890727 0.974465 1.029164 1.053033 0.994708 0.113275
Kenya 0.04953 0.087386 0.08218 0.074781 0.075183 0.089767 0.0954 0.099933 0.10022 0.098398 0.106658
Italy 1.047766 0.989975 0.956674 0.940219 0.97715 1.011773 0.995699 1.039405 1.008554 0.676195 0.072532
Bangladesh 0.042587 0.035954 0.036048 0.03952 0.041887 0.03289 0.045317 0.057184 0.063293 0.068807
Egypt 0.046697 0.046684 0.035568 0.033623 0.034388 0.039715 0.042452 0.040888 0.042644 0.035476 0.048754
Sudan 0.090179 0.066293 0.144066 0.083851 0.090792 0.110113 0.137515 0.13681 0.03314 0.022535 0.030532
Cambodia 0.155781 0.120044 0.128452 0.142351 0.157421 0.177877 0.189777 0.209658
Ethiopia 0.010049 0.008737 0.010907 0.007346 0.007032 0.007729 0.007185 0.009251
India 0.079965 0.084225 0.086452 0.083418 0.070344 0.075145 0.089383 0.10521 0.109309 0.117528
Laos 0.13184 0.106676 0.123893 0.183446
Nepal 0.048155 0.054483 0.064587 0.057988 0.043941 0.036801 0.025976 0.039896
Pakistan 0.057569 0.049093 0.045889 0.055315 0.087206 0.079132 0.086928 0.085043 0.088819 0.092285
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TABLE 8 – OLS OVERALL ECONOMIES 
 
 
mco_1_1 mco_1_2 mco_1_3 mco_1_4 mco_1_5 mco_1_6 mco_1_7 mco_1_9 mco_1_10 mco_1_8
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
ln_trademarks_1 1.170*** 0.209*** 0.303*** 0.284*** 0.187*** 0.313*** 0.230*** 0.184*** 0.190***
(0.028) (0.050) (0.071) (0.058) (0.045) (0.046) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030)
ln_roypayments_1 0.142*** 0.139*** 0.073** 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.149*** 0.010 0.047**
(0.028) (0.039) (0.032) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
ln_patents_1 0.257*** -0.094** 0.035 0.125*** 0.042 0.126*** 0.215*** 0.267*** 0.190***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.025) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022)
ln_fdi_1 0.283*** 0.214*** 0.172*** 0.181*** 0.140*** 0.155*** 0.137*** 0.168*** 0.139***
(0.029) (0.036) (0.029) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
rd_1 0.193*** 0.099** 0.065
(0.053) (0.044) (0.045)
education_1 0.010** -0.000 0.005*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
ln_pobla_1 0.758*** 0.554*** 0.365*** 0.539*** 0.335*** 0.352*** 0.401*** 0.361***
(0.072) (0.063) (0.036) (0.052) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
govern_1 0.459*** 0.040 -0.099 0.101 -0.063 0.001 0.022 -0.004
(0.080) (0.078) (0.068) (0.062) (0.054) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
CAT2 -1.418*** -0.239 -0.054 -0.261** -0.047 0.216** -0.006
(0.150) (0.278) (0.138) (0.123) (0.087) (0.100) (0.106)
CAT3 -0.810*** 0.106 0.352** -0.028 0.476*** 0.697*** 0.374***
(0.102) (0.307) (0.167) (0.151) (0.109) (0.126) (0.133)
CAT4 (dropped) 1.191*** 1.191*** 1.029*** 1.637*** 1.762*** 1.495***
(0.340) (0.195) (0.188) (0.142) (0.162) (0.165)
2000 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
2001 -0.894*** (dropped) -0.829***
(0.078) (0.081)
2002 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
2003 -0.651*** 0.229*** -0.614***
(0.078) (0.073) (0.081)
2004 -0.517*** 0.378*** -0.472***
(0.079) (0.074) (0.080)
2005 -0.437*** 0.458*** -0.407***
(0.079) (0.074) (0.079)
2006 -0.410*** 0.475*** -0.380***
(0.077) (0.074) (0.078)
2007 -0.310*** 0.571*** -0.289***
(0.077) (0.076) (0.078)
2008 -0.264*** 0.585*** -0.261***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.078)
2009 -0.347*** 0.533*** -0.340***
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079)
2010 -0.097 0.778*** -0.088
(0.077) (0.078) (0.077)
2011 (dropped) 0.894*** (dropped)
(0.083)
2012 (dropped) (dropped) (dropped)
_cons 14.471*** 12.900*** 1.963** 8.908*** 10.378*** 7.449*** 10.450*** 13.239*** 11.837*** 12.277***
(0.273) (0.481) (0.848) (1.003) (0.692) (0.757) (0.507) (0.433) (0.452) (0.460)
Number of observations 520 390 161 161 248 223 344 388 364 344
Adjusted R2 0.775 0.864 0.939 0.962 0.941 0.962 0.951 0.960 0.964 0.965
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
MCO con rezagos
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TABLE 9 – OLS PER CATEGORY 
 
mco_1_1 mco_1_2 mco_1_3 mco_1_5 mco_1_6 mco_1_7 mco_1_8 mco_1_9
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
trad_cat1 0.802*** 0.498*** (dropped) 0.134** 0.271*** 0.219*** 0.147*** 0.122***
(0.047) (0.049) (0.067) (0.054) (0.040) (0.034) (0.033)
trad_cat2 0.874*** 0.361*** 0.206*** 0.132*** 0.260*** 0.191*** 0.148*** 0.125***
(0.036) (0.044) (0.061) (0.045) (0.047) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031)
trad_cat3 0.912*** 0.367*** 0.271*** 0.174*** 0.301*** 0.219*** 0.189*** 0.182***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.058) (0.042) (0.046) (0.034) (0.028) (0.029)
trad_cat4 1.035*** 0.433*** 0.344*** 0.277*** 0.376*** 0.318*** 0.292*** 0.289***
(0.032) (0.045) (0.060) (0.043) (0.047) (0.036) (0.030) (0.031)
ln_roypayments_1 0.159*** 0.094*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.160*** 0.067***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
ln_patents_1 0.196*** 0.021 0.102*** 0.036 0.115*** 0.176*** 0.211***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)
ln_fdi_1 0.188*** 0.169*** 0.175*** 0.143*** 0.155*** 0.140*** 0.141***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016)
rd_1 0.120*** 0.092**
(0.044) (0.043)
education_1 -0.001 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
ln_pobla_1 0.527*** 0.354*** 0.506*** 0.319*** 0.338*** 0.330***
(0.065) (0.035) (0.054) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024)
govern_1 0.029 -0.135** 0.106* -0.077 -0.016 0.007
(0.080) (0.066) (0.063) (0.052) (0.044) (0.045)
2001 -0.815*** -0.911***
(0.079) (0.076)
2002 (dropped) (dropped)
2003 -0.599*** -0.659***
(0.078) (0.076)
2004 -0.459*** -0.525***
(0.078) (0.077)
2005 -0.401*** -0.449***
(0.076) (0.077)
2006 -0.374*** -0.421***
(0.076) (0.076)
2007 -0.283*** -0.317***
(0.076) (0.076)
2008 -0.259*** -0.273***
(0.076) (0.075)
2009 -0.345*** -0.357***
(0.077) (0.077)
2010 -0.082 -0.092
(0.074) (0.076)
2011 (dropped) (dropped)
2012 (dropped) (dropped)
_cons 16.880*** 13.382*** 8.549*** 10.935*** 8.112*** 10.702*** 12.776*** 14.085***
(0.337) (0.534) (0.999) (0.689) (0.795) (0.521) (0.477) (0.437)
Number of observations 520 390 161 248 223 344 344 388
Adjusted R2 0.871 0.912 0.961 0.944 0.961 0.953 0.967 0.961
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Lagged OLS w/ Dummies
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TABLE 10 – CONTROL OMITTED VARIABLES
 
 
 
 
mco_1_1 mco_1_2 mco_1_3 mco_1_5 mco_1_6 mco_1_7 mco_1_8 mco_1_9
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
trad_cat1 0.046 -0.011 0.394 -0.017 -0.257 -0.073 0.178*
(0.120) (0.207) (1.211) (0.223) (0.188) (0.143) (0.108)
trad_cat2 1.011*** 0.425*** 0.880*** 0.466*** 0.611*** 0.240** 0.218*** 0.164***
(0.110) (0.096) (0.142) (0.125) (0.111) (0.095) (0.072) (0.062)
trad_cat3 0.898*** 0.319*** 0.215 0.125 0.168 0.203** 0.140* 0.149**
(0.125) (0.095) (0.152) (0.110) (0.136) (0.094) (0.072) (0.071)
trad_cat4 -0.465** -0.518*** -0.297* -0.419** -0.289* -0.263* -0.023 -0.022
(0.203) (0.160) (0.175) (0.174) (0.149) (0.154) (0.120) (0.108)
ln_roypayments_1 0.402*** 0.226*** 0.312*** 0.249*** 0.319*** 0.116***
(0.024) (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024)
ln_patents_1 0.027 -0.147*** -0.017 -0.134*** -0.037 0.047* 0.045
(0.037) (0.054) (0.046) (0.041) (0.035) (0.028) (0.027)
ln_fdi_1 0.114*** 0.075*** 0.099*** 0.077*** 0.087*** 0.066*** 0.073***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
rd_1 0.143 -0.039
(0.126) (0.111)
education_1 0.009 0.007
(0.008) (0.005)
ln_pobla_1 1.870** 2.787*** 2.590*** 3.594*** 0.062 -0.311
(0.953) (0.528) (0.539) (0.362) (0.370) (0.344)
govern_1 -0.079 -0.000 -0.005 0.038 0.181*** 0.233***
(0.110) (0.096) (0.092) (0.083) (0.065) (0.063)
a2001 (dropped) -0.344***
(0.035)
a2002 (dropped) (dropped)
a2003 0.174*** -0.148***
(0.035) (0.032)
a2004 0.295***
(0.037)
a2005 0.348*** 0.083**
(0.040) (0.033)
a2006 0.437*** 0.183***
(0.042) (0.035)
a2007 0.564*** 0.321***
(0.046) (0.036)
a2008 0.636*** 0.413***
(0.050) (0.038)
a2009 0.540*** 0.340***
(0.055) (0.039)
a2010 0.728*** 0.529***
(0.056) (0.038)
a2011 0.826*** 0.639***
(0.061) (0.042)
a2012 (dropped) (dropped)
21.881*** 14.658*** -13.297 -31.226*** -26.461*** -46.000*** 19.631*** 28.585***
(0.767) (0.718) (15.928) (9.108) (9.048) (6.194) (6.593) (5.965)
Number of observations 520 390 161 248 223 344 344 388
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.982 0.989 0.986 0.989 0.987 0.993 0.992
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER III 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF MNE TRADEMARK PATTERNS  
(OHIM 1996 – 2011) 
 
i. INTRODUCTION 
 
Previously in our study (Chapter II) we addressed the idea that societies actively 
encourage the protection of property rights as a mean to achieve and further economic 
development within their border. This protection of property, whether this property is 
tangible or intangible, is a key mechanism that allow societies to create and maximize the 
value of economic assets overall.  At that point in our research and based on the results of 
our study, we proposed that this protection not only has a fundamental and positive 
economic effect within the borders of a country but, that there also exist an overall 
aggregate spillover effect on the world economy as a whole, as the positive externalities of 
asset and value creation transcend geographical borders in a world that is highly 
interconnected and that is, in many ways, one global market.  
 
The ultimate motivation behind our previous paper was to better understand the far 
reaching effects (if there were any at all) that trademarks have on a general macro-
economic setting but, there is a lot more to be said about trademarks particularly at their 
most elemental form, at their individual level. At this level, one of the most important 
characteristics of trademarks is that (without any loss of generality) they are vital and 
exclusive intangible economic assets of the firm. Specifically in this paper we will look 
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closer and in detail at the symbiotic relationship that exist between brands and trademarks 
and at the indisputable legal protection conferred to the former by the latter. As it has been 
argued before, it is because of this protection (and the protection strategies followed by the 
firm), that many brands acquire significant market value, value that might be far superior 
to the combined value of all other assets (tangible or intangible) owned by the firm. In the 
past we presented the reader with the idea that trademarks are the legal protected entities 
while brands are the commercial representation of such legal entities, but in this paper we 
will go way beyond that idea and will reveal to the reader a far more complex relationship 
between brands and trademarks that is neither evident nor trivial. 
 
As we have mentioned before, although there is extensive literature in several areas 
of academic study (such as marketing, international business, finance, accounting, legal, 
etc.) regarding the nature, applications and effects of trademarks and brands on firms and 
societies there are no studies known to this researcher, that look deep into the way firms 
(especially MNE) address their trademark needs from an economic perspective nor does 
there exist a study that answers (with cold hard evidence) a very simple, general but 
fundamental question: are the protection characteristics and the “creation” of these 
economic assets the same across all different economic sectors or geographical and 
political borders? This profound but yet unpretentious question has many levels of 
complexity that could only be answered if we do an in-depth and detailed analysis of 
trademark protection and creation across different industries and across different types of 
borders.  
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The challenge we faced when we started this study was, how to address and tackle 
properly the problem in front of us given the limitations of trademark (and brand) data 
readily available. And moreover, which trademarks were to be used for our research, as it 
was clear that a study of all trademark applications in a specific IP database (such as the 
USTPO, OHIM, etc.) would have not been possible or relevant for this research. As we 
will explain in detail later, our first task was to find an independent way to narrow down 
the number of trademarks in order to obtain a group that would be meaningful and relevant 
to our study. One thing was clear to us from the very start, for our paper and in order to 
study and validate the existence of any differences whatsoever in trademarking patterns 
across different economic sectors or geographical and political borders we needed to study 
brands that had a wide appeal and transcended (political) national and (geographical) 
regional borders, brands that were likely to actively use trademarking strategies to protect 
their value, defend their survival and improve their chances at market success.  
 
As we will also explain later, a research agenda, such as the one we propose in this 
paper, would have been nearly impossible a few years back as the databases (and probably 
relevant data and “critical mass”) needed to get the level of detail on each trademark would 
have not been available (as in the case of the OHIM) or maybe “available” but in a not very 
user friendly or useful way at all (as in the case of the USTPO).   
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ii. BRAND, TRADEMARKS AND THE MNE 
 
Trademarks are economic intangible assets that store value and from which 
economic benefits can be derived by the trademark owner. The economic benefit is related 
to the use of the IP and the activities related to the brand protected by the trademark. 
Companies will seek trademark protection for their brands and then actively protect their 
trademarks (and thus their brands) against any perceived or possible infringement as long 
as the expected economic value of doing it exceeds all the cost associated with researching, 
filing, maintaining and defending the trademark. Apart from being assets over which 
ownership rights could be enforced, trademarks are intellectual property which must be 
private and their use “exclusive” in order to have revenue productivity for the MNE 
(economic benefit). A brand, backed up by an adequate system of trademarks, has the tools 
needed to become not only valuable but powerful, and as we have discussed before this 
could allow the trademark owner to exert certain control over a market. The key concept 
at this point which we want to emphasize is: system of trademarks; this concept will be 
crucial in our research, but we will elaborate on this later on. 
 
Aside the obvious trademark/brand relationship commonly known to researchers, 
most scholars might be unaware of the true complexity of trademark protection and the 
overall strategies MNE follow not only to protect their assets but more importantly, to 
create and increase the value of these assets. Without adequate trademark protection 
creation of value is impossible. This creation of value is a key economic aspect of 
trademarks. Scholars have known and understood well the protection capabilities of 
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trademarks but have neglected or have not been able to fully comprehend the role a 
complete system of trademarks plays at creating and increasing the value of the brand (and 
all related trademarks). As we will discuss in this chapter, in order to increase the value of 
their “brands”, MNE create (not so evidently) extensions of those same brands and seek 
further protection, creating a complex relation amongst brands, trademarks, corporate 
structure, etc. The purpose of this research is to study in detail the intricacies of trademarks 
as economic assets of the firm; of special interest will be the protection mechanisms and 
characteristics of this protection across several multidimensional aspects (corporate 
structure, industrial sectors, geographical and political borders, etc.) in order to improve 
our knowledge and understanding of the matters related to MNE ownership of trademarks 
and fill the void that might exist in the literature. 
 
So given the true global reach of the modern MNE and the complex structures of 
these organizations, we want to go beyond the original question posed earlier and find 
proper answers to questions such as: 
• Aside general definitions, what other relations do we find between brands 
and trademarks that could be supported by the empirical evidence? 
• How do MNE address their needs for trademark protection? 
• How do MNE corporate structure characteristics influence trademark 
protection? 
• Are there any differences in trademark protection across different regions 
of the world, across different countries and/or across different economic 
activities?  
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• When related to the MNE, are all trademarks the same? If any, what kinds 
of differences or patterns exist? And why do these differences and patterns 
exist?  
• Based on the data available to us, which regions, countries or economic 
activities seem to be more trademark intensive?  
• Is the number of trademarks by firm related to the value of a brand?  
• What can trademark protection and the MNE tell us about pre-conceived 
ideas regarding brands characteristics?  
• What are the most sought after “classes” and what type of protection 
patterns do we see? 
 
To talk about trademark protection is in fact a matter of not only addressing the 
allocation of property rights but also of addressing the issue of overall incomplete 
contracts. In that regard, in 2011 Pol Antrás talked at length about property rights and 
incomplete contracts in the context of the MNE. This issue has been and continue to be a 
hot topic in the literature related to MNE, as these type of firms, in order to conduct their 
business, not only rely heavily on activities and operations that could take place in distant 
corners of the world but they also depend on activities and operations that lay outside the 
boundaries of the firm. It is good to note and point out that when it comes to MNE, property 
rights over certain assets (such as trademarks) are not necessarily straightforward, even 
when overall business activities are tightly kept “within” the boundaries of the firm, as 
corporate structure and some other particularities of modern ways of doing business play a 
role on the complexity of the matter. When it comes to corporate structure for example, we 
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could have (as we will see later on) a complex system where a subsidiary of subsidiary of 
a parent MNE could own (at least on record) the property rights over IP on behalf of the 
overall MNE. Without having insider information or knowledge regarding the corporate 
rules governing the usage of these assets it is difficult to fully understand the limitations 
that could exist or are imposed on related companies on the usage of these corporate assets. 
Also, although less common, it is possible though for two (or more) formerly related 
companies (but now separate and independent firms), to have access to the usage of a 
trademark. In these instances, legally binding arrangements contracted by the parties are 
struck and property rights over IP, such as trademarks, remain within the corporate 
boundaries of one the firms while the other firms enjoy access to the trademark based on 
their private contracts.  
 
But the truth is that nowadays it will be basically impossible for a MNE to fully 
operate within the boundaries of the firm. Whether it is related to production, operations, 
logistics or distribution, MNEs are likely to outsource certain activities. For example, 
regarding the control of foreign production processes, Antrás emphasized that when it is 
time for MNE to design their global sourcing strategies, one of the key organizational 
decisions faced by firms is the extent of the control they want to exert over these activities. 
On one hand, ownership of foreign operations and assets by the MNE is one of the main 
preferred methods to exert control over key activities, processes, proprietary IP and know-
how. On the other hand, the outsourcing of certain activities to non- affiliated companies, 
while maintaining within the boundaries of the firm some other activities, is the preferred 
way to operate for other firms. The level of control over certain activities, operations and 
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assets is for the MNE to decide. But regardless of the preferred operational setup chosen 
by the MNE, there are some crucial assets (tangible and/or intangible) that the MNE wants 
and needs to fiercely protect. For instance, control over these assets is especially important 
if the MNE plans to “relinquish” control over certain parts of their operations as it engages 
in outsourcing activities with non-affiliated companies. For example, let us say a German 
based MNE decides to contractually outsource ground distribution of their (branded or not) 
products in South East Asia to a Vietnamese company; what kind of rights (or obligations) 
does the Vietnamese company have over the brand of the German MNE in order to 
dutifully execute its distribution obligations? The answer might seem straight forward to 
some, but at the end it might not be the case at all as contracts cannot account for all states 
of nature, and as it is commonly said in civil law countries, “no one is forced to do what 
the law does not require or prevented from doing what it does not prohibit”. According to 
Antrás (2011), the Property rights theory suggests that because of the fact that contracts 
are incomplete there are some residual rights over an asset that must be purchased by or 
need to be allocated to a party. To own and control a trademark is to have the exclusive 
authority to decide and determine how the trademark could or should be used (by an 
affiliated unit or non-affiliated unit). Ownership over IP/IA such as trademarks (and 
brands) is not the kind of grey area matter the MNE wants to leave unresolved when it 
operates specially in a foreign market for example. Thanks to trademarks, the ownership 
of these protected assets is hard to challenge (unless certain specific rights have been given 
away) and MNE have the courts of law to enforce the protection of their property.  
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As pointed out along our research, in general when it comes to study IP and IA, 
patents account for much of the overall research that has been done in this matter in the 
economic field. This bias also exist when we talk about research related to the firm and IP 
protection (Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002), Kanwar and Evenson (2003), Kevles (2007), 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2002)). It is good to remember that unlike patents, which are 
protected only for a limited period of time, trademarks could be exclusive assets of the firm 
for an unlimited period of time as their registration could be renewed basically in perpetuity 
ensuring for the firm the continuous protection of these economic assets. Maybe one of the 
best explanations behind the bias in the study of these intangible assets could be attributed 
to the extensive availability of data related to patents which could have made it easier for 
scholars to study them, data that in many ways seemed to be limited, minimal or even 
absent for trademarks. In the past, lack of reliable, readily available and adequate data 
seems to have been a major obstacle for the study of this IP. Luckily in recent years, more 
and better efforts geared towards collecting trademark data and making it available have 
been implemented by some organizations around the world. Nowadays we have available 
to us, accurate and reliable data compiled in strict scientific and methodological fashion; 
and whether we want to access or obtain specific and detailed trademark information, 
market value of brands, trademark classification or general statistics, we can now rely on 
several organizations such as the OHIM (European Office of Harmonization for the 
Internal Market), WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization), USTPO (United 
States Patent and Trademark Office), Millward Brown and Interbrand’s brand valuation 
analyses, etc. 
 
110 
 
Because of the fact that no MNE trademarks database existed for us to do our study, 
for this paper we aimed to construct a high quality database to do our research. We relied 
mainly on two sources in order to set a framework and obtained part of information and 
data needed for this study. We used Interbrand’s Best Global Brands database for the years 
2001 to 2010 to come up with a pool of world class MNE related brands. Then we obtained 
from the OHIM (EU Office for the Harmonization of the Internal Market) detailed 
trademark data for each of those brands. We considered for our study all valid and relevant 
trademarks that unambiguously and directly protected a specific brand. For example 
trademarks such as Coca-Cola, Coca-Cola Light and Coca-Cola Zero (whether they are 
“word”, “figurative”, etc.) unambiguously and directly protect the same brand, Coca-Cola. 
On the other hand and although they are IP of the same parent MNE, trademarks such as 
Coke, Coke Light and Coke Zero do not protect Coca-Cola as a brand. Also note that 
“Apple” related trademarks do not protect other Apple Inc. owned brands such as iPhone, 
iPad or iMac. 
 
 
 
 
iii. TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND BRAND VALUATION SOURCES  
 
Nowadays, although fragmented and scattered, there exists brand and trademark 
data and information available from multiple trustworthy organizations for scholars to 
collect. These organizations have been able to index and record vast amounts of 
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information and data in a methodological and detailed fashion that is suitable for scholarly 
research. The problem faced when the present study began was that, because of their nature, 
these organizations (and their databases) have specialized on different and opposing 
aspects of the brand/trademark relationship, with no transitional happy middle. On one 
hand, for example, we have national or supranational organizations that were essentially 
created for the exclusive purpose of dealing with all issues associated with IP protection 
(and proper recording of extensive and detailed data and information related to trademark 
activity) in specific jurisdictions. And on the other hand we have organizations, mainly 
private, that as part of their activities and business purpose, seek to evaluate brands, rank 
them based on certain pre-established criteria and provide a market valuation for those 
brands. For our present study, brand valuation itself is not a concern of ours (nor it is a 
fundamental aspect of our research); our problem is one of being able to study properly 
trademarks as economic assets of the firm and also identify protection patterns across 
economic sectors and, geographical and political borders. In order to be able to answer all 
the pertinent and relevant questions related to our research we have done a detailed study 
and analysis of several sources of information and diligently constructed a database that 
merged both sides of the brand/trademark duality. We have mentioned before that most 
scholars might not be aware of the true complexity of trademark protection and other 
related matters; some scholars might not even be aware of the fundamental differences that 
exist between brands and trademarks and it is probable that many readers might not be 
familiar with some of the most important institutions and systems that govern trademarks 
protection and that assess brand valuation. In order to have a more productive discussion 
it will be good for the reader to be presented and get familiarized with some of these 
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institutions and systems. Because of their “contribution” to our research (and their 
worldwide influence on brand and trademark matters) these organizations and system are: 
•  USTPO 
• OHIM 
• WIPO 
• Madrid System 
• Nice Classification 
• Millard Brown 
• Interbrand 
 
For our study, we examined trademark data from the European OHIM and the 
American USTPO, possibly the two most reputable and well known IP offices in the world. 
Headquartered in Alexandria, VA, the United States Patent and Trademark Office is the 
Federal agency that is entitled with the responsibility of granting patents and registering 
trademarks in fulfillment of the mandates of the Copyright and Patent Clause and the 
Commerce Clause of the US Constitution respectively. The USTPO has its origins in the 
first US patent Act passed into law on April 10, 1790. The first Trademark Law dates from 
1881 and it was that same year that trademark registration was added to the functions of 
the Patent Office. There was a major amendment to the Act of 1881 in 1905 followed by 
some other partial revisions thereafter. Currently the Lanham Act of 1946 governs the U.S. 
federal trademark registration system and provides for protection of trademarks used in 
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commerce and registered with the USPTO.12 The USPTO works with other agencies to 
secure strong IP protection in free trade and other international agreements for US 
entrepreneurs and innovators around the world. Its stated mission is to foster innovation 
and competitiveness by “providing high quality and timely examination of patent and 
trademark applications, guiding domestic and international intellectual property policy, 
and delivering intellectual property information and education worldwide”.13 The USPTO 
aside being a filing office also “advises the President of the United States, the Secretary of 
Commerce, and U.S. Government agencies on intellectual property (IP) policy, protection, 
and enforcement; and promotes the stronger and more effective IP protection around the 
world”.14 As well the USPTO provides training, education, and capacity building programs 
intended to promote respect for IP and the development of strong IP enforcement regimes 
by trading partners of the U.S.  
 
Based in Alicante, Spain, the OHIM is the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market and it is the official trademarks and designs office of the European Union. 
Established by Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993, but officially 
opening on April 1, 1996 this EU office “registers the Community Trade Mark (CTM) and 
Registered Community Design (RCD), which are essential components of the European 
single market covering 28 countries in the European Union and over 500MM people”.15 
                                                            
12 The USPTO Trademark Case Files Dataset: Descriptions, Lessons, and Insights. January 2013. 
13 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/30100_mission_org.html 
14 http://www.uspto.gov/about/ 
15 http://www.ecap-project.org/resources/ohim 
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As part of their duties the OHIM works in close partnership with the national IP offices of 
all the EU member states, with international IP offices outside the boundaries of the EU 
and with the European Commission on a wide range of matters that affect the owners and 
users of intellectual property rights. Since it started operations, the OHIM has seen an 
explosive increase in the amount of trademark applications filed with this office, 
experiencing a 2262% 16  growth from 1996 to 2011. Until 2012 (and for the entire 
timeframe of our study), US brands (and firms) were OHIM’s largest filers of trademark 
applications, though lately German firms have taken the lead, on yearly applications and 
on the overall aggregate amount of trademarks filed with this office.17 
 
Both IP offices, OHIM and USTPO, have databases that are accessible online to 
the general public, but unlike the USPTO website (in the opinion of this researcher), the 
OHIM web interface has been created to be more user friendly (maybe because the database 
itself was born in times of the digital era) and appears to be more “reliable” and clear at the 
time results are reported. Also the OHIM database has the advantage of having more 
“recent”, less outdated IP data and information, so this IP database is more likely to have 
trademarks that are relevant to our study. For all these reasons the optimal choice for us 
was to use OHIM’s IP database to obtain part of the data needed to build our research’s 
dataset. 
                                                            
16 https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_ohim/the_office/ssc009-
statistics_of_community_trade_marks_2013_en.pdf 
 
17 https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_ohim/the_office/SSC009-
Statistics_of_Community_Trade_Marks-2014_en.pdf 
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The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a specialized agency of 
the United Nations. The WIPO is headquartered in Geneva (Switzerland) and was chartered 
by the WIPO Convention of 1967 with a mandate of promoting the protection of IP all over 
the world through cooperation among states and in collaboration and partnership with other 
international organizations. As of late 2014 there were 188 Member States (Table 11) up 
from 185 in 2011, i.e. over 90 percent of the countries of the world are members of the 
WIPO. The WIPO works with Member States to develop international laws and standards 
for trademarks and devotes great efforts at developing a balanced and accessible 
international IP system, promoting creativity, innovation and economic progress around 
the world while safeguarding the public interest. WIPO's World Intellectual Property 
Indicators report provides a wide range of statistical information covering various areas of 
intellectual property: “patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, 
microorganisms and plant varieties protection”. 18  Specifically to trademarks, these 
statistics are based on information supplied to WIPO by IP offices around the globe in 
annual surveys and are supplemented with data found in national IP offices annual and 
statistical reports. The WIPO-administered Madrid System for the International 
Registration of Marks (which at its core is shaped by the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid 
Protocol- Table 12) offers a route to trademark protection in multiple “countries” by filing 
a single application. With the Madrid system an applicant can seek protection for its 
trademark in 94 jurisdictions (Contracting Parties) by filing one application and paying one 
                                                            
18 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/wipi/ 
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single set of fees. A Contracting Party is defined as a State (or intergovernmental 
organization such as the EU) which is party to the Madrid Agreement and/or the Madrid 
Protocol. Although it has been revised and amended in several occasions the original 
Madrid Agreement dates from 1891.19 The Madrid Protocol is a newer document and it 
dates from 1989.20 In order to file for trademark protection through the Madrid System the 
trademark applicant must have the necessary ‘connection’ through an establishment, 
domicile or nationality on any Contracting Party. After the applicant has been able to 
register a trademark through the Madrid system, the protection to the trademark can be 
extended to other Contracting Parties as needed. One key aspect of the Madrid System is 
that regardless of the number of Contracting Parties included in an international 
registration, the registration will have just one single expiration day and from the start, each 
international registration is entitled to a ten year protection which can be renewed 
indefinitely for additional periods of ten years at a time. A cornerstone of the Madrid 
system is the figure of the basic national (or regional) trademark application or registration. 
The difference that exists between the Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol is that, 
whereas in the Madrid Agreement a basic registration (a registered trademark) must exist 
in the Contracting Party where the trademark owner has the necessary connection in order 
to apply for an international registration; under the Madrid Protocol, a basic registration 
does not need to exist and only a basic application suffices in order to be able to file for an 
international application, i.e., the international application may be based on a basic 
                                                            
19 https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_ohim/the_office/SSC009-
Statistics_of_Community_Trade_Marks-2014_en.pdf 
 
20 http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/pdf/madrid_marks.pdf 
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registration or a basic application. Trademark applicants through the Madrid system 
seeking to protect their marks for specific goods and/or services must do so complying 
with the International Classification of Goods and Services, also known as the Nice 
Classification (applicants are able to indicate any goods and/or services as long as they 
adequately classify their choices in accord with the Nice Classification). The trademark 
will enjoy protection for only the goods and/or services mentioned on the application.  
 
The Nice Classification is an international classification system used to classify 
goods and services for the purposes of the registration of trademarks (and service marks). 
It was established by the Nice Agreement on June, 1957 entering in force on April 1961 
and subsequently revised and modified in 1967, 1977 and 1979. The Nice Classification 
has “about 10,000 indications referring to goods (such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
machinery, scientific equipment, vehicles, textiles, household utensils, games, food and 
drink) and 1,000 indications referring to services (such as advertising, telecommunications, 
transport, entertainment, medical, legal and security services)”.21 The use of the Nice 
Classification by competent trademark offices has the advantage of simplifying and 
standardizing trademark application as the goods and services to which a given mark 
applies will be classified in the same way in all countries that have adopted the 
Classification. As of August, 2014 there were 84 States party to the Nice Agreement, New 
Zealand being its newest member (Table 13). According to the WIPO, in addition to the 
International Bureau of WIPO, around 150 IP offices from all over the world (member and 
                                                            
21 http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/faq/madrid_system.html 
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non-members), plus four regional organizations, namely the African Intellectual Property 
Organization (OAPI), the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization (ARIPO), 
the Benelux Organization for Intellectual Property (BOIP) and the European Union Office 
for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), use and 
apply the Nice Classification.22 The Nice Classification comprises 45 possible classes, the 
first 34 classes are for Goods and the last 11 classes are for Services (Table 14). 
   
  When it comes to assess brand valuation, there are two well-known and reputable 
global brand consultancy firms that stand out from the rest, Interbrand and Millward 
Brown. Both firms and their annual lists of 100 Best/Most Valuable Global Brands are 
without argument the best known and most comprehensive analysis of brand valuation in 
the market. Although their methodologies have similarities, they also have fundamental 
differences which lead (in many cases) to major discrepancies on their market valuation of 
the very “same” brands, as each firm has a different understanding and definition of what 
a brand is. For example, in their 2011 report Millward Brown ranked and valued the next 
brands as follows: Apple #1 at $153,285MM, Google #2 at $111,498MM, IBM #3 at 
$100,849MM (see glossary for MM). But for the same year those same brands were ranked 
and valued by Interbrand as follows: Apple #8 at $33,492MM, Google #4 at $55,317MM, 
IBM #3 at $69,905MM. Also, Microsoft ranked #3 and #5 on Millward Brown and 
Interbrand’s reports respectively at a corresponding value of $78,243MM and $59,087MM 
each. Although Coca Cola did not fare well on Millward Brown’s ranking landing at the 
                                                            
22 http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/en/about_the_ncl/faq.html 
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6th spot (as opposed to the 1st spot on the Interbrand’s report), both companies valued the 
brand pretty “close” to each other at $73,752MM vs. $71,861MM respectively. These 
differences in the market valuation, could certainly lead to some criticism on the way these 
rankings are put together and how accurately market valuation is assessed and determined. 
At the end, in the eventuality that any of these powerful brands become one day up for sale, 
market forces (and some good financial and accounting analysis) will reveal the true market 
value of the brand to the prospective buyer. But until then, these rankings constitute serious 
but referential studies of world-class brands that are by many standards, powerful and 
relevant in today’s market. For the purpose of our study these reports provide to us 
something that we need; an independent, unbiased and comprehensive list of world-class 
brands for us to dissect trademark patterns on and answer the questions proposed by our 
research. Founded 1973 Millward Brown is headquartered in New York City and it is part 
of Kantar, the information and consultancy division of British multinational WPP. 
According to information in the WPP website, as of late 2014, Millward Brown owns 87 
offices in 58 counties around the world. WPP asserts that BrandZ, their brand equity 
database created in 1998, is the largest in the world. Raw data for the BrandZ study is 
collected annually by interviewing over 150,000 consumers and professionals around the 
world, who are asked to evaluate brands in a competitive context from a category they 
actually shop in. This database holds over 60,000 brand results split in over 200 separate 
categories.23 On the other hand with 33 offices in 27 countries around the world and also 
headquartered in New York City, Interbrand started operations in 1974 and it is a division 
                                                            
23 http://www.wpp.com/wpp/marketing/brandz/what-is-brandz/ 
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of the Omnicom Group. Interbrand's method looks at the ongoing investment and 
management of the brand as a business asset taking into account financial performance, the 
role of brand in the purchase decision process, and the strength of the brand. 
 
Both studies by Interbrand and Millward Brown offer consistent, serious and solid 
valuation methodologies as indicated, but as also noted their assessment of the value of a 
very “same” brand could vary considerably as each company seems to interpret the concept 
of the “brand” in a somewhat different way. Millward Brown assesses the value of a 
“branded firm” as a whole, while Interbrand assesses the value of each individual “branded 
units” of a firm. For example in the case of Millward Brown, the Coca-Cola brand becomes 
more an analysis of Coca-Cola Inc., which will include other brand names such as Sprite 
and Fanta, but in the case of Interbrand the analysis centers around the value of Coca-Cola 
as a brand name and Sprite is treated as a different entity (Sprite itself is a Best Global 
brand in the Interbrand rankings), therefore the Interbrand survey allows us to identify the 
net estimated market value of each individual brand unit. Also, even though both 
organizations base their brand valuation on a similar 3-step parameter system, the 
Interbrand approach add certain inclusion pre-requisites to ensure that the brand in question 
is a true global powerhouse and that it has successfully transcended geographic (and 
cultural) differences, and furthermore, that it has expanded across the established economic 
centers of the world and is entering the major markets of the future. In measurable terms, 
the Interbrand methodology requires that: 
• At least 30 percent of revenues come from outside the home country, and 
no more than 50 percent of revenues come from any one continent. 
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• It must have a presence on at least three major continents, and must have 
broad geographic coverage in growing and emerging markets. 
• There must be substantial, publicly available data on the brand’s financial 
performance. Economic profit must be positive showing a return above the 
operating and financing costs. 
• The brand must have a public profile and awareness above and beyond its 
own marketplace. 
 
This way the Interbrand approach weeds out “brands” that, although powerful, 
could be more of a national or regional reach. So because we are interested in true global 
brands (across different sectors and across geographical and political borders) for which 
trademark protection would be of extreme need for the defense of their business and the 
survival of the organization, the Interbrand survey is the optimal choice for our research. 
Now it is good to note that it could be argued that some of these requirements seem to be 
related more to the firm that “owns” the brand that to the brand itself, for example when it 
requires that there must be substantial, publicly available data on the brand’s financial 
performance and that economic profit must be positive. Although it is fair to say that with 
some adequate accounting it is possible for most firms to estimate the financial 
performance and that economic profit of a brand, it would be extremely rare to see firms 
reporting numbers like these. 
 
To construct the dataset for our study, we gathered each and every brand that made 
it to Interbrand’s 100 Best Global Brands for a 11 year period, from 2001 to 2011 (Table 
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15). By doing this, we identified a total of 147 Best Global Brands for the indicated time 
period that were valid and relevant for our study (for list of business type abbreviations and 
full descriptions please refer to Table 26). These brands came from 18 different home 
countries24 (Table 16 and 17), spanning three different continents (Americas, Europe and 
Asia); hence we covered our need to have a study that transcended political and 
geographical borders. Also, following Interbrand’s classification of industrial sectors, 
brands were categorized into 26 distinct sectors (subsequently we clustered these brands 
into nine groups); which covered our need to have a study that would look into different 
economic activities (Table 19). The majority of these brands was a reoccurring feature in 
the Interbrand’s ranking for all 11 years; most appeared in most years, some made the 
ranking in only few years and some others made just a single appearance on it. The fact 
that we only have 147 (valid and relevant) brands over the entire period of 11 years (and 
therefore 1,100 single rankings) is a testament to the long term value and stable place of 
these brands as true global superpowers.  
  
In order to get detailed trademark information for our study on these 147 brands we 
meticulously researched each and every of these brands in the European OHIM web based 
database.25 The trademarks we obtained were filed by a natural or legal person on behalf 
of a subsidiary or the parent MNE and included all trademarks on record from April 2006 
                                                            
24 Self-governing since 1620, Bermuda is the oldest and most populous of the British overseas territories 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bd.html), but for the purpose of this 
paper it will be considered a home “country”. 
 
25 https://oami.europa.eu/eSearch/#advanced/trademarks 
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to October 2011. As it is required by the European Union, all trademarks applications 
presented to the OHIM are done so using the Nice Classification system.  
 
There could be a concern to some readers that we will only find trademark 
applications by European brands owners given that OHIM is an European Trademark 
System, but the evidence does not support the possibility of such a claim. As noted earlier, 
the brands used in our study are true Global Brands on their own merits and in order to be 
labeled as such, these brands had to meet met certain minimum requirements (pp. 121-122 
above) which are not easily achievable, not even by other powerful brands, such as: Wal-
Mart, Baidu, Kirin, Tim Hortons, Itaú, OXXO, etc. Because of the extent, the reach and 
the complexity of their operations it is reasonable to expect that the firms that own these 
powerful brands will seek extensive protection for their property in markets around the 
world. The fact that US brands dominate Interbrand’s list of Best Global brands and also 
dominate the trademark statistics obtained from our analysis of the OHIM data is a 
validation of this assertion and rest any validity to a concern related to bias on the data. 
 
 
 
 
iv. DATASET DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Our data consists of all valid trademarks on record at the OHIM from 1996 to late 
2012 for selected brands that were part of Interbrand’s 100 Best Global Brands ranking 
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report from 2001 to 2011 (a total of 11 years). In order to meet the Interbrand list, these 
brands had to meet stringent requirements related to their performance and reach of 
operations that made them ideal for our research. As part of our analysis we researched 
these brands through different sources (such SEC, LexisNexis, Bloomberg, etc.) to gather 
additional information related to the MNE corporate structure, amongst other things. Under 
close examination of the brands included in our research, it was noted that in two instances, 
Interbrand’s requirements for being considered a Best Global brand were bent slightly for 
the following brand names: Rolex and Merck. Rolex is privately owned firm and as such 
it does not openly or commonly disclose financial information. This situation might be in 
contradiction with the requirement that financial performance must be publicly available 
(and possibly that the economic profit must be positive). In the case of Merck, although 
previously related, the US “based” brand owned by Merck & Co., Inc, included in the 
Interbrand’s reports (which operates as Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) outside the US and 
Canada), is technically not the same as the Merck brand owned by Germany based Merck 
KGaA, which has the rights to the brand name Merck everywhere else in the world but in 
the US and Canada. This situation will go against the requirements that no more than 50 
percent of revenues (of the “brand”) could come from any one continent and that it has to 
have a presence in at least three major continents and coverage in emerging markets. For 
the purpose of our paper though, understanding that under minimal rules of good corporate 
governance both companies have an (mutually beneficial) implicit fiduciary responsibility 
with one another to protect (jointly and severally) the good name of the Merck brand 
worldwide, provided that under close examination the German “brand” does meet 
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Interbrand’s requirements, given that both MNE operate in the same sector and because 
both companies have actually the same origin, we will treat them both as one.  
 
For the period 2001-2011 a total of 151 Global brands were identified in the 
Interbrand’s reports. Unfortunately four brands were deemed not valid to be incorporated 
to our study for different but specific reasons. The four brands in question are Chanel, Sony 
Ericsson, Reuters and Sun Microsystems. In the case of the brand name Chanel, there are 
no trademarks filed for the brand, although Chanel S.A. (parent MNE) does own two 
unrelated trademarks (CTM # 000628891 and 006430086) at the OHIM. Sony Ericsson is 
a defunct brand; Sony Corporation bought L. M. Ericsson out of their mobile business 
partnership. The brand Reuters (and the namesake company) was acquired by the Thomson 
Corporation and the new company was rebranded as Thomson Reuters (which is part of 
our brands to be studied). Lastly, Sun Microsystems (and the namesake company) was 
acquired by Oracle Inc. and it is now a defunct brand. So after removing these brands we 
were left with the 147 brands that are part of our final research.  
 
Originally, for our pool of 147 brands we identified a total of 4,352 individual 
trademarks that were filed with the OHIM for these brands, and together these trademarks 
we obtained a total of 15,003 individual class applications (Nice Classes). All trademarks 
were analyzed to determine if they were valid and relevant for our study; under close 
examination we identified 31 trademarks that for different reasons had to be removed from 
our dataset (Table 18). The removal of CTMs lowered our total number of trademarks to 
4,321 for all 147 brands (Table 20) and the total number of individual class applications 
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related to these trademarks was left at 14,918 (Table 21). For each specific trademark 
record we were able to obtain individual information on the following parameters: 
• Trademark 
• Trademark number 
• Filing date 
• Classes (Nice Classification) 
• Name of owner 
• Type of mark 
• Status 
 
For each Community Trademark (CTM) record, “Trademark” is the verbal 
description of the trademark (which is the same as the trademark if the CTM is a “word” 
trademark). The “Trademark number” is permanent identification number assigned to each 
CTM by the OHIM. The “Filing date” is the date the trademark application was formally 
received by the OHIM. The “Classes” are the specific Nice Classifications for which 
protection is sought for. The “Name of owner” is the name of the legal entity that will 
appear on record as the CTM owner. For “Type” and “Status of trademark” we found that 
there exist several possibilities to be known.  
 
For Types of mark we have: 
• 3D 
• Color 
• Sound 
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• Figurative 
• Olfactory 
• Hologram 
• Word 
• Others. 
 
The possible statuses for trademark applications (found in our study) are: 
• Registered 
• Absolute grounds OK 
• International registration accepted 
• Application under examination 
• Application published  
• Registration expired 
• Application withdrawn 
• Application opposed 
• Application refused 
• Registration cancelled 
• Registration cancellation pending 
• Registration surrendered 
• Removed from register 
 
It is good to point out now that for the purpose of our research, “Registered” was 
not the only status that was valid for a trademark to be part of our study. MNE do not take 
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lightly the time, efforts and costs associated with filing, maintaining and defending their 
trademark portfolio so they do their best to make sure that their trademarks will withstand 
possible challenges. Furthermore, from the moment a trademark is filed the applicant 
acquires certain protection and rights, even before the Community Trademark (CTM) has 
a “Registered” status. After careful evaluation, here below are the reasons why a CTM with 
a status other than “Registered” could have been used for our study: 
 
1) Registration expired: Even if a CTM was expired at the time we pulled 
the data from the OHIM database, at certain point that CTM was registered 
and valid during the timeframe established for our study (most likely it was 
valid for most of the timeframe) which makes them relevant for our 
research. Examples of these trademarks are: HONDA i-SERIES (CTM#: 
1933811) and JACK DANIEL'S OLD TIME Old No. 7 BRAND 
QUALITY Tennessee SOUR MASH WHISKEY BOTTLED AT THE 
DISTILLERY (CTM#: 1342815). 
2) Application withdrawn: Most of these CTM were filed and later 
withdrawn (sometimes many years later) without any litigation or challenge 
to the rights of the trademark owner by a third party. This category includes 
some CTMs that were just transformed to National Marks. So at one point 
(and for some or most of the timeframe of our analysis) the applicant 
claimed and had certain rights over these trademarks and if needed they 
would have been able defend their rights to those trademarks. Examples of 
these trademarks are: TOYOTA Reflex (CTM#: 006661144), 
129 
 
HYUNDAICARD mini M (CTM#: 003584257) and GUINNESS (CTM#: 
3985652). 
3) Application opposed: That a trademark was opposed at the time the data 
was collected does not mean that the applicant was unable to exert their 
rights over such trademark or that the challenge was successful. The vast 
majority of these oppositions we resolved in favor of the applicant but we 
also have amicable settlements and registrations after some limitations were 
imposed. Examples of these trademarks include: CISCO NEXUS 
(CTM#:7359417), PEPSI NEXT (CTM#:9819301), THOMSON 
REUTERS (CTM#: 6680987), BABY GAP (CTM#: 9460651), HTC 
DESIRE S (CTM#:9733221), LG Apps (CTM#: 9849803). 
4) Application refused: This category includes just one specific entry: 
INNOVATION TECHNOLOGY DESIGN PREMIO INTEL DESIGN 
(CTM#: 1138528). This trademark was not filed by Intel Corporation but it 
was opposed by this company. At the end Intel Corporation was able to 
successfully defend their challenge of the CTM and prevail. After the CTM 
was refused to the original applicant, Intel Corporation requested the 
transfer of the ownership of the trademark and they have rights over it. 
5) Registration cancelled: This category also includes just one specific entry: 
GILLETTE DIVINE (CTM#: 3393485). Registration was alive for six 
years. 
6) Registration cancellation pending: Pending cancelation does not imply 
necessarily that the CTM will be cancelled. In this category we have 
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trademarks that are still going through the cancelation process (and are still 
“pending cancelation”) and trademarks that were able to win the challenge 
(and were registered).  Examples of these trademarks include: ZARA 
(CTM#: 732958) and Lexus (CTM#:24406). 
7) Registration surrendered: This category include trademarks that were 
“cancelled” at the request of the owner without any known litigation on 
record. Applicants had the rights to the trademarks for an extended period 
of time that fell within the timeframe of our study and also and if needed 
they would have been able to defend their rights to those trademarks. 
Examples of these trademarks include: VISA TRANSFORMING THE 
WORLD OF COMMERCE (CTM#: 7252778), ALICO AIG LIFE (CTM#: 
6600126), AT&T SECUREBUY (CTM#: 494815) all surrendered 
voluntarily. 
8) Removed from register: This category also includes just one specific 
entry: FEDEX EVERY PACKAGE MATTERS (CTM# 0873758). 
Registration was alive for three years. 
 
 In the Interbrand Best Global brands report, a “home country” for the brand has 
already been established and we will refer to this home country as the “country of origin” 
(COO) of the brand moving forward. Although there is no disclosure regarding the criteria 
used to determine this country of origin, it seems like it was based on the actual country 
where the brand was first originated. For example, Budweiser and Corona are considered 
to be US and Mexican brands respectively in the Interbrand report, even though their parent 
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company is not. The only brand that does not follow this rule is Smirnoff, which has been 
labeled as a UK brand (although its origin is Russian). As we will discuss later on, aside 
the COO of the brand and the parent MNE we have a third COO to be aware about, the 
COO of the trademark owner. All these three COO could be different from one another (as 
it occurs sometimes in our study). As the reader could notice, the COO issue adds another 
level of complexity to the brand, trademark and MNE story. As part of the additional 
information that was incorporated to our dataset regarding MNE corporate structure, we 
determined that data on the COO of the parent MNE was needed. For the purpose of our 
paper, the parent MNE will be the highest level company in the corporate hierarchy on 
record as of late 2011. We will define the country of origin (COO) of the parent MNE as 
the jurisdiction of incorporation of that (highest level) company. A quick comparison 
between the COO of the brand and parent MNE shows us that it is common for these two 
COO to be different. The question now is: why do we have a different country of origin 
(COO) between the brand and the parent MNE? Complex MNE’s corporate structures in a 
highly globalized economy will be the most simple but accurate answer. As MNEs venture 
outside their home countries and expand the scale and scope of their operations they could 
add “foreign” brands to their portfolios. In our study we found a total of 18 COO for our 
brands. The total number of COO for the parent companies was also 18, although they were 
not necessarily the same as the brand’s COOs (Table 24). We found situations like this for 
brands from Europe and the Americas, though Europe had a higher incidence of brands 
having a different COO than the COO of the parent company. For example we found: 
 
• German brand Puma has a French parent company (Kering S.A.). 
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• Italian brands Bulgari and Gucci have a French parent company (LVMH 
and Kering S.A. respectively). 
• Italian brand Ferrari now has a Dutch incorporated parent company (Fiat-
Chrysler Automibiles N.V.) 
• Irish brand Guinness has a UK parent company (Diageo plc). 
• US brand Budweiser now has a Belgian incorporated parent company 
(Anheuser-Busch InBev N.V.) 
• Mexican brand Corona now has a Belgian incorporated parent company 
(Anheuser-Busch InBev N.V.) 
• The Accenture brand, which can trace its roots to the US, has a parent 
company that has been incorporated in Ireland. 
 
 
 
 
v. STATISTICS, OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS 
 
In this part of our research we will proceed to present the reader with an in depth 
and comprehensive analysis of our extensive and detailed data. Our efforts will be targeted 
at not only identifying specificities of overall IP protection characteristics but we will also 
look at patterns and differences across a multilayered fabric of economic sectors, political 
borders and geographical regional boundaries that will allow us to tell a more accurate and 
holistic story of the relationship between brands, trademarks and the MNE. As we move 
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forward with this analysis we will attempt to address the questions we originally proposed 
at the beginning of this paper and some other questions that we identified during our 
research, we will also provide overall results and observations based on our data that will 
help us elaborate our conclusions at the end of this chapter.  
 
One of the most important observations to be made before we proceed with our 
analysis is that, although a total of 147 valid Best Global brands were identified for our 
study as part of the Interbrand survey for the years 2001-2011, only a total of 18 brand’s 
COO were identified for those same years (and 18 parent MNE’s COO for a total of 19 
countries overall, Table 16 and 17). This number represents an extraordinary concentration 
of not only Best Global brands but also of value in the hands of just a few countries (with 
the corresponding worldwide stream of economic benefit). An even more remarkable 
concentration to be aware about is that, out of a total population sample of 147 Best Global 
brands, 127 of them call seven specific countries their country of origin (US, Germany, 
France, Japan, Switzerland, UK, and Italy) and an equal 127 of these brands have a parent 
MNE incorporated in also seven specific countries (US, Germany, France, Japan, 
Switzerland, UK, and Netherlands); in both instances this is over 86% of all the brands 
studied for this 11 year period. The US comes on top of the ranking as the world’s brand 
super power; no other country comes close to rival or to challenge its hegemony and top 
spot on the list. The US alone accounts for 53% and 52% of all the brands and parent MNE 
respectively. Overall, all countries in these two COO lists (brand and parent MNE) are 
134 
 
high-income26 capitalistic democracies (Mexico is the exception being an upper-middle-
income; IMF figures place Taiwan as a high-income country27), all countries (except 
Taiwan) are OECD28 member states and overall they all have very strong (or at least higher 
than average) IP protection systems (Table 25).  
 
It is evident that these brands come from well-developed national or regional 
markets that could guarantee their success at those levels but thanks to the MNE they have 
been able to transcend the borders of their own “neighborhood” and have extended to far 
and remote corners of the world. In our paper we will cluster our Best Global as originating 
in the Americas, Europe and Asia, although it will be more precise to say that they 
originated in North America (which will include Mexico), Western Europe and Eastern 
Asia. 
 
So in the context of the MNE and Global brands we have been able to find with our 
research fact-based answers to key questions such as: 
 
Is there one trademark for each brand? 
Our study indicates that one brand is likely to have multiple trademarks protecting 
it; moreover in our study all brands had more than one trademark associated to them 
and we did not find any 1-1 relationship whatsoever. 
                                                            
26 http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups 
 
27 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/index.aspx 
 
28 As we mentioned before, Bermuda is a British (UK) overseas territory. UK is an OECD member. 
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Why are there multiple trademarks for each brand? 
Form our analysis we were able to identify three main reasons to be known: 
• Firms create “extensions” of their original brands and then they seek to also 
protect those extension of the brand. For example: Pepsi and Pepsi Max; 
Marriot and Courtyard by Marriot; or Google and Google Latitude. 
• Firms might file trademarks for different “types” of the same brand. In the 
OHIM system, types include: 3D, Color, Sound, Figurative, Olfactory, 
Hologram, Word and others. For Example: Coca-Cola (word – CTM #2091569)   
and Coca-Cola (figurative – CTM #569731). 
• Firms might seek separate or additional registrations for a specific “type” of 
trademarks. This approach might be in response to a corporate/business strategy 
or as needed by market in which they operate as different trademarks address 
different business needs. In this category we have two main cases to be known:  
o Variation of the “same” word trademark but filed for different (Nice) 
classes.  For Example “APPLE” CTMs # 2593168 and # 2592988. 
o Variations of the “same” figurative brand trademark (based on the 
trademark word description), such as logos which could change over time. 
For example, figurative “PEPSI” trademarks CTMs #106112 and #105338.  
It will be good to remind the reader again that trademarks are the legal protected 
entities and brands are the commercial representation of such legal entities, where 
logos are graphic marks of the brand. For a list of current official logos29 (as of late 
                                                            
29 Interbrand’s Best Global Brands 2014 ranking (http://bestglobalbrands.com/2014/ranking/). Interbrand’s 
Best Global Reports – Previous Years (http://bestglobalbrands.com/previous-years/2013) 
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2014) and to see the difference between a logo, brand and a trademark please refer 
to Figure 5.  
 
Are all trademarks in the MNE’s portfolio equally the same for the firm? 
Not likely. On the contrary, our data support the hypothesis that actually even if 
they are basically the ‘same”, no trademarks are alike. Take for example 
Microsoft’s CTMs #330910, #479956, #2850634 and #530253; all these 
registrations are for the trademark “Microsoft”. The first three CTMs are for “word” 
trademarks but for different (Nice) classes; the last CTM is for a “Microsoft” 
figurative trademark. As we said before and based on the evidence, it is our 
understanding that different trademarks address different business needs and 
moreover, they are likely to respond to an overall corporate strategy. 
 
Do characteristics such as corporate structure, country of origin of the parent 
MNE/brand and business sector influence trademark protection patterns and 
portfolio characteristics? 
Yes. Our study supports the idea that all these factors affect the trademark 
protection patterns and the characteristics of the trademark portfolio of a MNE.  
For example, based on corporate structure, “ownership” of trademarks could be 
centralized or decentralized, moreover it could be exerted directly by a parent MNE 
or a subsidiary. Also when seeking protection, depending on the COO of the brand 
and economic sector, we could see a bias towards “service” or “good” classes or 
even specific classes (as we will see later on). 
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Is the brand name the same as the parent MNE name? 
Not necessarily. At least in our study our data showed that although it is very 
common for the brand name to be part of the name of the parent MNE, the brand 
name was always different that the MNE parent name (Table 15). So if we want to 
be “proper”, we should never use the name of a brand to refer to a company, it is 
highly likely that they are not the same. 
 
 
 
Are trademarks always owned by the MNE parent company? 
No. Overall in most cases trademarks are filed (and owned on record) by a parent 
MNE company (in our study 82 out 147 brands were owned by a parent MNE– 
Table 23), but in many cases this is not that case and we have subsidiaries filing for 
trademark protection (and are at least on record the owner of that trademark). For 
example:  
• Trademarks related to the Microsoft brand name are owned by the parent 
company, Microsoft Corporation. 
• The Trademarks related to the Disney brand name are owned by Disney 
Enterprises, Inc., which is a subsidiary of the parent company The Walt Disney 
Company. 
 
Do we always have either a parent or a direct subsidiary of the parent owning 
trademarks on the record? 
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No, this is not the case. We have found in our analysis highly complex ways of 
ownership that are related to the corporate structure. In some instances, for 
example, we have found subsidiaries of subsidiaries being trademark owners on 
record. For example:  
• On record, the trademarks for the brand name Accenture are owned by 
Accenture Global Services Limited, which is a subsidiary of Accenture SCA, 
which is then a subsidiary of Accenture plc, the parent MNE.  
• Accenture Global Services Limited and Accenture plc are companies 
incorporated in Ireland. Accenture SCA is incorporated in Luxemburg. 
• As a side note Accenture Inc. (the US based company) is a subsidiary of 
Accenture SCA. 
 
Do we always have one MNE entity (parent or subsidiary) owing all 
trademarks? 
Not necessarily. In our study we have found that it is possible for two or more 
related entities to own trademarks for the same brand (in our study 23 out 147 
brands had trademarks that were owned by two or more related companies – Table 
22). This fact is further evidence of different and complex types of corporate 
structures and that different MNEs handle their IP assets in different ways. For 
example: 
• On one hand we have that all the trademarks related to the brand name “Apple” 
are owned by the parent MNE, Apple Inc. 
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• And on the other hand we have several subsidiaries of the Hyundai Motor 
Group (parent MNE) owning (at least on record) trademarks for the “Hyundai” 
brand name (Hyundai Steel Company, Mobis Parts Europe N.V., Hyundai Card 
Company Limited, Hyundai Hysco Co., Ltd.). 
 
Have we found evidence of IP Holding companies? 
Although some additional research is needed in this area, it seems like we found 
evidence of IP Holding companies. As we have previously defined (Chapter II), IP 
Holdings are companies incorporated in low tax jurisdictions as wholly-owned 
subsidiaries of a parent company, which own a substantial amount of IP, in an effort 
to better manage its intellectual property, reduce tax burden on licensing revenues 
and maximize earnings related to its IP assets. In this arrangement, the parent 
company transfers ownership of its intellectual property to its IP Holding subsidiary 
and then the IP Holding subsidiary licenses back the right to use the intellectual 
property to the parent company. In many industries, including the Fast Moving 
Consumer Goods (FMCG) industry it is common for companies to own many 
brands (and trademarks); this extensive portfolio of brands  make these companies 
true brand powerhouses. Companies such as Nestlé, Unilever, Sara Lee, Procter & 
Gamble, Coca-Cola, General Mills, Pepsi and Mars, etc., each own dozens of world 
renowned brands. Note that when we say low tax jurisdictions we are talking about 
sovereign nations and non-sovereign nations jurisdictions (Switzerland vs. 
Delaware for example). Some of the presumably IP Holding companies that we 
found in our study are: 
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• Motorola Trademark Holding, LLC 
• Kraft Foods Global Brands, LLC,  
• AT&T Intellectual Property II, L.P. 
• Compaq Trademark B.V. 
• HLT International IP LLC 
 
Have we found any evidence of companies incorporated for the purpose of 
taking advantage of Tax Havens? 
Although some additional research will also be needed in this area, possibly we 
might have found some evidence of some companies being incorporated for the 
purpose of taking advantage of Tax Havens. As we also mentioned previously 
(Chapter II), the concentration of intangible assets in these financial centers is a 
result of the low or no taxes applied to the income generated by the assets (such as 
licensing fees and royalty payments).  
For example:  
• Parent MNE Accenture plc, with subsidiary companies incorporated all around 
the world, was incorporated in 2009 in Ireland.30 This company can trace its 
origins back in the US. 
• Texas Instruments Incorporated, a US MNE headquartered in Dallas, TX, has 
been incorporated in the State of Delaware.31 
                                                            
30 SEC Form 8-K (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467373/000146737315000090/a2015-
02x04plc8xk.htm) 
 
31 SEC FORM 10-K (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/97476/000009747615000003/txn-
12312014x10xk.htm) 
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• The Coca Cola Company, a US MNE headquartered in Atlanta, GA, has been 
incorporated in the State of Delaware.32 
• Ford Motor Company, a US MNE headquartered in Dearborn, MI, has been 
incorporated in the State of Delaware.33 
It is good to point out at this point that it is likely that not only taxes motivate firms 
to incorporate in Delaware but also matters related to corporate law. 
 
Do we have any evidence of trademark ownership issues between related 
subsidiaries? 
Yes.  Danone Group seems to have a very complex corporate structure. The group 
appears to be formed by three related but somewhat independent companies:  
• Danone S.A., based in Barcelona, Spain. 
• Compagnie Gervais Danone S.A., based in Paris, France. 
• The Dannon Company, Inc., based in New York, US. 
Danone S.A. has been successful at challenging in the past Compagnie Gervais 
Danone S.A. trademark applications. Additional research is needed. 
 
Is the country of origin of the brand the same as the country of incorporation 
of the MNE parent? 
                                                            
 
32 SEC FORM 8-K (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/21344/000110465915016299/a15-
5696_18k.htm) 
 
33 SEC FORM 8-K (http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799615000015/sales8-
kdated3x3x2015.htm) 
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Not necessarily. As we saw earlier some “consolidation” of brands has taken place, 
especially in Europe. When MNE expand their operations and businesses, they 
often acquire other companies (with their IP) in the process. It is reasonable to 
expect some further consolidation in the future and this will result on more brands 
and parent MNE having a different COO (especially in Europe). It is good to point 
out that in some instances we found subsidiaries of the parent MNE being the 
owners “on record” of trademarks. In some cases the COO of these subsidiaries did 
not match the brand or the parent MNE’s COO.   
 
 
Do we have one MNE parent company for each brand name and related set of 
trademarks? 
Not necessarily. From our study we found out that on many occasions one parent 
MNE company owns the trademark rights to more than one Global brand name (in 
many cases thanks to the “consolidation” process we spoke about before). Within 
our research we have identified a total of 12 key MNEs controlling 29 of our Best 
Global brands. That is approximately 9% of the parent MNE controlling in our 
research almost 20% of all the studied brands, 17% of all trademarks and 18% of 
all individuals classes. 
These parent MNE companies are: 
• Anheuser-Busch InBev N.V    2 Global Brands 
• Diageo plc       3 Global Brands 
• Hewlett-Packard Company    2 Global Brands 
143 
 
• Kering SA       2 Global Brands 
• L'Oréal S.A.      2 Global Brands 
• LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton S.A.   4 Global Brands 
• Nestlé S.A.       2 Global Brands 
• The Coca-Cola Company     2 Global Brands 
• The Procter & Gamble Co.     4 Global Brands 
• Toyota Motor Corporation    2 Global Brands 
• Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft    3 Global Brands 
• Yum! Brands, Inc.      2 Global Brands 
 
Is there any evidence in our data that could validate some “preconceptions” 
regarding brands? 
Possibly yes. For example here are a few: 
• The US is the world’s brand superpower and it has the most “industry” 
diversified brands. 
• All of Japan’s global brands are concentrated in the electronics and automotive 
sectors. 4 out of 8 Japanese trademarks are “Electronics” and 4 out of 8 Japanese 
trademarks are “Automotive”. 
• Europe has an almost complete dominance in the “luxury” brands (9 out of 11 
Best Global brands). 3 out of 9 French trademarks are “Luxury”, 4 out of 6 
Italian trademarks are “Luxury”. 
• 5 out of 11 German trademarks are “Automotive”. 
• 3 out of 9 Swiss trademarks are for “Financial Services”. 
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• Taiwan’s only global brand is in the electronics sector. 
• The restaurants sector is dominated by US global brands. 
 
As we have seen earlier, out of 45 possible classes in the Nice system (Table 14), 
the first 34 are for Goods (75.6%) and the last 11 are for Services (24.4%); but in our study 
we found that overall 63.52% of all classes filed (for our studied trademarks) were for 
Goods classes and 36.48% were for Services classes.  A more interesting fact is that overall, 
out of the eight top classes (which by themselves represent an impressive 48.56% of the 
overall volume of total classes filed) five of these classes were Service classes. On the other 
hand seven out of the eight least used classes, representing just 3.39% of all classes filed, 
were for Goods classes (Table 27). This finding could be related to the fact that developed 
countries are service economies. Overall the most used classification is 9 and the least used 
classification is 13 with 9.35% and 0.25% respectively of the total volume of classes filed. 
Class 9 is related to electrical/electronic instruments, apparatus, etc., and class 13 is related 
to firearms, explosives and fireworks. 
 
COO of brands were categorized on three geographical regions, Americas, Europe 
and Asia with 4, 11 and 3 countries respectively in each region. From the beginning we 
could start seeing some differences on the trademark patterns for each region. For example 
from Table 28 we can see that for the Americas we have that Fast Moving Consume Goods 
(FMCG) and Electronics are the leading industrial sectors in this region, with 12 and 11 
brands respectively in each sector or about 28% of the brands in this region (Note that by 
itself, the US dominates the Americas region). In Europe, with a total of 53 companies, the 
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Luxury and Financial Services sectors were the two top categories with nine brands each 
sector or 35.85% of all the brands in this region (alcohol came a close third with eight 
brands). Asia was an interesting case as its brands concentrated exclusively around the 
Automotive and Electronics sectors with five brands in the first sector and seven in the 
second sector. We also found some that 33% (3 out of 9) of French brands are in “Luxury”, 
66% (4 out of 6) of Italian brands are in “Luxury”, 45% (5 out of 11) of German brands 
are in “Automotive”, 33% (3 out of 9) Swiss brands are in “Financial Services”, 50% (4 
out of 8) Japanese brands are in “Electronics” and the other 50% are in “Automotive” and 
the US brands (the most industry diversified COO) are present in 23 out of 26 possible 
sectors. Also from Table 28 we can notice that “Alcohol” is the most prevalent sector across 
all countries, with nine countries with a brand in this category (note that “Electronics” have 
more brands in the category but it is more concentrated on fewer countries). When we 
analyze the Group classification “Drinks” also comes on top with a total of ten countries 
owing a brand in this category. Also note that the only categories that have presence in all 
geographical regions are the “Automotive” and “Electronics” sectors. A total of 78 of these 
Best Global brands or 53% have the US as their COO. The country with the second largest 
amount of global brands is Germany with 11 brands or 7.48%, followed by France with 
nine brands or 6.12% of the overall number of brands.  
 
In absolute terms, German brand Nivea is the largest single applicant with a total 
of 148 trademarks for that one brand. US based brands, Marlboro comes second with total 
129 trademarks, closely followed by MTV with 119 applications (Table 29). But when it 
comes to total classifications filed, although it only has 45 trademarks, BP takes the top 
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spot with 588 classes filed. When we differentiate between Good and Service 
classifications, Disney has an important lead on the Good classification with 424 out of 
their 542 total individual classifications on this group of classes. On the other hand, when 
it comes to Service classes, Swiss brand Zurich takes the lead with a total of 268 service 
classes filed. In relative terms, although it is less uncommon for brands to exclusively have 
“word” trademarks (APPLE, HSBC, TIME, FINANCIAL TIMES), it is rarer to find brands 
with just “non-word” trademarks such as LEVI’S and PUMA, but their trademark 
applications (during the time frame of our study) was minimal and any assumption here 
could be misleading. Overall German BMW is the brand that files more classes per 
trademark with an average of 16.89 CLASS/TM, followed by Dutch PHILIPSs and US 
based CATERPILLAR with 15.75 and 13.63 CLASS/TM respectively. Although there a 
few companies that have filed for just “Goods” classes (GILLETTE, HEINZ, KLEENEX, 
CAMPBELL’S, WRIGLEY, DURACELL AND LEVI’S) only one brand has filed 
services classes almost exclusively, AXA. 
 
As we will see in Tables 30-33, although we have 18 “COO” countries for our Best 
Global brands, only seven of them have enough critical mass for us to feel comfortable to 
make observations and assumptions on them (six or more Best Global brands). These seven 
COO have been highlighted on Table 30. On Table 31 we could see a detailed summary of 
all the classes filed for each COO of the brand. Following a pattern that we will also notice 
when we talk about overall regions, we could see from Table 30 that Japanese MNEs have 
the highest ratio of trademarks per brand (40.75TM/BRAND), i.e., for each brand they 
own, they seek to protect their brands more actively through trademarks, while French 
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brands have the lowest (18TM/BRAND). On the other hand UK brands seek protection in 
more areas (classes) on average with almost 186 CLASS/BRAND, i.e., for each brand they 
own as a COO, they seek to protect their brands on more “fronts” by classes per brand. 
Additionally, let us note that out of the seven largest “COO” countries for brands, the three 
top filers of classes per trademark (CLASS/TM) are European COO (Germany, Italy and 
UK). Furthermore, Swiss brands at .83, are the only brands related to those seven countries 
that have a GOODS/SERVICES ratio lower than one and well below the average ratio of 
1.74 GOOD/SERVICES for all brands, this indicates that Swiss brands have more service 
related classes filed with their trademarks than any of the other brands. On Table 32 we 
can appreciate how US brands have basically an absolute dominance on applications per 
single class, although this is most likely because the US brands are the number one 
trademark and class filer (with 50.38% and 45.75% respectively). Still we have four 
instances in which brands from a different country are the top class applicant. We have that 
brands from Germany because of their “Automotive” industry snatch class 13 (related to 
firearms, explosive and fireworks) and class 23 (related to yarns and threads). We also have 
that overall, Japan as an COO for brands, thanks to strong brands in the “Automotive” 
industry is the top filer for class 12 (related to vehicles) and the UK brands overall, thanks 
to brands like Smirnoff and Johnnie Walker, are the top filer for class 33 (related to 
alcoholic beverages, except beer). When we go to the COO brand level we can also see 
some interesting patterns of trademark protection. On Table 33 we could see for example 
how class 9 is the top class for countries such as Canada, Finland and Taiwan, which at the 
time had Blackberry, Nokia and HTC as their strongest brands (Class 9 is, amongst other 
things, related to apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images). 
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Also we have countries with strong banking/financial institutions and activities such as 
Spain, Switzerland and UK with class 36 (related to insurance, financial and monetary 
affairs) as their top class. All these reinforces that idea that trademark protection is not the 
same for all, and that specific MNE/countries could concentrate their efforts protecting 
their brands/trademarks in areas that matter the most to them. 
 
Some of the most interesting patterns are observable at the regional level as we 
cluster all brands, trademarks and classes into just three categories and it is easier to identify 
the aggregate effects of trademark protection. On Table 35 we could see a detailed 
summary of all the classes filed per region. One the most interesting observations at the 
regional level (Table 34) is that on average Asian brands (Asian MNEs) file for more 
trademarks per brand than any other geographical regions; 41.33 vs. an overall average of 
29.38 TM/BRAND for all Best Global brands combined. On the other hand, on average 
European brands are more likely to file for more class protection for each individual 
trademark they own (4.06 CLASS/TM). We also identify overall similarities amongst these 
groups, the most important is the one related to the GOODS/SERVICES ratio which are 
easier to see if we convert the ratios into percentages, this way we will have for the 
Americas, Asia, Europe and Overall, the percentage of “Good” classes filed per trademark 
are 62.90%, 66.83%, 63.48% and 63.52 respectively; and 37.10%, 33.17%, 36.52% and 
36.48% respectively for “Service” classes. Overall, even though the Americas (thanks to 
the US) dominate on applications per single class, Europe as a whole has gained significant 
terrain (Table 36). The Americas barely lead the ranking with 23 individual classes going 
to the Americas and 22 individual classes going to Europe (Asia does not have dominance 
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on any single class but also this region only a minority fraction of the overall filings; 8.16% 
as opposed to 55.78% for the Americas and 36.05% for Europe). Analyzing Table 37 we 
found another key similarity (and difference); whereas for the Americas and Asia (and also 
Overall) the top class is 9 (a Good class), for Europe the top class is a Service class, 36 (see 
Table 14 for class description).  Additionally for both the Americas and Asia (and also 
overall) the top three spots for individual classes are in this order: two “Goods” classes and 
one “Services” class. For Europe it is the opposite, two “Services” classes followed by one 
“Goods” class. 
 
Even though we have a total of 26 Sector classifications as proposed by Interbrand 
for our Best Global brands, similarly to the COO issue, we have only identified 11 sectors 
that have enough critical mass (five or more Best Global brands). These sectors have been 
highlighted on Table 38. On Table 39 we can see a detailed summary of all the classes filed 
on each specific sector. The Electronics sector, with a total of 20 brands, not only has the 
highest number of Best Global brands in a single category but also has the highest number 
of trademarks with 619 or 14.22% of the overall amount of trademarks in our study (Table 
38). This sector was closely followed by Financial Services and Fast Moving Consumer 
Goods (FMCG) with 17 brands apiece, and with 583 and 600 trademarks each respectively 
or 13.49% and 13.89% of the total applications each. The Automotive sector has the highest 
ratio of trademarks per brand with 43.38 TM/BRAND and the Luxury category has the 
lowest ratio of trademarks per brand with 11.45 TM/BRAND but it has the second highest 
ratio of classifications per trademark (C/T) with 5.44 CLASS/TM (so for each trademark 
they week more class protection). As it could be expected, sectors such as Alcohol, FMCG 
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and Luxury have ratios higher than one on the GOODS/SERVICES relationship (actually 
they have the highest ratios for all sectors highlighted), but also sectors that rely heavily on 
service activities, such as Hospitality and Financial Services have ratios that are lower than 
one, with Hospitality having the lowest of all sectors, i.e., they concentrate their 
trademarking protection on Services classes. Although Electronics is the category that has 
more brands and trademarks overall, the Automotive sector is the one with the highest 
number of classes overall (15.59%) and as well, this sector is the top filer for 15 individual 
classes (Table 40). The Electronic sector comes in second place with both, the overall 
percentage of classes filed with 14.85% and with the number of individual classes where 
it is the highest applicant (with a total of ten). At the individual sector level class 9 is the 
most important classification for many of them (including Electronics) but for other sectors 
(Financial Services, Hospitality, Internet Services, Media and Telecommunications) that 
are intrinsically service oriented the most important class is a service class. 
 
In the last part of our data analysis we sought to consolidate some of the original 
Interbrand’s sectors (please see Table 38) into larger groups based on the brand’s business 
“affinity” (Table 46). Just as with the regions, some of the most interesting patterns are 
observable at this level. We clustered all brands, trademarks and classes into nine 
categories, all of them with enough critical mass that should allow us to identify the 
aggregate effects of trademark protection on these broader groups. On Table 43 we could 
see a detailed summary of all the classes filed on each specific group. On Table 42 we find 
that now our group Consumer Goods is the most trademark intensive of all. Also our group 
manufacturing has the highest ratio of classes per trademark, which means that for each 
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trademark more “areas” of protection are sought for. Also we have two clear opposites on 
the GOODS/SERVICES ratio, with Consumer Goods having almost as many as seven 
times more “Goods” classes than “Service” classes, and the Services group having 
basically twice as many “Services” classes than “Goods” classes. On Table 44 we can note 
that two groups dominate the applications per single class; Technology with 15 single 
classes and Transportation with ten single classes. Table 45 further confirms what we have 
observed all along, sectors that are essentially services oriented will seek different 
trademark protection than other groups, this way we have groups Media and Services 
having as a top class a service related classification.  
 
 
 
 
 
vi. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on our extensive research, in this paper we proposed to the reader the idea 
that trademarks were economic assets that store value and from which firms could derive 
an economic benefit. We also indicated that brand owners will seek trademark protection 
for their brands and then actively protect these trademarks (and thus their brands) by doing 
a thorough cost-benefit analysis. So the MNE will protect and safeguard the integrity of 
their IP as long as the expected economic value of protecting these trademarks is higher 
than the aggregate cost associated with defending the economic asset against actual or 
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“perceived” infringement (perceived infringement could become a costly material 
violation to their IP in the future and needs to be deterred swiftly).  
 
From an economic perspective, with this paper we sought to better understand the 
characteristics of the protection mechanisms that MNE, as profit seeking organizations, 
use in order to maximize the value of their trademarks and the economic benefits that could 
be derived from the private usage of this form of IP.  The protection mechanism (key to an 
IP system) is what confers on the asset its private aspect (exclusive ownership and control) 
which ultimately allows the MNE to have the final authority to decide and determine the 
most efficient and profitable way to use the trademark by an affiliated or non-affiliated 
unit. In order to address their maximization problems, MNEs create and follow certain 
strategies at the corporate level targeted at protecting and enforcing their exclusive rights 
over their trademarks, otherwise all the revenue productivity attributes of these economic 
assets will be lost. Furthermore, without this protection mechanism, the firm would lose 
any incentives to invest in developing the potential of the brand/trademark duality since it 
will not be possible to maximize the returns on their investments (investments that could 
be related to brand awareness, R&D on the goods or services associated on with the brand, 
etc.).  
 
In our research we extensively analyzed detailed trademark data across different 
economic sectors, geographical regions and political borders and we validated the 
hypothesis that the characteristics of trademark protection are not the same for all MNEs 
and moreover that these firms are likely to address their needs for trademark protection in 
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different ways (some prefer direct ownership of the assets by the parent MNE, some others 
not, some will seek to set up IP holdings, some will choose to file a high number of 
trademarks per brand, some will prefer to file less trademarks but more classes per 
trademark, some heavily trademark on service classes, etc.). More research is needed to 
determine how the MNE corporate structure and firm specific idiosyncrasies, together with 
country and regional level characteristics (cultural, legal, etc.) affect the way these MNEs 
understand and seek trademark protection. But with our study we also showed that although 
there are differences across different countries and regions, there are also some similarities 
as we saw on how overall there is a convergence on the GOODS/SERVICES ratios for 
these economies. Also with our research we showed that IP protection does not consist of 
just one-fit-all/all-purpose/quick-fix/all-terrain single trademark. Trademark protection is 
a highly complex process targeted at defending the value of these assets that responds not 
only to the idiosyncratic strategies of the MNE but also trademark protection is handled 
differently depending on the structure of the MNE. Environmental and cultural 
characteristics related to the origins of the brand/MNE also seem to play a role. MNEs 
from different countries and region handle these economic assets in a way that trademark 
protection will allow them to maximize the expected return on their IP so protection is not 
the same across the board. 
 
Based on our research and using the widely accepted Nice Classification standards 
as a background (see Table 14, p.160), we want to propose to the reader the idea that 
abstractly trademarks are tetracontapentagons (45-sided polygons) and brand owners could 
choose or not (or be allowed or not) to protect their brands (and extensions) on just one 
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side or on multiple sides of the trademark polygon. To not protect the trademark on one 
“side” of this polygon does not mean that the trademark will fail, but it could make it 
weaker. The opposite could also be true as the trademark owners might face more 
challenges to their trademarks if they decide to seek protection on all “sides”. So the proper 
combination of CLASS/TM is for the MNEs to decide based on their needs and on the 
strategies that they have chosen to follow. Moreover, we also claim that for all practical 
purposes trademarks are like the immune defense system of brands. Each trademark 
specialized on protecting specific aspects of the entire MNE brand eco-system. From the 
MNE perspective, a weak trademark protection system could lead to the death of the brand. 
Following the immune system analogy, trademarks are “living” corporate organisms 
(assets); they also need to be protected and taken care of through any legal mechanism at 
the MNE disposal. This definition could help us understand why we found multiple 
trademarks for each of the top brands. 
 
To finalize our conclusions we believe that additional research is needed to further 
unravel all the intricacies of trademark protection. It is important to look, for example, in 
more depth at the Law and Economics aspect of trademark protection. The same way a law 
clerk can influence the opinions of a court, legal professionals assisting the brand owners 
can influence in the way firms seek protection. Lastly, more research is needed on the issue 
of tax havens and trademarks.  
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FIGURE 5 – I.B.G. BRAND: LOGOS, BRANDS AND TRADEMARKS 
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FIGURE 5 (Cont’d) – I.B.G. BRAND: LOGOS, BRANDS AND TRADEMARKS 
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FIGURE 5 (Cont’d) – I.B.G. BRAND: LOGOS, BRANDS AND TRADEMARKS 
159 
 
 
TABLE 11 – WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION – MEMBER STATES 
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Afghanistan Georgia Pakistan
Albania Germany Panama
Algeria Ghana Papua New Guinea
Andorra Greece Paraguay
Angola Grenada Peru
Antigua and Barbuda Guatemala Philippines
Argentina Guinea Poland
Armenia Guinea-Bissau Portugal
Australia Guyana Qatar
Austria Haiti Republic of Korea
Azerbaijan Holy See Republic of Moldova
Bahamas Honduras Romania
Bahrain Hungary Russian Federation
Bangladesh Iceland Rwanda
Barbados India Saint Kitts and Nevis
Belarus Indonesia Saint Lucia
Belgium Iran (Islamic Republic of) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Belize Iraq Samoa
Benin Ireland San Marino
Bhutan Israel Sao Tome and Principe
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Italy Saudi Arabia
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jamaica Senegal
Botswana Japan Serbia
Brazil Jordan Seychelles
Brunei Darussalam Kazakhstan Sierra Leone
Bulgaria Kenya Singapore
Burkina Faso Kiribati Slovakia
Burundi Kuwait Slovenia
Cabo Verde Kyrgyzstan Somalia
Cambodia Lao People's Democratic Republic South Africa
Cameroon Latvia Spain
Canada Lebanon Sri Lanka
Central African Republic Lesotho Sudan
Chad Liberia Suriname
Chile Libya Swaziland
China Liechtenstein Sweden
Colombia Lithuania Switzerland
Comoros Luxembourg Syrian Arab Republic
Congo Madagascar Tajikistan
Costa Rica Malawi Thailand
Côte d'Ivoire Malaysia Republic of Macedonia
Croatia Maldives Togo
Cuba Mali Tonga
Cyprus Malta Trinidad and Tobago
Czech Republic Mauritania Tunisia
Dem. People's Republic of Korea Mauritius Turkey
Democratic Republic of the Congo Mexico Turkmenistan
Denmark Monaco Tuvalu
Djibouti Mongolia Uganda
Dominica Montenegro Ukraine
Dominican Republic Morocco United Arab Emirates
Ecuador Mozambique United Kingdom
Egypt Myanmar United Republic of Tanzania
El Salvador Namibia United States of America
Equatorial Guinea Nepal Uruguay
Eritrea Netherlands Uzbekistan
Estonia New Zealand Vanuatu
Ethiopia Nicaragua Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Fiji Niger Viet Nam
Finland Nigeria Yemen
France Niue Zambia
Gabon Norway Zimbabwe
Gambia Oman
Total Members : 188
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) - MEMBER STATES AS OF MARCH 2015
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TABLE 12 – MADRID SYSTEM FOR THE INT’L REGISTRATION OF MARKS34 
 
                                                            
34 The OAIP and Zimbabwe will become Contracting Parties in March 2015. 
CONTRACTING PARTY MADRID AGREEMENT MADRID PROTOCOL
African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) - YES
Albania YES YES
Algeria YES -
Antigua and Barbuda - YES
Armenia YES YES
Australia - YES
Austria YES YES
Azerbaijan YES YES
Bahrain - YES
Belarus YES YES
Belgium YES YES
Bhutan YES YES
Bosnia and Herzegovina YES YES
Botswana - YES
Bulgaria YES YES
China YES YES
Colombia - YES
Croatia YES YES
Cuba YES YES
Cyprus YES YES
Czech YES YES
Democratic People's Republic of Korea YES YES
Denmark - YES
Egypt YES YES
Estonia - YES
European Union - YES
Finland - YES
France YES YES
Georgia - YES
Germany YES YES
Ghana - YES
Greece - YES
Hungary YES YES
Iceland - YES
India - YES
Iran (Islamic Republic of) YES YES
Ireland - YES
Israel - YES
Italy YES YES
Japan - YES
Kazakhstan YES YES
Kenya YES YES
Kyrgyzstan YES YES
Latvia YES YES
Lesotho YES YES
Liberia YES YES
Liechtenstein YES YES
MADRID SYSTEM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS
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TABLE 12 (Cont’d) – MADRID SYSTEM FOR THE INT’L REGISTRATION OF MARKS 
 
 
CONTRACTING PARTY MADRID AGREEMENT MADRID PROTOCOL
Lithuania - YES
Luxembourg YES YES
Madagascar - YES
Mexico - YES
Monaco YES YES
Mongolia YES YES
Montenegro YES YES
Morocco YES YES
Mozambique YES YES
Namibia YES YES
Netherlands YES YES
New Zealand - YES
Norway - YES
Oman - YES
Philippines - YES
Poland YES YES
Portugal YES YES
Republic of Korea - YES
Republic Moldova YES YES
Romania YES YES
Russian Federation YES YES
Rwanda - YES
San Marino YES YES
Sao Tome and Principe - YES
Serbia YES YES
Sierra Leone YES YES
Singapore - YES
Slovakia YES YES
Slovenia YES YES
Spain YES YES
Sudan YES YES
Swaziland YES YES
Sweden - YES
Switzerland YES YES
Syrian Arab Republic - YES
Tajikistan YES YES
Republic of Macedonia YES YES
Tunisia - YES
Turkey - YES
Turkmenistan - YES
Ukraine YES YES
United Kingdom - YES
United States of America - YES
Uzbekistan - YES
Viet Nam YES YES
Zambia - YES
Zimbabwe - YES
Total Members 55 93
MADRID SYSTEM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION OF MARKS
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TABLE 13 – NICE AGREEMENT – MEMBER STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Albania Guinea Portugal
Algeria Hungary Republic of Korea
Argentina Iceland Republic of Moldova
Armenia Ireland Romania
Australia Israel Russian Federation
Austria Italy Saint Kitts and Nevis
Azerbaijan Jamaica Saint Lucia
Bahrain Japan Serbia
Barbados Jordan Singapore
Belarus Kazakhstan Slovakia
Belgium Kyrgyzstan Slovenia
Benin Latvia Spain
Bosnia and Herzegovina Lebanon Suriname
Bulgaria Liechtenstein Sweden
China Lithuania Switzerland
Croatia Luxembourg Syrian Arab Republic
Cuba Malawi Tajikistan
Czech Republic Malaysia Republic of Macedonia
Dem. People's Republic of Korea Mexico Trinidad and Tobago
Denmark Monaco Tunisia
Dominica Mongolia Turkey
Egypt Montenegro Turkmenistan
Estonia Morocco Ukraine
Finland Mozambique United Kingdom
France Netherlands United Republic of Tanzania
Georgia New Zealand United States of America
Germany Norway Uruguay
Greece Poland Uzbekistan
Total Members : 84
NICE AGREEMENT - MEMBER STATES AS OF MARCH 2015
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TABLE 14 - NICE CLASSIFICATION HEADINGS (10TH EDITION)35 
CLASS LIST OF TERMS 
1 
Chemicals used in industry, science and photography, as well as in agriculture, 
horticulture and forestry; Unprocessed artificial resins, unprocessed plastics; 
Manures; Fire extinguishing compositions; Tempering and soldering preparations; 
Chemical substances for preserving foodstuffs; Tanning substances; Adhesives used 
in industry 
2 
Paints, varnishes, lacquers; Preservatives against rust and against deterioration of 
wood; Colorants; Mordants; Raw natural resins; Metals in foil and powder form for 
painters, decorators, printers and artists 
3 
Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, 
scouring and abrasive preparations; Soaps; Perfumery, essential oils, cosmetics, hair 
lotions; Dentifrices 
4 
Industrial oils and greases; Lubricants; Dust absorbing, wetting and binding 
compositions; Fuels (including motor spirit) and illuminants; Candles and wicks for 
lighting 
5 
Pharmaceutical and veterinary preparations; Sanitary preparations for medical 
purposes; Dietetic food and substances adapted for medical or veterinary use, food 
for babies; Dietary supplements for humans and animals; Plasters, materials for 
dressings; Material for stopping teeth, dental wax; Disinfectants; Preparations for 
destroying vermin; Fungicides, herbicides 
6 
Common metals and their alloys; Metal building materials; Transportable buildings 
of metal; Materials of metal for railway tracks; Non-electric cables and wires of 
common metal; Ironmongery, small items of metal hardware; Pipes and tubes of 
metal; Safes; Goods of common metal not included in other classes; Ores 
7 
Machines and machine tools; Motors and engines (except for land vehicles); 
Machine coupling and transmission components (except for land vehicles); 
Agricultural implements other than hand-operated; Incubators for eggs; Automatic 
vending machines 
8 Hand tools and implements (hand-operated); Cutlery; Side arms; Razors 
9 
Scientific, nautical, surveying, photographic, cinematographic, optical, weighing, 
measuring, signalling, checking (supervision), life-saving and teaching apparatus 
and instruments; Apparatus and instruments for conducting, switching, 
transforming, accumulating, regulating or controlling electricity; Apparatus for 
recording, transmission or reproduction of sound or images; Magnetic data carriers, 
recording discs; Compact discs, DVDs and other digital recording media; 
Mechanisms for coin-operated apparatus; Cash registers, calculating machines, data 
processing equipment, computers; Computer software; Fire-extinguishing apparatus 
 
                                                            
35 http://oami.europa.eu/ec2/classheadings/?niceClassLang=en (02/22/15) 
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TABLE 14 (Cont’) - NICE CLASSIFICATION HEADINGS (10TH EDITION) 
CLASS LIST OF TERMS 
10 Surgical, medical, dental and veterinary apparatus and instruments, artificial limbs, eyes and teeth; Orthopedic articles; Suture materials 
11 Apparatus for lighting, heating, steam generating, cooking, refrigerating, drying, ventilating, water supply and sanitary purposes 
12 Vehicles; Apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water 
13 Firearms; Ammunition and projectiles; Explosives; Fireworks 
14 
Precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, 
not included in other classes; Jewellery, precious stones; Horological and 
chronometric instruments 
15 Musical instruments 
16 
Paper, cardboard and goods made from these materials, not included in other classes; 
Printed matter; Bookbinding material; Photographs; Stationery; Adhesives for 
stationery or household purposes; Artists' materials; Paint brushes; Typewriters and 
office requisites (except furniture); Instructional and teaching material (except 
apparatus); Plastic materials for packaging (not included in other classes); Printers' 
type; Printing blocks 
17 
Rubber, gutta-percha, gum, asbestos, mica and goods made from these materials and 
not included in other classes; Plastics in extruded form for use in manufacture; 
Packing, stopping and insulating materials; Flexible pipes, not of metal 
18 
Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included 
in other classes; Animal skins, hides; Trunks and travelling bags; Umbrellas and 
parasols; Walking sticks; Whips, harness and saddlery 
19 Building materials (non-metallic); Non-metallic rigid pipes for building; Asphalt, pitch and bitumen; Non-metallic transportable buildings; Monuments, not of metal 
20 
Furniture, mirrors, picture frames; Goods (not included in other classes) of wood, 
cork, reed, cane, wicker, horn, bone, ivory, whalebone, shell, amber, mother-of-
pearl, meerschaum and substitutes for all these materials, or of plastics 
21 
Household or kitchen utensils and containers; Combs and sponges; Brushes (except 
paintbrushes); Brush-making materials; Articles for cleaning purposes; Steelwool; 
Unworked or semi-worked glass (except glass used in building); Glassware, 
porcelain and earthenware not included in other classes 
22 
Ropes, string, nets, tents, awnings, tarpaulins, sails, sacks and bags (not included in 
other classes); Padding and stuffing materials (except of rubber or plastics); Raw 
fibrous textile materials 
23 Yarns and threads, for textile use 
24 Textiles and textile goods, not included in other classes; Bed covers; Table covers 
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TABLE 14 (Cont’) - NICE CLASSIFICATION HEADINGS (10TH EDITION) 
CLASS LIST OF TERMS 
25 Clothing, footwear, headgear 
26 Lace and embroidery, ribbons and braid; Buttons, hooks and eyes, pins and needles; 
Artificial flowers 
27 Carpets, rugs, mats and matting, linoleum and other materials for covering existing floors; Wall hangings (non-textile) 
28 Games and playthings; Gymnastic and sporting articles not included in other classes; Decorations for Christmas trees 
29 
Meat, fish, poultry and game; Meat extracts; Preserved, frozen, dried and cooked 
fruits and vegetables; Jellies, jams, compotes; Eggs; Milk and milk products; Edible 
oils and fats 
30 
Coffee, tea, cocoa and artificial coffee; Rice; Tapioca and sago; Flour and 
preparations made from cereals; Bread, pastry and confectionery; Edible ices; Sugar, 
honey, treacle; Yeast, baking-powder; Salt; Mustard; Vinegar, sauces (condiments); 
Spices; Ice 
31 
Grains and agricultural, horticultural and forestry products not included in other 
classes; Live animals; Fresh fruits and vegetables; Seeds; Natural plants and flowers; 
Foodstuffs for animals; Malt 
32 Beers; Mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic beverages; Fruit beverages and fruit juices; Syrups and other preparations for making beverages 
33 Alcoholic beverages (except beers) 
34 Tobacco; Smokers' articles; Matches 
35 Advertising; Business management; Business administration; Office functions 
36 Insurance; Financial affairs; Monetary affairs; Real estate affairs 
37 Building construction; Repair; Installation services 
38 Telecommunications 
39 Transport; Packaging and storage of goods; Travel arrangement 
40 Treatment of materials 
41 Education; Providing of training; Entertainment; Sporting and cultural activities 
42 
Scientific and technological services and research and design relating thereto; 
Industrial analysis and research services; Design and development of computer 
hardware and software 
43 Services for providing food and drink; Temporary accommodation 
44 Medical services; Veterinary services; Hygienic and beauty care for human beings or animals; Agriculture, horticulture and forestry services 
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TABLE 14 (Cont’) - NICE CLASSIFICATION HEADINGS (10TH EDITION) 
CLASS LIST OF TERMS 
45 Legal services; Security services for the protection of property and individuals; Personal and social services rendered by others to meet the needs of individuals 
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TABLE 15 – I.B.G. BRANDS: SUMMARY INFORMATION 
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LK
SW
AG
EN
Vo
lk
sw
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Vo
lk
sw
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
YE
S
YE
S
48
NI
NT
EN
DO
Ni
nt
en
do
 C
o.
, L
td
.
Ni
nt
en
do
 C
o.
, L
td
.
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
As
ia
Ja
pa
n
Ja
pa
n
YE
S
NO
49
HE
IN
Z
H.
 J.
 H
ei
nz
 C
om
pa
ny
H.
 J.
 H
ei
nz
 C
om
pa
ny
 Li
m
ite
d
FM
CG
Fo
od
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
50
FO
RD
Fo
rd
 M
ot
or
 C
om
pa
ny
Fo
rd
 M
ot
or
 C
om
pa
ny
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
CO
UN
TR
Y O
F O
RI
GI
N 
(C
OO
)
PA
RE
NT
 
M
NE
 C
TM
 
OW
NE
R
M
UL
TI
PL
E 
CT
M
 
AP
PL
IC
AN
TS
No
.
BR
AN
D 
NA
M
E
PA
RE
NT
 M
NE
CT
M
 O
W
NE
R 
ON
 R
EC
OR
D 
AT
 TH
E O
HI
M
CL
AS
SI
FI
CA
TI
ON
RE
GI
ON
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TABLE 15 (Cont’d) – I.B.G. BRANDS: SUMMARY INFORMATION 
 
SE
CT
OR
GR
OU
P
BR
AN
D
PA
RE
NT
 M
NE
51
CO
LG
AT
E
Co
lg
at
e-
Pa
lm
ol
iv
e 
Co
m
pa
ny
Co
lg
at
e-
Pa
lm
ol
iv
e 
Co
m
pa
ny
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
52
DA
NO
NE
Da
no
ne
 S.
A.
Co
m
pa
gn
ie
 G
er
va
is 
Da
no
ne
 S.
A
FM
CG
Fo
od
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
NO
YE
S
53
AX
A
AX
A 
S.
A.
AX
A 
S.
A.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
YE
S
NO
54
M
OR
GA
N 
ST
AN
LE
Y
M
or
ga
n 
St
an
le
y
M
or
ga
n 
St
an
le
y
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
55
NE
ST
LÉ
Ne
st
lé
 S.
A.
So
cié
té
 d
es
 P
ro
du
its
 N
es
tlé
 S.
A.
FM
CG
Fo
od
Eu
ro
pe
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
NO
YE
S
56
BL
AC
KB
ER
RY
Re
se
ar
ch
 In
 M
ot
io
n 
Lim
ite
d
Re
se
ar
ch
 In
 M
ot
io
n 
Lim
ite
d
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Ca
na
da
Ca
na
da
YE
S
NO
57
XE
RO
X
Xe
ro
x C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Xe
ro
x C
or
po
ra
tio
n
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
58
M
TV
Vi
ac
om
, I
nc
Vi
ac
om
, I
nc
M
ed
ia
M
ed
ia
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
59
AU
DI
Vo
lk
sw
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Vo
lk
sw
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
YE
S
NO
60
AD
ID
AS
Ad
id
as
 A
G
Ad
id
as
 A
G
Sp
or
tin
g G
oo
ds
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
YE
S
YE
S
61
HY
UN
DA
I
Hy
un
da
i M
ot
or
 G
ro
up
Hy
un
da
i C
ar
d 
Co
m
pa
ny
 Li
m
ite
d
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
As
ia
So
ut
h 
Ko
re
a
So
ut
h 
Ko
re
a
NO
YE
S
62
KF
C
Yu
m
! B
ra
nd
s, 
In
c.
Ke
nt
uc
ky
 Fr
ie
d 
Ch
ick
en
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l H
ol
di
ng
s, 
In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
63
SP
RI
TE
Th
e 
Co
ca
-C
ol
a C
om
pa
ny
Th
e 
Co
ca
-C
ol
a C
om
pa
ny
Be
ve
ra
ge
s
Dr
in
ks
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
64
CA
TE
RP
ILL
AR
Ca
te
rp
ill
ar
 In
c.
Ca
te
rp
ill
ar
 In
c.
Di
ve
rs
ifi
ed
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
65
AV
ON
Av
on
 P
ro
du
ct
s, 
In
c
Av
on
 P
ro
du
ct
s, 
In
c
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
66
HE
RM
ÉS
He
rm
ès
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
CA
He
rm
ès
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
CA
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
YE
S
NO
67
AL
LIA
NZ
Al
lia
nz
 SE
Al
lia
nz
 SE
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
YE
S
NO
68
SA
NT
AN
DE
R
BA
NC
O 
SA
NT
AN
DE
R,
 S.
A.
BA
NC
O 
SA
NT
AN
DE
R,
 S.
A.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Sp
ai
n
Sp
ai
n
YE
S
NO
69
PA
NA
SO
NI
C
Pa
na
so
ni
c C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Pa
na
so
ni
c C
or
po
ra
tio
n
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
As
ia
Ja
pa
n
Ja
pa
n
YE
S
NO
70
CA
RT
IE
R
Co
m
pa
gn
ie
 Fi
na
nc
iè
re
 R
ich
em
on
t S
A
Co
m
pa
gn
ie
 Fi
na
nc
iè
re
 R
ich
em
on
t S
A
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
YE
S
NO
71
KL
EE
NE
X
Ki
m
be
rly
-C
la
rk
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Ki
m
be
rly
-C
la
rk
 W
or
ld
w
id
e,
 In
c.
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
72
PO
RS
CH
E
Vo
lk
sw
ag
en
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Dr
. I
ng
. h
.c.
 F.
 P
or
sc
he
 A
kt
ie
ng
es
el
lsc
ha
ft
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
NO
NO
73
TI
FF
AN
Y &
 C
O.
Ti
ffa
ny
 &
 C
om
pa
ny
Ti
ffa
ny
 &
 C
om
pa
ny
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
74
SH
EL
L
Ro
ya
l D
ut
ch
 Sh
el
l p
lc
Ro
ya
l D
ut
ch
 Sh
el
l p
lc
En
er
gy
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Eu
ro
pe
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
YE
S
NO
75
VI
SA
Vi
sa
 In
c.
Vi
sa
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l S
er
vi
ce
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
76
YA
HO
O!
Ya
ho
o!
 In
c.
Ya
ho
o!
 In
c.
In
te
rn
et
 Se
rv
ice
s
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
77
M
OE
T &
 C
HA
ND
ON
LV
M
H 
M
oë
t H
en
ne
ss
y L
ou
is 
Vu
itt
on
 S.
A.
M
HC
S
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
NO
NO
78
JA
CK
 D
AN
IE
L'S
Br
ow
n-
Fo
rm
an
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Br
ow
n-
Fo
rm
an
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
79
BA
RC
LA
YS
Ba
rc
la
ys
 P
LC
Ba
rc
la
ys
 P
LC
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
YE
S
NO
80
AD
OB
E
Ad
ob
e 
Sy
st
em
s I
nc
or
po
ra
te
d
Ad
ob
e 
Sy
st
em
s I
nc
or
po
ra
te
d
Co
m
pu
te
r S
of
tw
ar
e
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
81
PI
ZZ
A 
HU
T
Yu
m
! B
ra
nd
s, 
In
c.
Pi
zz
a H
ut
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l, 
LL
C
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
82
CR
ED
IT
 SU
IS
SE
Cr
ed
it 
Su
iss
e 
Gr
ou
p
Cr
ed
it 
Su
iss
e 
Gr
ou
p
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
YE
S
YE
S
83
JO
HN
SO
N 
& 
JO
HN
SO
N
Jo
hn
so
n 
& 
Jo
hn
so
n
Jo
hn
so
n 
& 
Jo
hn
so
n
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
84
GA
P
Ga
p 
In
c.
Ga
p 
In
c.
Ap
pa
re
l
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
85
3M
3M
 C
om
pa
ny
3M
 C
om
pa
ny
Di
ve
rs
ifi
ed
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
86
CO
RO
NA
An
he
us
er
-B
us
ch
 In
Be
v N
.V
CE
RV
EC
ER
IA
 M
OD
EL
O,
 S.
A.
 D
E C
.V
.
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Am
er
ica
s
M
ex
ico
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
87
NI
VE
A
Be
ie
rs
do
rf 
AG
Be
ie
rs
do
rf 
AG
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
y
YE
S
NO
88
JO
HN
NI
E W
AL
KE
R
Di
ag
eo
 p
lc
Di
ag
eo
 B
ra
nd
s B
.V
.
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Eu
ro
pe
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
NO
NO
89
SM
IR
NO
FF
Di
ag
eo
 p
lc
Di
ag
eo
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ica
, I
nc
.
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Eu
ro
pe
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
NO
NO
90
NI
SS
AN
Ni
ss
an
 M
ot
or
 C
o.
, L
td
.
Ni
ss
an
 M
ot
or
 C
o.
, L
td
.
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
As
ia
Ja
pa
n
Ja
pa
n
YE
S
NO
91
HE
IN
EK
EN
He
in
ek
en
 H
ol
di
ng
 N
.V
.
He
in
ek
en
 B
ro
uw
er
ije
n 
B.
V.
Al
co
ho
l
Dr
in
ks
Eu
ro
pe
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
NO
NO
92
UB
S
UB
S A
G
UB
S A
G
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
YE
S
NO
93
AR
M
AN
I
Gi
or
gi
o 
Ar
m
an
i S
.p
.A
Gi
or
gi
o 
Ar
m
an
i S
.p
.A
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ita
ly
Ita
ly
YE
S
NO
94
ZU
RI
CH
Zu
ric
h 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
Gr
ou
p 
AG
Zü
ric
h 
Ve
rs
ich
er
un
gs
-G
es
el
lsc
ha
ft 
AG
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
NO
NO
95
BU
RB
ER
RY
Bu
rb
er
ry
 G
ro
up
 p
lc
Bu
rb
er
ry
 Li
m
ite
d
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
NO
NO
96
ST
AR
BU
CK
S
St
ar
bu
ck
s C
or
po
ra
tio
n
St
ar
bu
ck
s C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
97
JO
HN
 D
EE
RE
De
er
e 
& 
Co
m
pa
ny
De
er
e 
& 
Co
m
pa
ny
Di
ve
rs
ifi
ed
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
98
HT
C
HT
C 
Co
rp
or
at
io
n
HT
C 
Co
rp
or
at
io
n
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
As
ia
Ta
iw
an
Ta
iw
an
YE
S
NO
99
FE
RR
AR
I
Fi
at
 C
hr
ys
le
r A
ut
om
ob
ile
s N
.V
.
Fe
rra
ri 
S.
p.
A.
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Eu
ro
pe
Ita
ly
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
NO
NO
10
0
HA
RL
EY
 D
AV
ID
SO
N
Ha
rle
y-
Da
vi
ds
on
 In
c
H-
D 
M
ich
ig
an
, L
LC
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
CO
UN
TR
Y O
F O
RI
GI
N 
(C
OO
)
PA
RE
NT
 
M
NE
 C
TM
 
OW
NE
R
M
UL
TI
PL
E 
CT
M
 
AP
PL
IC
AN
TS
No
.
BR
AN
D 
NA
M
E
PA
RE
NT
 M
NE
CT
M
 O
W
NE
R 
ON
 R
EC
OR
D 
AT
 TH
E O
HI
M
CL
AS
SI
FI
CA
TI
ON
RE
GI
ON
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SE
CT
OR
GR
OU
P
BR
AN
D
PA
RE
NT
 M
NE
10
1
M
AR
LB
OR
O
Ph
ili
p 
M
or
ris
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l, 
In
c
Ph
ili
p 
M
or
ris
 B
ra
nd
s S
ar
l
To
ba
cc
o
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
YE
S
10
2
LA
NC
OM
E
L'O
ré
al
 S.
A.
LA
NC
OM
E P
AR
FU
M
S E
T B
EA
UT
E &
 C
IE
 (S
NC
)
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Eu
ro
pe
Fr
an
ce
Fr
an
ce
NO
NO
10
3
CA
M
PB
EL
L'S
Ca
m
pb
el
l S
ou
p 
Co
m
pa
ny
Ca
m
pb
el
l S
ou
p 
Co
m
pa
ny
FM
CG
Fo
od
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
10
4
W
RI
GL
EY
M
ar
s, 
In
c.
W
M
. W
RI
GL
EY
 JR
. C
OM
PA
NY
FM
CG
Co
ns
um
er
 G
oo
ds
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
10
5
RO
LE
X
Ro
le
x S
A
Ro
le
x S
A
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
YE
S
YE
S
10
6
BP
BP
 p
lc
BP
 p
lc
En
er
gy
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
Eu
ro
pe
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Un
ite
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
YE
S
NO
10
7
DU
RA
CE
LL
Th
e 
Pr
oc
te
r &
 G
am
bl
e 
Co
.
Du
ra
ce
ll 
Ba
tte
rie
s B
VB
A
El
ec
tro
ni
cs
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
10
8
PR
AD
A
Pr
ad
a G
ro
up
 S.
p.
A.
Pr
ad
a S
.A
.
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ita
ly
Ita
ly
NO
NO
10
9
BU
RG
ER
 K
IN
G
Bu
rg
er
 K
in
g H
ol
di
ng
s, 
In
c.
Bu
rg
er
 K
in
g C
or
po
ra
tio
n.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
11
0
LE
XU
S
To
yo
ta
 M
ot
or
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
To
yo
ta
 M
ot
or
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Au
to
m
ot
iv
e
Tr
an
sp
or
ta
tio
n
As
ia
Ja
pa
n
Ja
pa
n
YE
S
NO
11
1
PU
M
A
Ke
rin
g S
A
Ke
rin
g
Sp
or
tin
g G
oo
ds
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
NO
NO
11
2
PO
LO
 R
AL
PH
 LA
UR
EN
Ra
lp
h 
La
ur
en
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Th
e 
Po
lo
/L
au
re
n 
Co
m
pa
ny
 L.
P.
Lu
xu
ry
Cl
ot
hi
ng
/A
cc
es
so
rie
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
NO
NO
11
3
M
ER
RI
LL
 LY
NC
H
Ba
nk
 o
f A
m
er
ica
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Ba
nk
 o
f A
m
er
ica
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
11
4
AI
G
Am
er
ica
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ro
up
, I
nc
.
Am
er
ica
n 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ro
up
, I
nc
.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Am
er
ica
s
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
Un
ite
d 
St
at
es
YE
S
NO
11
5
IN
G
IN
G 
Gr
oe
p 
N.
V.
IN
G 
Gr
oe
p 
N.
V.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
er
vi
ce
s
Se
rv
ice
s
Eu
ro
pe
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
YE
S
YE
S
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TABLE 16 – COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: I.B.G. BRAND vs. PARENT MNE (COUNT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRAND PARENT MNE
United States 78 76
Germany 11 10
France 9 12
Japan 8 8
Switzerland 8 8
United Kingdom 7 8
Italy 6 3
Netherlands 4 5
South Korea 3 3
Sweden 3 3
Canada 2 2
Spain 2 2
Bermuda 1 1
Denmark 1 1
Finland 1 1
Ireland 1 1
Mexico 1 -
Taiwan 1 1
Belgium - 2
Grand Total 147 147
COUNTRY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (COO)
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TABLE 17 – COUNTRY OF ORIGIN: I.B.G. BRAND vs. PARENT MNE (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRAND PARENT MNE
United States 53.06% 51.70%
Germany 7.48% 6.80%
France 6.12% 8.16%
Japan 5.44% 5.44%
Switzerland 5.44% 5.44%
United Kingdom 4.76% 5.44%
Italy 4.08% 2.04%
Netherlands 2.72% 3.40%
South Korea 2.04% 2.04%
Sweden 2.04% 2.04%
Canada 1.36% 1.36%
Spain 1.36% 1.36%
Bermuda 0.68% 0.68%
Denmark 0.68% 0.68%
Finland 0.68% 0.68%
Ireland 0.68% 0.68%
Mexico 0.68% -
Taiwan 0.68% 0.68%
Belgium - 1.36%
Grand Total 100% 100%
COUNTRY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (COO)
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TABLE 18 – TRADEMARKS REMOVED FROM STUDY 
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TABLE 19 – I.B.G.  BRANDS: COUNT OF BRANDS 
 
REGION Total GROUP Total
Americas 82 Clothing and Accessories 20
Asia 12 Consumer Goods 14
Europe 53 Drinks 16
Grand Total 147 Food 6
Manufacturing 8
Media 6
Services 27
Technology 36
Transportation 14
Grand Total 147
BRAND'S COUNTRY Total SECTOR Total
Bermuda 1 Aerospace and Defense 1
Canada 2 Alcohol 12
Denmark 1 Apparel 4
Finland 1 Automotive 13
France 9 Beverages 4
Germany 11 Business Services 5
Ireland 1 Computer Software 2
Italy 6 Diversified 5
Japan 8 Electronics 20
Mexico 1 Energy 3
Netherlands 4 Financial Services 17
South Korea 3 FMCG 17
Spain 2 Home Furnishings 1
Sweden 3 Hospitality 2
Switzerland 8 Internet Services 5
Taiwan 1 Leisure Goods 1
United Kingdom 7 Luxury 11
United States 78 Media 6
Grand Total 147 Pharmaceuticals 3
Restaurants 5
Retail 1
Sporting Goods 3
Telecommunications 1
Tobacco 1
Toy Manufacturing 1
Transportation 3
Grand Total 147
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TABLE 20 – I.B.G. BRANDS: TOTAL VALID TRADEMARKS (CTM) 
 
REGION Total GROUP Total
Americas 2,298 Clothing and Accessories 283
Asia 496 Consumer Goods 655
Europe 1,527 Drinks 502
Grand Total 4,321 Food 101
Manufacturing 172
Media 243
Services 837
Technology 955
Transportation 573
Grand Total 4,321
BRAND'S COUNTRY Total SECTOR Total
Bermuda 55 Aerospace and Defense 13
Canada 38 Alcohol 381
Denmark 19 Apparel 97
Finland 40 Automotive 560
France 162 Beverages 121
Germany 398 Business Services 123
Ireland 33 Computer Software 43
Italy 142 Diversified 99
Japan 326 Electronics 616
Mexico 28 Energy 108
Netherlands 85 Financial Services 583
South Korea 124 FMCG 600
Spain 62 Home Furnishings 13
Sweden 88 Hospitality 43
Switzerland 233 Internet Services 75
Taiwan 46 Leisure Goods 12
United Kingdom 265 Luxury 126
United States 2,177 Media 243
Grand Total 4,321 Pharmaceuticals 45
Restaurants 77
Retail 8
Sporting Goods 40
Telecommunications 18
Tobacco 129
Toy Manufacturing 14
Transportation 134
Grand Total 4,321
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TABLE 21 – I.B.G. BRANDS: TOTAL CLASSES (NICE CLASSIFICATION) 
 
 
REGION Total GROUP Total
Americas 7,269 Clothing and Accessories 1,202
Asia 1,450 Consumer Goods 1,153
Europe 6,199 Drinks 1,460
Grand Total 14,918 Food 361
Manufacturing 1,211
Media 1,105
Services 2,375
Technology 3,614
Transportation 2,437
Grand Total 14,918
BRAND'S COUNTRY Total SECTOR Total
Bermuda 156 Aerospace and Defense 112
Canada 215 Alcohol 1,098
Denmark 60 Apparel 363
Finland 170 Automotive 2,325
France 386 Beverages 362
Germany 1,668 Business Services 452
Ireland 126 Computer Software 117
Italy 773 Diversified 645
Japan 1,157 Electronics 2,215
Mexico 72 Energy 797
Netherlands 333 Financial Services 1,665
South Korea 231 FMCG 1,135
Spain 302 Home Furnishings 77
Sweden 291 Hospitality 114
Switzerland 790 Internet Services 312
Taiwan 62 Leisure Goods 17
United Kingdom 1,300 Luxury 686
United States 6,826 Media 1,105
Grand Total 14,918 Pharmaceuticals 241
Restaurants 229
Retail 32
Sporting Goods 104
Telecommunications 46
Tobacco 204
Toy Manufacturing 98
Transportation 367
Grand Total 14,918
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TABLE 22 – I.B.G. BRANDS: MULTIPLE TRADEMARK (CTM) APLICANTS 
 
REGION NO YES GROUP NO YES
Americas 73 9 Clothing and Accessories 17 3
Asia 8 4 Consumer Goods 12 2
Europe 43 10 Drinks 15 1
Grand Total 124 23 Food 3 3
Manufacturing 8 -
Media 4 2
Services 24 3
Technology 30 6
Transportation 11 3
Grand Total 124 23
BRAND'S COUNTRY NO YES SECTOR NO YES
Bermuda 1 - Aerospace and Defense 1 -
Canada 1 1 Alcohol 11 1
Denmark 1 - Apparel 4 -
Finland 1 - Automotive 10 3
France 8 1 Beverages 4 -
Germany 8 3 Business Services 4 1
Ireland - 1 Computer Software 2 -
Italy 5 1 Diversified 4 1
Japan 6 2 Electronics 16 4
Mexico 1 - Energy 3 -
Netherlands 3 1 Financial Services 15 2
South Korea 1 2 FMCG 13 4
Spain 2 - Home Furnishings 1 -
Sweden 3 - Hospitality 1 1
Switzerland 5 3 Internet Services 5 -
Taiwan 1 - Leisure Goods 1 -
United Kingdom 7 - Luxury 9 2
United States 70 8 Media 4 2
Grand Total 124 23 Pharmaceuticals 3 -
Restaurants 5 -
Retail 1 -
Sporting Goods 2 1
Telecommunications 1 -
Tobacco 1
Toy Manufacturing 1 -
Transportation 3 -
Grand Total 124 23
MULTIPLE TRADEMARK (CTM) APPLICANTS AT THE OHIM PER:
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TABLE 23 – I.B.G. BRANDS: PARENT MNE OWNERSHIP OF CTM 
 
 
REGION NO YES GROUP NO YES
Americas 40 42 Clothing and Accessories 10 10
Asia 2 10 Consumer Goods 7 7
Europe 23 30 Drinks 11 5
Grand Total 65 82 Food 4 2
Manufacturing 1 7
Media 4 2
Services 13 14
Technology 10 26
Transportation 5 9
Grand Total 65 82
BRAND'S COUNTRY NO YES SECTOR NO YES
Bermuda 1 - Aerospace and Defense 1 -
Canada 1 1 Alcohol 10 2
Denmark - 1 Apparel - 4
Finland - 1 Automotive 4 9
France 5 4 Beverages 1 3
Germany 2 9 Business Services 3 2
Ireland 1 - Computer Software - 2
Italy 5 1 Diversified - 5
Japan - 8 Electronics 5 15
Mexico 1 - Energy - 3
Netherlands 1 3 Financial Services 4 13
South Korea 2 1 FMCG 9 8
Spain - 2 Home Furnishings 1 -
Sweden 2 1 Hospitality 2 -
Switzerland 4 4 Internet Services 1 4
Taiwan - 1 Leisure Goods 1 -
United Kingdom 3 4 Luxury 6 5
United States 37 41 Media 4 2
Grand Total 65 82 Pharmaceuticals 1 2
Restaurants 4 1
Retail 1 -
Sporting Goods 2 1
Telecommunications 1 -
Tobacco 1 -
Toy Manufacturing - 1
Transportation 3 -
Grand Total 65 82
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TABLE 24 – PARENT MNE, CTM OWNER AND I.B.G. BRAND TABLE SUMMARY 
 
REGION PARENT MNE's COO PARENT MNE CTM OWNER ON RECORD AT THE OHIM BRAND BRAND's COO
Americas Bermuda Bacardi Limited Bacardi & Company Limited BACARDI Bermuda
Canada Research In Motion Limited Research In Motion Limited BLACKBERRY Canada
Thomson Reuters Corporation Thomson Reuters Global Resources THOMSON REUTERS Canada
Ireland Accenture plc Accenture Global Services Limited ACCENTURE United States
United States 3M Company 3M Company 3M United States
Adobe Systems Incorporated Adobe Systems Incorporated ADOBE United States
Amazon.com, Inc. Amazon Europe Holding Technologies SCS AMAZON.COM United States
American Express Company American Express Marketing & Development Corp. AMERICAN EXPRESS United States
American International Group, Inc. American International Group, Inc. AIG United States
Anheuser-Busch InBev N.V Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated* BUDWEISER United States
CERVECERIA MODELO, S.A. DE C.V. CORONA Mexico
Aol Inc. Aol Inc. AOL United States
Apple Inc. Apple Inc. APPLE United States
AT&T Inc. AT&T INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY II, L.P. AT&T United States
Avon Products, Inc Avon Products, Inc AVON United States
Bank of America Corporation Bank of America Corporation MERRILL LYNCH United States
Brown-Forman Corporation Brown-Forman Corporation JACK DANIEL'S United States
Burger King Holdings, Inc. Burger King Corporation. BURGER KING United States
Campbell Soup Company Campbell Soup Company CAMPBELL'S United States
Caterpillar Inc. Caterpillar Inc. CATERPILLAR United States
Cisco Systems, Inc. Cisco Technology, Inc. CISCO United States
Citigroup Inc. Citigroup Inc. CITI United States
Colgate-Palmolive Company Colgate-Palmolive Company COLGATE United States
Deere & Company Deere & Company JOHN DEERE United States
Dell Inc. Dell Inc. DELL United States
Eastman Kodak Company Eastman Kodak Company KODAK United States
eBay Inc. eBay Inc. eBAY United States
Exxon Mobil Corp. Exxon Mobil Corp. MOBIL United States
FedEx Corporation Federal Express Corporation FEDEX United States
Ford Motor Company Ford Motor Company FORD United States
Gap Inc. Gap Inc. GAP United States
General Electric Company General Electric Company GE United States
Google Inc. Google Inc. GOOGLE United States
H. J. Heinz Company H. J. Heinz Company Limited HEINZ United States
Harley-Davidson Inc H-D Michigan, LLC HARLEY DAVIDSON United States
Hertz Global Holdings Inc Hertz System, Inc HERTZ United States
Hewlett-Packard Company Compaq Trademark B.V. COMPAQ United States
Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P HP United States
Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc. HLT INTERNATIONAL IP LLC HILTON United States
Intel Corporation Intel Corporation INTEL United States
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) IBM United States
Johnson & Johnson Johnson & Johnson JOHNSON & JOHNSON United States
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPMorgan Chase & Co. J.P. MORGAN United States
Kellogg Company Kellogg Company KELLOGG'S United States
Kimberly-Clark Corporation Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. KLEENEX United States
Kraft Foods Inc. Kraft Foods Global Brands LLC KRAFT United States
Levi Strauss & Co. Levi Strauss & Co. LEVI'S United States
Marriott International, Inc. Marriott Worldwide Corporation MARRIOT United States
Mars, Inc. WM. WRIGLEY JR. COMPANY WRIGLEY United States
Mattel, Inc. Mattel, Inc. BARBIE United States
McDonald's Corporation McDonald's International Property Company, Ltd. McDONALD'S United States
Merck & Co., Inc. Merck KGaA MERCK United States
Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Corporation MICROSOFT United States
Morgan Stanley Morgan Stanley MORGAN STANLEY United States
Motorola Mobility LLC Motorola Trademark Holdings, LLC MOTOROLA United States
News Corporation Dow Jones & Company, Inc. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL United States
Nike, Inc. Nike International Ltd. NIKE United States
Oracle Corporation Oracle International Corporation ORACLE United States
PepsiCo Inc. PepsiCo Inc. PEPSI United States
Pfizer, Inc. Pfizer, Inc. PFIZER United States
Philip Morris International, Inc Philip Morris Brands Sarl MARLBORO United States
Ralph Lauren Corporation The Polo/Lauren Company L.P. POLO RALPH LAUREN United States
Starbucks Corporation Starbucks Corporation STARBUCKS United States
Texas Instruments Inc. Texas Instruments Inc. TEXAS INSTRUMENTS United States
The Boeing Company Boeing Management Company BOEING United States
The Coca-Cola Company The Coca-Cola Company COCA-COLA United States
SPRITE United States
The Estée Lauder Companies Inc. ESTEE LAUDER COSMETICS LTD. ESTEE LAUDER United States
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Goldman, Sachs & Co. GOLDMAN SACHS United States
The Procter & Gamble Co. Duracell Batteries BVBA DURACELL United States
The Gillete Company GILLETTE United States
The Procter & Gamble Co. PAMPERS United States
The Walt Disney Company Disney Enterprises, Inc. DISNEY United States
Tiffany & Company Tiffany & Company TIFFANY & CO. United States
Time Warner Inc. Time Inc. TIME United States
United Parcel Service, Inc. United Parcel Service of America, Inc UPS United States
Viacom, Inc Viacom, Inc MTV United States
Visa Inc. Visa International Service Association VISA United States
Xerox Corporation Xerox Corporation XEROX United States
Yahoo! Inc. Yahoo! Inc. YAHOO! United States
Yum! Brands, Inc. Kentucky Fried Chicken International Holdings, Inc. KFC United States
Pizza Hut International, LLC PIZZA HUT United States
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TABLE 24 (Cont’d) – PARENT MNE, CTM OWNER AND I.B.G. BRAND TABLE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
REGION PARENT MNE's COO PARENT MNE CTM OWNER ON RECORD AT THE OHIM BRAND BRAND's COO
Asia Japan Honda Motor Co., Ltd. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. HONDA Japan
Nintendo Co., Ltd. Nintendo Co., Ltd. NINTENDO Japan
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. NISSAN Japan
Panasonic Corporation Panasonic Corporation PANASONIC Japan
Sony Corporation Sony Corporation SONY Japan
Toyota Motor Corporation Toyota Motor Corporation LEXUS Japan
TOYOTA Japan
Canon Inc. (Canon Kabushiki Kaisha)* Canon Inc. (Canon Kabushiki Kaisha)* CANON Japan
South Korea Hyundai Motor Group Hyundai Card Company Limited HYUNDAI South Korea
LG Corp. LG Corp. LG South Korea
Samsung Group Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. SAMSUNG South Korea
Taiwan HTC Corporation HTC Corporation HTC Taiwan
Europe Denmark Carlsberg A/S Carlsberg A/S CARLSBERG Denmark
Finland Nokia Corporation (Nokia Oyj) Nokia Corporation (Nokia Oyj) NOKIA Finland
France AXA S.A. AXA S.A. AXA France
Compagnie Financière Richemont SA Compagnie Financière Richemont SA CARTIER France
Danone S.A. Compagnie Gervais Danone S.A DANONE France
Hermès International SCA Hermès International SCA HERMÉS France
Kering SA GUCCIO GUCCI S.P.A. GUCCI Italy
Kering PUMA Germany
L'Oréal S.A. LANCOME PARFUMS ET BEAUTE & CIE (SNC) LANCOME France
L'Oréal S.A. L'ORÉAL France
LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton S.A. Bulgari S.p.A. BULGARI Italy
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. LOUIS VUITTON France
MHCS MOET & CHANDON France
SOCIETE JAS HENNESSY & Co HENNESSY France
Germany Adidas AG Adidas AG ADIDAS Germany
Allianz SE Allianz SE ALLIANZ Germany
Bayerische Motoren Werke AG Bayerische Motoren Werke AG BMW Germany
Beiersdorf AG Beiersdorf AG NIVEA Germany
Daimler AG Daimler AG MERCEDES-BENZ Germany
SAP AG SAP AG SAP Germany
Siemens AG Siemens AG SIEMENS Germany
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche Aktiengesellschaft PORSCHE Germany
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft AUDI Germany
VOLKSWAGEN Germany
Italy Benetton Group S.p.A. Bencom S.r.l. BENETTON Italy
Giorgio Armani S.p.A Giorgio Armani S.p.A ARMANI Italy
Prada Group S.p.A. Prada S.A. PRADA Italy
Netherlands Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. Ferrari S.p.A. FERRARI Italy
Heineken Holding N.V. Heineken Brouwerijen B.V. HEINEKEN Netherlands
ING Groep N.V. ING Groep N.V. ING Netherlands
Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. PHILIPS Netherlands
Royal Dutch Shell plc Royal Dutch Shell plc SHELL Netherlands
Spain Grupo Santander BANCO SANTANDER, S.A. SANTANDER Spain
Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. ZARA Spain
Sweden H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB H&M Sweden
Pernod Ricard V&S Vin & Sprit Aktiebolag ABSOLUT Sweden
Inter IKEA Holding S.A.* Inter IKEA Systems B.V. IKEA Sweden
Switzerland Credit Suisse Group Credit Suisse Group CREDIT SUISSE Switzerland
Hans Wilsdorf Foundation Rolex SA ROLEX Switzerland
Nestlé S.A. Nestlé S.A. NESCAFé Switzerland
Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. NESTLÉ Switzerland
Novartis AG Novartis AG NOVARTIS Switzerland
The Swatch Group AG SWATCH AG (SWATCH SA) (SWATCH LTD.) SWATCH Switzerland
UBS AG UBS AG UBS Switzerland
Zurich Insurance Group AG Zürich Versicherungs-Gesellschaft AG ZURICH Switzerland
United Kingdom Barclays PLC Barclays PLC BARCLAYS United Kingdom
BP plc BP plc BP United Kingdom
Burberry Group plc Burberry Limited BURBERRY United Kingdom
Diageo plc Diageo Brands B.V. JOHNNIE WALKER United Kingdom
Diageo Ireland GUINNESS Ireland
Diageo North America, Inc. SMIRNOFF United Kingdom
HSBC Holdings plc HSBC Holdings plc HSBC United Kingdom
Pearson PLC Pearson PLC FINANCIAL TIMES United Kingdom
GRAND TOTAL 130 144 147
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TABLE 25 – INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION RANKINGS  
 
 
 
 
 
INDEX RANKǂ INDEX RANKǂ
Finland 8.60 1 6.20 1
Japan 8.50 2 6.00 7
United States 8.40 3 5.40 20
Netherlands 8.30 4 5.70 11
United Kingdom 8.30 4 5.90 8
Germany 8.20 7 5.40 21
Sweden 8.20 7 5.50 19
Belgium 8.10 9 5.30 23
Canada 8.10 9 5.70 12
Switzerland 8.10 9 6.00 4
Denmark 8.00 13 5.30 24
France 7.90 16 5.60 13
Ireland 7.90 16 5.60 14
Taiwan 7.10 22 5.10 26
Spain 6.70 26 3.60 77
Italy 6.60 30 3.70 70
Mexico 5.60 42 3.50 82
South Korea N/A - 3.70 68
Bermuda N/A - N/A -
OVERALL AVERAGE 7.80 5.48
ǂ Each study ranked each country based on the specific overall   population sample. In the case of 
the IPRI the total population was 97 countries. In the case of the World Economic Forum the total 
population was 144 countries. The IPRI allowed for countries to tie for a rank position, the World 
Economic Forum Ranking did not. IPRI ranks countries on a scale from 0 (worst)-10(best). World 
Economic Forum ranked countries on a scale from 1(worst)-7(best).
IPRI (IPR)* WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM** 
IP PROTECTION RANKINGS
COUNTRY
*The International Property Rights Index 2014. The IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) index is one of 
the compnonets of the overall  IPRI index (the other two components are Legal and Political 
Environment (LP) and Physical Property Rights (PPR)). Note that one of the sources to construct the 
IPR index was the World Economic Forum Index. http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/
** Edition 2014--2015. Competitiveness Rankings: Intellectual Property Protection. 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/rankings/
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TABLE 26 – LIST OF BUSINESS ENTITY TYPES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviation  Full Description Country
A/S Aktieselskab Denmark
AB Aktiebolag Sweden
AG Aktiengesellschaft Germany
B.V. Besloten vennootschap Netherlands
Corp. (Inc.) Corporation (Incorporated) US
GMbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung Germany
KGaA Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien Germany
KK Kabushiki Kaisha Japan
LLC Limited Liability Company US
LP Limited partnership US
Ltd. Limited company UK/Ireland
N.V. Naamloze vennootschap Netherlands/Belgium
OYJ Osakeyhtiö Finland
PLC Public limited company UK/Ireland
S.A. Sociedad Anónima Civil Law Countries
S.p.A. Società per Azioni Italy
S.r.l. Società a responsabilità limitata Italy
SARL Société à responsabilité limitée France
SCA Société en commandite par actions France
SE Societas Europaea Europe
SNC Société en nom collectif France
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TABLE 27 – INTERBRAND’S BEST GLOBAL (I.B.G.) BRANDS: RANKING OF CLASSES  
 
No. COUNT % INCREASING DECREASING
01 GOODS 09 1,396 9.36% 9.36% 100.00%
02 GOODS 16 978 6.56% 15.91% 90.64%
03 SERVICES 35 974 6.53% 22.44% 84.09%
04 SERVICES 36 914 6.13% 28.57% 77.56%
05 SERVICES 41 821 5.50% 34.07% 71.43%
06 SERVICES 42 795 5.33% 39.40% 65.93%
07 GOODS 25 692 4.64% 44.04% 60.60%
08 SERVICES 38 660 4.42% 48.46% 55.96%
09 GOODS 03 642 4.30% 52.77% 51.54%
10 GOODS 28 463 3.10% 55.87% 47.23%
11 GOODS 12 459 3.08% 58.95% 44.13%
12 GOODS 18 382 2.56% 61.51% 41.05%
13 SERVICES 37 382 2.56% 64.07% 38.49%
14 SERVICES 39 381 2.55% 66.62% 35.93%
15 GOODS 32 380 2.55% 69.17% 33.38%
16 GOODS 14 329 2.21% 71.38% 30.83%
17 GOODS 21 315 2.11% 73.49% 28.62%
18 GOODS 33 296 1.98% 75.47% 26.51%
19 GOODS 30 289 1.94% 77.41% 24.53%
20 GOODS 34 236 1.58% 78.99% 22.59%
21 GOODS 11 222 1.49% 80.48% 21.01%
22 GOODS 24 206 1.38% 81.86% 19.52%
23 GOODS 29 206 1.38% 83.24% 18.14%
24 SERVICES 43 195 1.31% 84.55% 16.76%
25 GOODS 20 192 1.29% 85.84% 15.45%
26 GOODS 05 178 1.19% 87.03% 14.16%
27 GOODS 04 173 1.16% 88.19% 12.97%
28 GOODS 07 166 1.11% 89.30% 11.81%
29 GOODS 06 160 1.07% 90.37% 10.70%
30 SERVICES 40 134 0.90% 91.27% 9.63%
31 GOODS 01 132 0.88% 92.16% 8.73%
32 GOODS 08 121 0.81% 92.97% 7.84%
33 GOODS 26 115 0.77% 93.74% 7.03%
34 GOODS 02 113 0.76% 94.50% 6.26%
35 GOODS 10 109 0.73% 95.23% 5.50%
36 SERVICES 44 106 0.71% 95.94% 4.77%
37 GOODS 27 99 0.66% 96.60% 4.06%
38 SERVICES 45 80 0.54% 97.14% 3.40%
39 GOODS 22 73 0.49% 97.63% 2.86%
40 GOODS 17 72 0.48% 98.11% 2.37%
41 GOODS 31 67 0.45% 98.56% 1.89%
42 GOODS 19 65 0.44% 98.99% 1.44%
43 GOODS 15 64 0.43% 99.42% 1.01%
44 GOODS 23 49 0.33% 99.75% 0.58%
45 GOODS 13 37 0.25% 100.00% 0.25%
GRAND TOTAL 14,918 100%
CUMULATIVERANK TYPE
CLASS
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TABLE 28 – COUNTRY OR REGION OF ORIGIN OF BRAND: SECTORS AND GROUPS 
 
Bermuda
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
United Kingdom
United States
GRAND TOTALS
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TABLE 29 – I.B.G. BRANDS STATISTICS AND RATIOS 
 
TRADEMARKS WORD CLASSES GOODS SERVICES WORD/TM CLASS/TM GOODS/CLASS SERV./CLASS
COCA-COLA 47 23 169 140 29 0.49 3.60 0.83 0.17
IBM 29 14 130 63 67 0.48 4.48 0.48 0.52
MICROSOFT 31 18 82 41 41 0.58 2.65 0.50 0.50
GOOGLE 9 6 25 9 16 0.67 2.78 0.36 0.64
GE 47 39 206 90 116 0.83 4.38 0.44 0.56
McDONALD'S 8 6 26 15 11 0.75 3.25 0.58 0.42
INTEL 68 39 216 152 64 0.57 3.18 0.70 0.30
APPLE 17 17 112 70 42 1.00 6.59 0.63 0.38
DISNEY 76 56 542 424 118 0.74 7.13 0.78 0.22
HP 53 42 192 94 98 0.79 3.62 0.49 0.51
TOYOTA 35 24 104 71 33 0.69 2.97 0.68 0.32
MERCEDES-BENZ 9 8 152 118 34 0.89 16.89 0.78 0.22
CISCO 61 52 179 94 85 0.85 2.93 0.53 0.47
NOKIA 40 26 170 94 76 0.65 4.25 0.55 0.45
BMW 52 48 239 172 67 0.92 4.60 0.72 0.28
GILLETTE 15 12 18 18 0 0.80 1.20 1.00 0.00
SAMSUNG 70 50 115 91 24 0.71 1.64 0.79 0.21
LOUIS VUITTON 7 4 26 22 4 0.57 3.71 0.85 0.15
HONDA 53 28 151 115 36 0.53 2.85 0.76 0.24
ORACLE 12 11 31 16 15 0.92 2.58 0.52 0.48
H&M 17 8 40 32 8 0.47 2.35 0.80 0.20
PEPSI 51 18 87 79 8 0.35 1.71 0.91 0.09
AMERICAN EXPRESS 23 12 48 1 47 0.52 2.09 0.02 0.98
SAP 16 12 80 41 39 0.75 5.00 0.51 0.49
NIKE 31 23 81 69 12 0.74 2.61 0.85 0.15
AMAZON.COM 7 6 90 66 24 0.86 12.86 0.73 0.27
UPS 63 49 195 61 134 0.78 3.10 0.31 0.69
J.P. MORGAN 7 6 10 2 8 0.86 1.43 0.20 0.80
BUDWEISER 13 11 25 17 8 0.85 1.92 0.68 0.32
NESCAFé 11 5 43 34 9 0.45 3.91 0.79 0.21
IKEA 13 6 77 54 23 0.46 5.92 0.70 0.30
HSBC 6 6 10 5 5 1.00 1.67 0.50 0.50
CANON 5 2 55 40 15 0.40 11.00 0.73 0.27
KELLOGG'S 13 5 80 59 21 0.38 6.15 0.74 0.26
SONY 19 13 100 54 46 0.68 5.26 0.54 0.46
eBAY 23 13 58 26 32 0.57 2.52 0.45 0.55
THOMSON REUTERS 12 11 56 12 44 0.92 4.67 0.21 0.79
GOLDMAN SACHS 18 17 28 6 22 0.94 1.56 0.21 0.79
GUCCI 24 11 270 221 49 0.46 11.25 0.82 0.18
L'ORÉAL 34 25 48 34 14 0.74 1.41 0.71 0.29
PHILIPS 4 2 63 42 21 0.50 15.75 0.67 0.33
CITI 16 12 36 8 28 0.75 2.25 0.22 0.78
DELL 38 32 125 43 82 0.84 3.29 0.34 0.66
ZARA 13 11 132 109 23 0.85 10.15 0.83 0.17
ACCENTURE 5 3 32 8 24 0.60 6.40 0.25 0.75
SIEMENS 23 12 160 87 73 0.52 6.96 0.54 0.46
VOLKSWAGEN 51 46 283 186 97 0.90 5.55 0.66 0.34
NINTENDO 74 17 383 197 186 0.23 5.18 0.51 0.49
HEINZ 19 10 50 50 0 0.53 2.63 1.00 0.00
FORD 60 44 217 133 84 0.73 3.62 0.61 0.39
COLGATE 66 38 98 96 2 0.58 1.48 0.98 0.02
DANONE 10 2 37 32 5 0.20 3.70 0.86 0.14
AXA 25 6 75 1 74 0.24 3.00 0.01 0.99
MORGAN STANLEY 22 18 53 23 30 0.82 2.41 0.43 0.57
NESTLÉ 30 7 119 96 23 0.23 3.97 0.81 0.19
BLACKBERRY 26 20 159 81 78 0.77 6.12 0.51 0.49
XEROX 24 18 84 32 52 0.75 3.50 0.38 0.62
MTV 119 88 358 179 179 0.74 3.01 0.50 0.50
AUDI 57 47 321 196 125 0.82 5.63 0.61 0.39
ADIDAS 7 2 17 14 3 0.29 2.43 0.82 0.18
HYUNDAI 8 4 15 11 4 0.50 1.88 0.73 0.27
KFC 8 5 21 16 5 0.63 2.63 0.76 0.24
SPRITE 12 10 63 52 11 0.83 5.25 0.83 0.17
CATERPILLAR 8 3 109 72 37 0.38 13.63 0.66 0.34
AVON 53 43 66 47 19 0.81 1.25 0.71 0.29
HERMÉS 9 5 68 55 13 0.56 7.56 0.81 0.19
ALLIANZ 27 18 130 52 78 0.67 4.81 0.40 0.60
SANTANDER 49 28 170 41 129 0.57 3.47 0.24 0.76
PANASONIC 29 2 131 103 28 0.07 4.52 0.79 0.21
CARTIER 10 8 18 12 6 0.80 1.80 0.67 0.33
KLEENEX 5 3 13 13 0 0.60 2.60 1.00 0.00
PORSCHE 6 4 70 55 15 0.67 11.67 0.79 0.21
TIFFANY & CO. 10 6 34 30 4 0.60 3.40 0.88 0.12
SHELL 35 24 167 117 50 0.69 4.77 0.70 0.30
VISA 52 44 140 49 91 0.85 2.69 0.35 0.65
YAHOO! 22 21 97 32 65 0.95 4.41 0.33 0.67
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TABLE 29 (Cont’d) – I.B.G. BRANDS STATISTICS AND RATIOS 
 
TRADEMARKS WORD CLASSES GOODS SERVICES WORD/TM CLASS/TM GOODS/CLASS SERV./CLASS
MOET & CHANDON 17 3 48 31 17 0.18 2.82 0.65 0.35
JACK DANIEL'S 34 9 114 106 8 0.26 3.35 0.93 0.07
BARCLAYS 73 58 292 142 150 0.79 4.00 0.49 0.51
ADOBE 12 11 35 14 21 0.92 2.92 0.40 0.60
PIZZA HUT 8 1 20 14 6 0.13 2.50 0.70 0.30
CREDIT SUISSE 41 17 70 15 55 0.41 1.71 0.21 0.79
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 6 3 46 25 21 0.50 7.67 0.54 0.46
GAP 64 48 182 124 58 0.75 2.84 0.68 0.32
3M 10 6 106 82 24 0.60 10.60 0.77 0.23
CORONA 28 9 72 49 23 0.32 2.57 0.68 0.32
NIVEA 148 35 210 181 29 0.24 1.42 0.86 0.14
JOHNNIE WALKER 12 11 51 45 6 0.92 4.25 0.88 0.12
SMIRNOFF 84 46 221 177 44 0.55 2.63 0.80 0.20
NISSAN 83 61 162 114 48 0.73 1.95 0.70 0.30
HEINEKEN 21 3 33 27 6 0.14 1.57 0.82 0.18
UBS 26 16 94 38 56 0.62 3.62 0.40 0.60
ARMANI 12 5 56 49 7 0.42 4.67 0.88 0.13
ZURICH 93 58 350 82 268 0.62 3.76 0.23 0.77
BURBERRY 21 15 68 61 7 0.71 3.24 0.90 0.10
STARBUCKS 50 31 140 96 44 0.62 2.80 0.69 0.31
JOHN DEERE 11 6 64 46 18 0.55 5.82 0.72 0.28
HTC 46 32 62 43 19 0.70 1.35 0.69 0.31
FERRARI 82 26 369 261 108 0.32 4.50 0.71 0.29
HARLEY DAVIDSON 36 8 171 135 36 0.22 4.75 0.79 0.21
MARLBORO 129 49 204 184 20 0.38 1.58 0.90 0.10
LANCOME 43 16 48 46 2 0.37 1.12 0.96 0.04
CAMPBELL'S 14 2 39 39 0 0.14 2.79 1.00 0.00
WRIGLEY 10 5 29 29 0 0.50 2.90 1.00 0.00
ROLEX 15 12 82 68 14 0.80 5.47 0.83 0.17
BP 45 17 558 363 195 0.38 12.40 0.65 0.35
DURACELL 16 14 21 21 0 0.88 1.31 1.00 0.00
PRADA 12 3 29 24 5 0.25 2.42 0.83 0.17
BURGER KING 3 1 22 19 3 0.33 7.33 0.86 0.14
LEXUS 28 25 71 60 11 0.89 2.54 0.85 0.15
PUMA 2 0 6 4 2 0.00 3.00 0.67 0.33
POLO RALPH LAUREN 2 1 18 17 1 0.50 9.00 0.94 0.06
MERRILL LYNCH 6 5 11 1 10 0.83 1.83 0.09 0.91
AIG 74 59 78 2 76 0.80 1.05 0.03 0.97
ING 25 7 70 19 51 0.28 2.80 0.27 0.73
MOTOROLA 23 14 75 55 20 0.61 3.26 0.73 0.27
HENNESSY 7 3 18 15 3 0.43 2.57 0.83 0.17
MARRIOT 21 12 75 18 57 0.57 3.57 0.24 0.76
FEDEX 37 28 79 13 66 0.76 2.14 0.16 0.84
KODAK 2 1 14 8 6 0.50 7.00 0.57 0.43
KRAFT 15 2 36 28 8 0.13 2.40 0.78 0.22
LG 46 24 101 70 31 0.52 2.20 0.69 0.31
HERTZ 34 29 93 45 48 0.85 2.74 0.48 0.52
PFIZER 15 3 33 26 7 0.20 2.20 0.79 0.21
NOVARTIS 5 2 15 13 2 0.40 3.00 0.87 0.13
BULGARI 4 2 17 8 9 0.50 4.25 0.47 0.53
LEVI'S 3 0 9 9 0 0.00 3.00 1.00 0.00
MERCK 25 13 193 140 53 0.52 7.72 0.73 0.27
TIME 6 6 20 11 9 1.00 3.33 0.55 0.45
AOL 14 9 42 17 25 0.64 3.00 0.40 0.60
ESTEE LAUDER 59 54 64 60 4 0.92 1.08 0.94 0.06
BOEING 13 7 112 76 36 0.54 8.62 0.68 0.32
MOBIL 28 18 72 56 16 0.64 2.57 0.78 0.22
BACARDI 55 19 156 149 7 0.35 2.84 0.96 0.04
BARBIE 14 12 98 87 11 0.86 7.00 0.89 0.11
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 6 5 29 10 19 0.83 4.83 0.34 0.66
AT&T 18 12 46 12 34 0.67 2.56 0.26 0.74
COMPAQ 3 1 16 8 8 0.33 5.33 0.50 0.50
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS 13 2 21 18 3 0.15 1.62 0.86 0.14
PAMPERS 60 53 134 130 4 0.88 2.23 0.97 0.03
ABSOLUT 58 22 174 130 44 0.38 3.00 0.75 0.25
GUINNESS 33 22 126 91 35 0.67 3.82 0.72 0.28
FINANCIAL TIMES 24 24 100 34 66 1.00 4.17 0.34 0.66
HILTON 22 14 39 5 34 0.64 1.77 0.13 0.87
CARLSBERG 19 6 60 48 12 0.32 3.16 0.80 0.20
SWATCH 12 6 17 12 5 0.50 1.42 0.71 0.29
BENETTON 8 3 32 29 3 0.38 4.00 0.91 0.09
GRAND TOTALS 4,321 2,607 14,918 9,476 5,442 0.60 3.45 0.64 0.36
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TABLE 30 – COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (COO) OF I.B.G. BRAND: STATISTICS SUMMARY 
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TABLE 31 – COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (COO) OF I.B.G. BRAND: COUNT OF CLASSES 
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TABLE 32 – COO OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP COUNTRY PER CLASS/OVERALL 
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TABLE 33 – COO OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP CLASS PER COUNTRY/OVERALL 
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TABLE 34 – REGION OF ORIGIN OF I.B.G. BRAND: STATISTICS SUMMARY 
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TABLE 35 – REGION OF ORIGIN OF I.B.G. BRAND: COUNT OF CLASSES 
 
Americas Asia Europe Grand Total
01 57 11 64 132 0.88%
02 55 15 43 113 0.76%
03 299 7 336 642 4.30%
04 53 10 110 173 1.16%
05 111 10 57 178 1.19%
06 62 12 86 160 1.07%
07 57 49 60 166 1.11%
08 57 9 55 121 0.81%
09 768 281 347 1,396 9.36%
10 50 17 42 109 0.73%
11 81 41 100 222 1.49%
12 109 158 192 459 3.08%
13 9 4 24 37 0.25%
14 137 20 172 329 2.21%
15 25 10 29 64 0.43%
16 516 82 380 978 6.56%
17 33 8 31 72 0.48%
18 179 16 187 382 2.56%
19 26 8 31 65 0.44%
20 103 14 75 192 1.29%
21 181 11 123 315 2.11%
22 22 6 45 73 0.49%
23 10 5 34 49 0.33%
24 100 10 96 206 1.38%
25 388 26 278 692 4.64%
26 52 8 55 115 0.77%
27 37 10 52 99 0.66%
28 203 77 183 463 3.10%
29 126 4 76 206 1.38%
30 182 8 99 289 1.94%
31 23 5 39 67 0.45%
32 205 4 171 380 2.55%
33 92 5 199 296 1.98%
34 164 8 64 236 1.58%
35 448 69 457 974 6.53%
36 398 41 475 914 6.13%
37 149 52 181 382 2.56%
38 336 84 240 660 4.42%
39 241 29 111 381 2.55%
40 66 16 52 134 0.90%
41 429 94 298 821 5.50%
42 465 65 265 795 5.33%
43 77 5 113 195 1.31%
44 47 14 45 106 0.71%
45 41 12 27 80 0.54%
Grand Total 7,269 1,450 6,199 14,918 100%
CLASSES %REGION OF ORIGIN OF THE BRAND
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TABLE 36 – REGION OF ORIGIN OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP REGION PER CLASS/OVERALL 
 
Americas Asia Europe Grand Total
01 43.18% 8.33% 48.48% 100%
02 48.67% 13.27% 38.05% 100%
03 46.57% 1.09% 52.34% 100%
04 30.64% 5.78% 63.58% 100%
05 62.36% 5.62% 32.02% 100%
06 38.75% 7.50% 53.75% 100%
07 34.34% 29.52% 36.14% 100%
08 47.11% 7.44% 45.45% 100%
09 55.01% 20.13% 24.86% 100%
10 45.87% 15.60% 38.53% 100%
11 36.49% 18.47% 45.05% 100%
12 23.75% 34.42% 41.83% 100%
13 24.32% 10.81% 64.86% 100%
14 41.64% 6.08% 52.28% 100%
15 39.06% 15.63% 45.31% 100%
16 52.76% 8.38% 38.85% 100%
17 45.83% 11.11% 43.06% 100%
18 46.86% 4.19% 48.95% 100%
19 40.00% 12.31% 47.69% 100%
20 53.65% 7.29% 39.06% 100%
21 57.46% 3.49% 39.05% 100%
22 30.14% 8.22% 61.64% 100%
23 20.41% 10.20% 69.39% 100%
24 48.54% 4.85% 46.60% 100%
25 56.07% 3.76% 40.17% 100%
26 45.22% 6.96% 47.83% 100%
27 37.37% 10.10% 52.53% 100%
28 43.84% 16.63% 39.52% 100%
29 61.17% 1.94% 36.89% 100%
30 62.98% 2.77% 34.26% 100%
31 34.33% 7.46% 58.21% 100%
32 53.95% 1.05% 45.00% 100%
33 31.08% 1.69% 67.23% 100%
34 69.49% 3.39% 27.12% 100%
35 46.00% 7.08% 46.92% 100%
36 43.54% 4.49% 51.97% 100%
37 39.01% 13.61% 47.38% 100%
38 50.91% 12.73% 36.36% 100%
39 63.25% 7.61% 29.13% 100%
40 49.25% 11.94% 38.81% 100%
41 52.25% 11.45% 36.30% 100%
42 58.49% 8.18% 33.33% 100%
43 39.49% 2.56% 57.95% 100%
44 44.34% 13.21% 42.45% 100%
45 51.25% 15.00% 33.75% 100%
Grand Total 48.73% 9.72% 41.55% 100%
CLASSES REGION OF ORIGIN OF THE BRAND
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TABLE 37 – REGION OF ORIGIN OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP CLASS PER REGION/OVERALL 
 
Americas Asia Europe Grand Total
01 0.78% 0.76% 1.03% 0.88%
02 0.76% 1.03% 0.69% 0.76%
03 4.11% 0.48% 5.42% 4.30%
04 0.73% 0.69% 1.77% 1.16%
05 1.53% 0.69% 0.92% 1.19%
06 0.85% 0.83% 1.39% 1.07%
07 0.78% 3.38% 0.97% 1.11%
08 0.78% 0.62% 0.89% 0.81%
09 10.57% 19.38% 5.60% 9.36%
10 0.69% 1.17% 0.68% 0.73%
11 1.11% 2.83% 1.61% 1.49%
12 1.50% 10.90% 3.10% 3.08%
13 0.12% 0.28% 0.39% 0.25%
14 1.88% 1.38% 2.77% 2.21%
15 0.34% 0.69% 0.47% 0.43%
16 7.10% 5.66% 6.13% 6.56%
17 0.45% 0.55% 0.50% 0.48%
18 2.46% 1.10% 3.02% 2.56%
19 0.36% 0.55% 0.50% 0.44%
20 1.42% 0.97% 1.21% 1.29%
21 2.49% 0.76% 1.98% 2.11%
22 0.30% 0.41% 0.73% 0.49%
23 0.14% 0.34% 0.55% 0.33%
24 1.38% 0.69% 1.55% 1.38%
25 5.34% 1.79% 4.48% 4.64%
26 0.72% 0.55% 0.89% 0.77%
27 0.51% 0.69% 0.84% 0.66%
28 2.79% 5.31% 2.95% 3.10%
29 1.73% 0.28% 1.23% 1.38%
30 2.50% 0.55% 1.60% 1.94%
31 0.32% 0.34% 0.63% 0.45%
32 2.82% 0.28% 2.76% 2.55%
33 1.27% 0.34% 3.21% 1.98%
34 2.26% 0.55% 1.03% 1.58%
35 6.16% 4.76% 7.37% 6.53%
36 5.48% 2.83% 7.66% 6.13%
37 2.05% 3.59% 2.92% 2.56%
38 4.62% 5.79% 3.87% 4.42%
39 3.32% 2.00% 1.79% 2.55%
40 0.91% 1.10% 0.84% 0.90%
41 5.90% 6.48% 4.81% 5.50%
42 6.40% 4.48% 4.27% 5.33%
43 1.06% 0.34% 1.82% 1.31%
44 0.65% 0.97% 0.73% 0.71%
45 0.56% 0.83% 0.44% 0.54%
Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
CLASSES REGION OF ORIGIN OF THE BRAND
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TABLE 38 – SECTOR OF I.B.G. BRAND: STATISTICS SUMMARY 
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TABLE 39– SECTOR OF I.B.G. BRAND: COUNT OF CLASSES 
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5
44
12
21
17
1
15
12
1
8
2
3
30
13
91
1
4
2
16
1
29
66
0
39
4
2
2
86
2
2
1
24
37
38
34
3
2
2
8
6
9
2
1
3
11
3
38
1
40
2
18
1
1
16
48
23
2
2
4
6
6
1
4
13
4
41
7
55
3
97
18
41
11
22
15
1
25
85
38
3
15
20
16
16
4
5
10
2
7
2
8
9
7
82
1
42
9
34
10
53
9
75
22
51
17
3
34
11
0
15
3
10
40
14
53
21
26
3
8
2
20
79
5
43
1
70
5
25
3
3
6
6
16
7
1
28
3
6
4
11
19
5
44
1
1
12
2
9
16
2
5
31
2
1
5
6
13
10
6
45
1
2
12
2
1
1
7
21
3
15
4
5
1
5
80
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
11
2
1,
09
8
36
3
2,
32
5
36
2
45
2
11
7
64
5
2,
21
5
79
7
1,
66
5
1,
13
5
77
11
4
31
2
17
68
6
1,
10
5
24
1
22
9
32
10
4
46
20
4
98
36
7
14
,9
18
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TABLE 40 – SECTOR OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP SECTOR PER CLASS/OVERALL 
 
CLASSES
SE
CT
O
R 
CL
AS
SF
IC
AT
IO
N
 O
F 
BR
AN
DS
Aerosp
ace an
d Def
ense
Alcoho
l
Appar
el
Autom
otive
Bevera
ges
Busine
ss Serv
ices
Compu
ter 
Softwa
re
Divers
ified
Electro
nics
Energy
Financ
ial Ser
vices
FMCG
Home 
Furnis
hings
Hospit
ality
Intern
et Serv
ices
Leisur
e Goo
ds
Luxury
Media
Pharm
aceuti
cals
Restau
rants
Retail
Sportin
g Goo
ds
Teleco
mmun
i- ca
tions
Tobac
co
Toy 
Manuf
acturin
g
Transp
ortatio
n
Grand
 Total
01
1.
52
%
18
.9
4%
12
.8
8%
12
.8
8%
26
.5
2%
0.
76
%
3.
79
%
1.
52
%
5.
30
%
15
.9
1%
10
0%
02
2.
65
%
22
.1
2%
9.
73
%
30
.9
7%
9.
73
%
0.
88
%
1.
77
%
2.
65
%
1.
77
%
6.
19
%
10
.6
2%
0.
88
%
10
0%
03
1.
25
%
4.
98
%
5.
76
%
0.
31
%
0.
47
%
1.
71
%
1.
71
%
2.
49
%
0.
62
%
65
.1
1%
0.
16
%
0.
16
%
0.
31
%
7.
48
%
3.
43
%
2.
49
%
0.
31
%
0.
31
%
0.
31
%
0.
62
%
10
0%
04
2.
89
%
9.
25
%
20
.2
3%
4.
62
%
4.
62
%
47
.4
0%
1.
16
%
1.
16
%
5.
78
%
1.
73
%
0.
58
%
0.
58
%
10
0%
05
2.
25
%
8.
43
%
3.
93
%
7.
87
%
7.
87
%
5.
62
%
0.
56
%
35
.3
9%
1.
12
%
3.
93
%
1.
69
%
19
.6
6%
0.
56
%
0.
56
%
0.
56
%
10
0%
06
2.
50
%
11
.8
8%
1.
88
%
28
.7
5%
1.
88
%
2.
50
%
8.
75
%
12
.5
0%
10
.0
0%
3.
75
%
2.
50
%
0.
63
%
1.
88
%
7.
50
%
1.
25
%
0.
63
%
0.
63
%
0.
63
%
10
0%
07
2.
41
%
1.
20
%
32
.5
3%
1.
20
%
18
.6
7%
20
.4
8%
9.
04
%
1.
20
%
1.
81
%
4.
22
%
3.
01
%
3.
61
%
0.
60
%
10
0%
08
3.
31
%
9.
92
%
3.
31
%
21
.4
9%
4.
13
%
2.
48
%
7.
44
%
11
.5
7%
2.
48
%
3.
31
%
6.
61
%
2.
48
%
2.
48
%
12
.4
0%
4.
13
%
0.
83
%
0.
83
%
0.
83
%
10
0%
09
0.
29
%
2.
87
%
0.
79
%
9.
60
%
1.
50
%
7.
09
%
2.
58
%
3.
87
%
37
.3
2%
2.
72
%
6.
09
%
0.
86
%
0.
21
%
0.
14
%
2.
15
%
3.
01
%
11
.3
9%
1.
29
%
0.
57
%
0.
21
%
0.
79
%
0.
50
%
0.
14
%
0.
79
%
3.
22
%
10
0%
10
3.
67
%
1.
83
%
11
.9
3%
0.
92
%
16
.5
1%
22
.9
4%
1.
83
%
0.
92
%
13
.7
6%
1.
83
%
6.
42
%
1.
83
%
13
.7
6%
0.
92
%
0.
92
%
10
0%
11
1.
80
%
4.
05
%
1.
35
%
22
.5
2%
4.
50
%
1.
80
%
10
.3
6%
27
.4
8%
7.
66
%
1.
35
%
1.
35
%
1.
35
%
0.
90
%
4.
95
%
2.
25
%
2.
25
%
3.
15
%
0.
45
%
0.
45
%
10
0%
12
1.
09
%
0.
22
%
0.
87
%
73
.2
0%
0.
44
%
3.
49
%
3.
49
%
2.
83
%
1.
53
%
0.
87
%
0.
65
%
0.
44
%
2.
18
%
1.
96
%
0.
22
%
0.
44
%
6.
10
%
10
0%
13
2.
70
%
5.
41
%
35
.1
4%
5.
41
%
13
.5
1%
5.
41
%
5.
41
%
5.
41
%
18
.9
2%
2.
70
%
10
0%
14
1.
52
%
9.
73
%
5.
47
%
17
.6
3%
2.
13
%
1.
52
%
3.
95
%
9.
42
%
3.
34
%
4.
86
%
2.
13
%
0.
30
%
0.
30
%
2.
13
%
3.
04
%
17
.6
3%
8.
81
%
1.
22
%
0.
61
%
2.
13
%
1.
22
%
0.
91
%
10
0%
15
12
.5
0%
4.
69
%
25
.0
0%
3.
13
%
20
.3
1%
3.
13
%
1.
56
%
4.
69
%
3.
13
%
14
.0
6%
6.
25
%
1.
56
%
10
0%
16
0.
41
%
5.
52
%
1.
02
%
10
.8
4%
1.
02
%
5.
01
%
1.
43
%
1.
94
%
14
.9
3%
3.
27
%
21
.4
7%
8.
08
%
0.
51
%
0.
72
%
1.
53
%
2.
86
%
10
.2
2%
1.
94
%
0.
82
%
0.
20
%
0.
10
%
0.
51
%
1.
02
%
1.
12
%
3.
48
%
10
0%
17
5.
56
%
2.
78
%
20
.8
3%
18
.0
6%
19
.4
4%
18
.0
6%
2.
78
%
2.
78
%
6.
94
%
1.
39
%
1.
39
%
10
0%
18
1.
05
%
7.
85
%
9.
69
%
17
.0
2%
2.
36
%
2.
62
%
2.
36
%
8.
64
%
2.
88
%
6.
02
%
1.
57
%
0.
79
%
0.
26
%
1.
83
%
14
.9
2%
8.
90
%
0.
52
%
1.
31
%
1.
31
%
3.
40
%
2.
36
%
2.
36
%
10
0%
19
7.
69
%
3.
08
%
20
.0
0%
13
.8
5%
13
.8
5%
23
.0
8%
3.
08
%
1.
54
%
3.
08
%
7.
69
%
1.
54
%
1.
54
%
10
0%
20
2.
08
%
4.
69
%
4.
17
%
15
.1
0%
3.
13
%
2.
08
%
4.
17
%
15
.6
3%
5.
21
%
8.
85
%
3.
65
%
2.
60
%
1.
04
%
3.
13
%
8.
33
%
13
.0
2%
0.
52
%
0.
52
%
2.
08
%
10
0%
21
1.
27
%
14
.2
9%
3.
49
%
13
.3
3%
4.
13
%
1.
90
%
3.
81
%
8.
25
%
4.
13
%
6.
98
%
13
.3
3%
1.
27
%
0.
32
%
2.
22
%
6.
03
%
9.
52
%
2.
54
%
0.
32
%
2.
86
%
10
0%
22
1.
37
%
4.
11
%
31
.5
1%
4.
11
%
6.
85
%
9.
59
%
13
.7
0%
4.
11
%
1.
37
%
2.
74
%
15
.0
7%
1.
37
%
1.
37
%
1.
37
%
1.
37
%
10
0%
23
4.
08
%
28
.5
7%
4.
08
%
14
.2
9%
20
.4
1%
4.
08
%
2.
04
%
6.
12
%
16
.3
3%
10
0%
24
1.
94
%
10
.6
8%
4.
85
%
19
.4
2%
2.
91
%
2.
43
%
2.
43
%
5.
83
%
5.
34
%
7.
28
%
5.
34
%
1.
46
%
0.
97
%
1.
46
%
10
.6
8%
11
.6
5%
1.
46
%
2.
43
%
1.
46
%
10
0%
25
0.
72
%
16
.6
2%
6.
94
%
15
.1
7%
4.
05
%
1.
45
%
0.
43
%
1.
73
%
6.
94
%
2.
60
%
3.
76
%
5.
64
%
0.
43
%
0.
14
%
1.
59
%
7.
95
%
13
.5
8%
1.
45
%
0.
72
%
3.
90
%
1.
30
%
1.
45
%
1.
45
%
10
0%
26
3.
48
%
9.
57
%
6.
09
%
32
.1
7%
4.
35
%
0.
87
%
1.
74
%
6.
96
%
8.
70
%
1.
74
%
1.
74
%
1.
74
%
12
.1
7%
3.
48
%
0.
87
%
3.
48
%
0.
87
%
10
0%
27
3.
03
%
27
.2
7%
5.
05
%
5.
05
%
8.
08
%
11
.1
1%
3.
03
%
11
.1
1%
3.
03
%
2.
02
%
13
.1
3%
4.
04
%
2.
02
%
1.
01
%
1.
01
%
10
0%
28
1.
08
%
6.
05
%
1.
73
%
21
.1
7%
1.
30
%
2.
16
%
0.
43
%
3.
02
%
22
.6
8%
2.
81
%
6.
48
%
3.
24
%
0.
65
%
0.
22
%
1.
51
%
3.
46
%
12
.9
6%
1.
73
%
0.
65
%
3.
67
%
0.
86
%
2.
16
%
10
0%
29
3.
40
%
0.
97
%
9.
71
%
8.
25
%
0.
97
%
2.
43
%
7.
28
%
33
.9
8%
0.
97
%
0.
49
%
1.
46
%
2.
43
%
7.
77
%
5.
34
%
14
.0
8%
0.
49
%
10
0%
30
7.
96
%
1.
04
%
7.
27
%
11
.7
6%
0.
35
%
0.
69
%
3.
11
%
5.
19
%
0.
69
%
30
.8
0%
0.
69
%
0.
35
%
1.
73
%
2.
42
%
5.
88
%
3.
81
%
15
.2
2%
0.
35
%
0.
69
%
10
0%
31
4.
48
%
2.
99
%
20
.9
0%
5.
97
%
8.
96
%
20
.9
0%
7.
46
%
4.
48
%
2.
99
%
7.
46
%
5.
97
%
2.
99
%
4.
48
%
10
0%
32
40
.0
0%
0.
53
%
5.
79
%
25
.2
6%
0.
53
%
1.
32
%
3.
68
%
0.
53
%
11
.3
2%
0.
26
%
0.
26
%
1.
32
%
3.
95
%
0.
53
%
4.
21
%
0.
26
%
0.
26
%
10
0%
33
75
.6
8%
0.
68
%
6.
08
%
4.
39
%
0.
68
%
2.
03
%
4.
73
%
0.
68
%
1.
01
%
0.
34
%
0.
34
%
1.
69
%
0.
34
%
0.
68
%
0.
34
%
0.
34
%
10
0%
34
1.
69
%
8.
90
%
1.
27
%
14
.8
3%
0.
85
%
2.
97
%
2.
97
%
5.
93
%
1.
27
%
0.
85
%
0.
85
%
5.
93
%
0.
85
%
50
.8
5%
10
0%
35
0.
51
%
2.
77
%
5.
03
%
10
.5
7%
1.
44
%
3.
49
%
1.
03
%
4.
11
%
14
.3
7%
3.
90
%
24
.1
3%
3.
59
%
1.
03
%
1.
75
%
3.
80
%
0.
31
%
3.
39
%
6.
06
%
1.
03
%
1.
33
%
0.
10
%
0.
51
%
0.
31
%
0.
51
%
0.
21
%
4.
72
%
10
0%
36
0.
11
%
0.
66
%
0.
77
%
10
.9
4%
0.
22
%
2.
19
%
0.
33
%
4.
38
%
6.
46
%
3.
61
%
59
.4
1%
0.
77
%
0.
22
%
1.
20
%
1.
20
%
1.
09
%
3.
72
%
0.
33
%
0.
33
%
0.
33
%
0.
11
%
1.
64
%
10
0%
37
1.
83
%
0.
79
%
37
.9
6%
3.
14
%
0.
26
%
9.
16
%
20
.1
6%
11
.5
2%
3.
14
%
0.
52
%
0.
79
%
0.
79
%
0.
52
%
2.
36
%
2.
62
%
0.
26
%
0.
52
%
3.
66
%
10
0%
38
0.
30
%
2.
58
%
0.
76
%
7.
12
%
0.
76
%
6.
67
%
1.
82
%
3.
18
%
25
.9
1%
2.
27
%
18
.3
3%
1.
21
%
0.
30
%
0.
45
%
4.
55
%
1.
97
%
13
.7
9%
0.
15
%
0.
61
%
0.
30
%
2.
42
%
0.
15
%
4.
39
%
10
0%
39
1.
05
%
0.
52
%
0.
52
%
22
.5
7%
0.
52
%
0.
52
%
0.
26
%
6.
30
%
9.
71
%
9.
97
%
8.
92
%
0.
79
%
0.
52
%
0.
52
%
2.
10
%
1.
57
%
2.
36
%
0.
52
%
0.
26
%
0.
79
%
29
.6
6%
10
0%
40
1.
49
%
13
.4
3%
0.
75
%
0.
75
%
11
.9
4%
35
.8
2%
17
.1
6%
1.
49
%
1.
49
%
2.
99
%
4.
48
%
4.
48
%
0.
75
%
2.
99
%
10
0%
41
0.
85
%
6.
70
%
0.
37
%
11
.8
1%
2.
19
%
4.
99
%
1.
34
%
2.
68
%
18
.3
9%
3.
05
%
10
.3
5%
4.
63
%
0.
37
%
1.
83
%
2.
44
%
1.
95
%
19
.9
8%
0.
61
%
1.
22
%
0.
24
%
0.
85
%
0.
24
%
0.
97
%
1.
10
%
0.
85
%
10
0%
42
1.
13
%
4.
28
%
1.
26
%
6.
67
%
1.
13
%
9.
43
%
2.
77
%
6.
42
%
21
.7
6%
4.
28
%
13
.8
4%
1.
89
%
0.
38
%
1.
26
%
5.
03
%
1.
76
%
6.
67
%
2.
64
%
3.
27
%
0.
38
%
1.
01
%
0.
25
%
2.
52
%
10
0%
43
0.
51
%
35
.9
0%
2.
56
%
12
.8
2%
1.
54
%
1.
54
%
3.
08
%
3.
08
%
8.
21
%
3.
59
%
0.
51
%
14
.3
6%
1.
54
%
3.
08
%
2.
05
%
5.
64
%
10
0%
44
0.
94
%
0.
94
%
11
.3
2%
1.
89
%
8.
49
%
15
.0
9%
1.
89
%
4.
72
%
29
.2
5%
1.
89
%
0.
94
%
4.
72
%
5.
66
%
12
.2
6%
10
0%
45
1.
25
%
2.
50
%
15
.0
0%
2.
50
%
1.
25
%
1.
25
%
8.
75
%
26
.2
5%
3.
75
%
18
.7
5%
5.
00
%
6.
25
%
1.
25
%
6.
25
%
10
0%
G
ra
nd
 T
ot
al
0.
75
%
7.
36
%
2.
43
%
15
.5
9%
2.
43
%
3.
03
%
0.
78
%
4.
32
%
14
.8
5%
5.
34
%
11
.1
6%
7.
61
%
0.
52
%
0.
76
%
2.
09
%
0.
11
%
4.
60
%
7.
41
%
1.
62
%
1.
54
%
0.
21
%
0.
70
%
0.
31
%
1.
37
%
0.
66
%
2.
46
%
10
0%
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TABLE 41 – SECTOR OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP CLASS PER SECTOR/OVERALL 
 
CLASSES
SE
CT
O
R 
CL
AS
SF
IC
AT
IO
N
 O
F 
BR
AN
DS
Aerosp
ace an
d Def
ense
Alcoho
l
Appar
el
Autom
otive
Bevera
ges
Busine
ss Serv
ices
Compu
ter 
Softwa
re
Divers
ified
Electro
nics
Energy
Financ
ial Ser
vices
FMCG
Home
 Furnis
hings
Hospit
ality
Intern
et Serv
ices
Leisur
e Goo
ds
Luxury
Media
Pharm
aceuti
cals
Restau
rants
Retail
Sporti
ng Go
ods
Teleco
mmun
i- ca
tions
Tobacc
o
Toy 
Manu
factur
ing
Transp
ortatio
n
Grand
 Total
01
0.
55
%
1.
08
%
2.
64
%
0.
77
%
4.
39
%
0.
06
%
0.
44
%
0.
64
%
1.
02
%
8.
71
%
0.
88
%
02
0.
83
%
1.
08
%
1.
71
%
1.
58
%
1.
38
%
0.
06
%
0.
18
%
3.
90
%
0.
64
%
1.
02
%
4.
98
%
3.
13
%
0.
76
%
03
0.
73
%
8.
82
%
1.
59
%
0.
55
%
0.
66
%
1.
71
%
0.
50
%
2.
01
%
0.
24
%
36
.8
3%
1.
30
%
0.
88
%
0.
64
%
7.
00
%
1.
99
%
6.
64
%
6.
25
%
1.
92
%
0.
98
%
4.
08
%
4.
30
%
04
0.
46
%
4.
41
%
1.
51
%
1.
24
%
0.
36
%
10
.2
9%
0.
18
%
0.
64
%
1.
46
%
0.
27
%
0.
41
%
1.
02
%
1.
16
%
05
1.
10
%
0.
65
%
1.
93
%
2.
17
%
0.
63
%
1.
25
%
0.
06
%
5.
55
%
0.
64
%
1.
02
%
0.
27
%
14
.5
2%
0.
44
%
0.
49
%
1.
02
%
1.
19
%
06
3.
57
%
1.
73
%
0.
83
%
1.
98
%
0.
83
%
0.
88
%
2.
17
%
0.
90
%
2.
01
%
0.
36
%
0.
35
%
1.
30
%
0.
96
%
1.
75
%
0.
18
%
0.
41
%
0.
49
%
1.
02
%
1.
07
%
07
3.
57
%
0.
55
%
2.
32
%
0.
44
%
4.
81
%
1.
53
%
1.
88
%
0.
18
%
0.
96
%
1.
02
%
2.
07
%
2.
62
%
0.
27
%
1.
11
%
08
3.
57
%
1.
09
%
1.
10
%
1.
12
%
1.
38
%
0.
66
%
1.
40
%
0.
63
%
0.
38
%
0.
24
%
0.
70
%
3.
90
%
0.
96
%
2.
19
%
0.
45
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TABLE 42 – GROUP OF I.B.G. BRAND: STATISTICS SUMMARY 
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TABLE 43 – GROUP OF I.B.G. BRAND: COUNT OF CLASSES 
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TABLE 44 – GROUP OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP GROUP PER CLASS/OVERALL 
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TABLE 45 – GROUP OF I.B.G. BRAND: TOP CLASS PER GROUP/OVERALL 
 
C
lo
th
in
g 
an
d
 
A
cc
e
ss
o
ri
e
s
C
o
n
su
m
e
r 
G
o
o
d
s
D
ri
n
ks
Fo
o
d
M
an
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
M
e
d
ia
Se
rv
ic
e
s
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
Tr
an
sp
o
rt
at
io
n
G
ra
n
d
 T
o
ta
l
1
0.
75
%
0.
26
%
0.
55
%
4.
95
%
0.
04
%
0.
89
%
1.
03
%
0.
88
%
2
0.
92
%
0.
26
%
0.
55
%
2.
31
%
0.
04
%
1.
19
%
1.
03
%
0.
76
%
3
6.
99
%
36
.6
9%
0.
68
%
0.
55
%
2.
64
%
1.
99
%
0.
21
%
0.
75
%
1.
52
%
4.
30
%
4
2.
16
%
0.
09
%
0.
34
%
0.
55
%
7.
27
%
0.
27
%
0.
36
%
1.
44
%
1.
16
%
5
0.
92
%
3.
64
%
0.
48
%
6.
37
%
3.
72
%
0.
27
%
0.
08
%
0.
83
%
0.
62
%
1.
19
%
6
1.
25
%
0.
26
%
1.
51
%
1.
11
%
1.
73
%
0.
18
%
0.
25
%
1.
02
%
2.
05
%
1.
07
%
7
0.
75
%
0.
55
%
2.
15
%
0.
29
%
1.
77
%
2.
38
%
1.
11
%
8
1.
66
%
0.
95
%
1.
16
%
0.
55
%
0.
66
%
0.
45
%
0.
17
%
0.
66
%
1.
23
%
0.
81
%
9
5.
57
%
2.
25
%
4.
18
%
0.
55
%
5.
45
%
14
.3
9%
5.
89
%
20
.3
9%
5.
66
%
9.
36
%
10
0.
83
%
0.
95
%
1.
11
%
1.
40
%
0.
18
%
0.
08
%
1.
27
%
0.
70
%
0.
73
%
11
1.
16
%
0.
52
%
1.
30
%
0.
55
%
2.
23
%
0.
45
%
0.
42
%
2.
35
%
2.
22
%
1.
49
%
12
1.
33
%
0.
43
%
0.
07
%
0.
55
%
1.
57
%
0.
81
%
1.
47
%
0.
86
%
13
.9
9%
3.
08
%
13
0.
75
%
0.
09
%
0.
07
%
0.
55
%
0.
17
%
0.
25
%
0.
53
%
0.
25
%
14
7.
90
%
0.
95
%
2.
67
%
1.
11
%
1.
57
%
2.
62
%
0.
88
%
1.
33
%
2.
59
%
2.
21
%
15
1.
00
%
0.
09
%
0.
55
%
0.
83
%
0.
17
%
0.
36
%
0.
04
%
0.
47
%
0.
66
%
0.
43
%
16
3.
41
%
7.
81
%
4.
38
%
4.
16
%
4.
71
%
9.
05
%
10
.9
1%
6.
70
%
4.
51
%
6.
56
%
17
0.
67
%
0.
55
%
1.
49
%
0.
69
%
0.
78
%
0.
48
%
18
9.
32
%
2.
17
%
2.
67
%
0.
55
%
1.
65
%
3.
08
%
1.
22
%
1.
44
%
2.
83
%
2.
56
%
19
0.
67
%
0.
09
%
0.
34
%
0.
55
%
1.
57
%
0.
47
%
0.
53
%
0.
44
%
20
2.
00
%
1.
21
%
1.
03
%
0.
83
%
1.
07
%
2.
26
%
0.
84
%
1.
25
%
1.
35
%
1.
29
%
21
2.
50
%
4.
42
%
3.
97
%
1.
39
%
1.
49
%
2.
71
%
1.
31
%
1.
27
%
1.
89
%
2.
11
%
22
1.
33
%
0.
35
%
0.
07
%
0.
55
%
1.
07
%
0.
39
%
0.
94
%
0.
49
%
23
0.
83
%
0.
09
%
0.
55
%
0.
83
%
0.
33
%
0.
57
%
0.
33
%
24
2.
91
%
1.
65
%
1.
92
%
0.
83
%
1.
16
%
2.
17
%
0.
72
%
0.
61
%
1.
81
%
1.
38
%
25
11
.2
3%
4.
86
%
9.
79
%
1.
39
%
2.
15
%
8.
51
%
1.
98
%
2.
10
%
4.
51
%
4.
64
%
26
1.
83
%
0.
43
%
1.
10
%
0.
55
%
0.
83
%
0.
36
%
0.
08
%
0.
36
%
1.
68
%
0.
77
%
27
1.
50
%
1.
21
%
0.
34
%
0.
55
%
1.
16
%
0.
36
%
0.
13
%
0.
33
%
1.
11
%
0.
66
%
28
3.
66
%
2.
34
%
2.
33
%
1.
39
%
1.
73
%
5.
43
%
1.
64
%
3.
60
%
4.
23
%
3.
10
%
29
0.
58
%
0.
43
%
1.
64
%
18
.8
4%
2.
15
%
1.
45
%
1.
26
%
0.
28
%
0.
82
%
1.
38
%
30
0.
83
%
1.
65
%
3.
90
%
20
.7
8%
2.
15
%
1.
54
%
1.
98
%
0.
47
%
0.
86
%
1.
94
%
31
0.
58
%
0.
26
%
0.
21
%
1.
39
%
1.
49
%
0.
36
%
0.
13
%
0.
28
%
0.
57
%
0.
45
%
32
0.
58
%
0.
17
%
16
.9
9%
11
.9
1%
1.
32
%
1.
36
%
0.
80
%
0.
22
%
0.
90
%
2.
55
%
33
0.
67
%
0.
09
%
16
.2
3%
0.
83
%
1.
24
%
0.
21
%
0.
25
%
0.
74
%
1.
98
%
34
1.
58
%
10
.4
1%
1.
58
%
0.
55
%
1.
57
%
0.
13
%
0.
30
%
1.
60
%
1.
58
%
35
7.
57
%
3.
47
%
2.
81
%
3.
32
%
4.
71
%
5.
34
%
13
.0
9%
7.
06
%
4.
43
%
6.
53
%
36
1.
41
%
0.
61
%
0.
55
%
0.
83
%
3.
80
%
3.
08
%
24
.0
8%
3.
49
%
4.
14
%
6.
13
%
37
1.
16
%
0.
55
%
4.
21
%
0.
90
%
1.
22
%
3.
43
%
6.
24
%
2.
56
%
38
1.
66
%
0.
69
%
1.
51
%
0.
83
%
1.
65
%
8.
24
%
6.
61
%
8.
02
%
2.
01
%
4.
42
%
39
0.
67
%
0.
43
%
0.
27
%
0.
83
%
3.
80
%
0.
81
%
6.
32
%
1.
83
%
3.
69
%
2.
55
%
40
0.
67
%
0.
55
%
2.
64
%
0.
29
%
1.
85
%
0.
74
%
0.
90
%
41
2.
33
%
4.
08
%
5.
00
%
3.
05
%
2.
89
%
14
.8
4%
4.
93
%
6.
70
%
4.
27
%
5.
50
%
42
2.
25
%
0.
95
%
2.
95
%
2.
49
%
5.
45
%
4.
80
%
6.
99
%
9.
91
%
2.
54
%
5.
33
%
43
0.
92
%
0.
43
%
5.
00
%
0.
83
%
0.
50
%
0.
36
%
2.
32
%
0.
33
%
1.
07
%
1.
31
%
44
0.
50
%
2.
08
%
0.
21
%
1.
94
%
1.
24
%
0.
54
%
0.
29
%
0.
72
%
0.
49
%
0.
71
%
45
0.
25
%
0.
17
%
0.
21
%
0.
55
%
0.
33
%
0.
45
%
0.
63
%
0.
94
%
0.
49
%
0.
54
%
G
ra
n
d
 T
o
ta
l
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
C
la
ss
e
s
G
R
O
U
P
 C
LA
SS
FI
C
A
TI
O
N
 O
F 
B
R
A
N
D
S
203 
 
TABLE 46 – RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS 
 
GROUP SECTOR BRAND
GAP
H&M
LEVI'S
ZARA
Leisure Goods SWATCH
ARMANI
BULGARI
BURBERRY
CARTIER
GUCCI
HERMÉS
LOUIS VUITTON
POLO RALPH LAUREN
PRADA
ROLEX
TIFFANY & CO.
Retail BENETTON
ADIDAS
NIKE
PUMA
AVON
COLGATE
ESTEE LAUDER
GILLETTE
JOHNSON & JOHNSON
KLEENEX
LANCOME
L'ORÉAL
NIVEA
PAMPERS
WRIGLEY
Home Furnishings IKEA
Tobacco MARLBORO
Toy Manufacturing BARBIE
ABSOLUT
BACARDI
BUDWEISER
CARLSBERG
CORONA
GUINNESS
HEINEKEN
HENNESSY
JACK DANIEL'S
JOHNNIE WALKER
MOET & CHANDON
SMIRNOFF
COCA-COLA
NESCAFé
PEPSI
SPRITE
Consumer Goods
FMCG
Drinks
Alcohol
Beverages
RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS
Clothing and Accessories
Apparel
Luxury
Sporting Goods
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TABLE 46 (Cont’d) – RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS 
 
 
GROUP SECTOR BRAND
CAMPBELL'S
DANONE
HEINZ
KELLOGG'S
KRAFT
NESTLÉ
CATERPILLAR
JOHN DEERE
BP
MOBIL
SHELL
MERCK
NOVARTIS
PFIZER
DISNEY
FINANCIAL TIMES
MTV
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
THOMSON REUTERS
TIME
AIG
ALLIANZ
AMERICAN EXPRESS
AXA
BARCLAYS
CITI
CREDIT SUISSE
GOLDMAN SACHS
HSBC
ING
J.P. MORGAN
MERRILL LYNCH
MORGAN STANLEY
SANTANDER
UBS
VISA
ZURICH
HILTON
MARRIOT
BURGER KING
KFC
McDONALD'S
PIZZA HUT
STARBUCKS
FEDEX
HERTZ
UPS
FMCG
RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS
Media Media
Services
Financial Services
Hospitality
Restaurants
Transportation
Food
Manufacturing
Diversified
Energy
Pharmaceuticals
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TABLE 46 (Cont’d) – RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS 
 
GROUP SECTOR BRAND
ACCENTURE
CISCO
IBM
ORACLE
SAP
ADOBE
MICROSOFT
3M
GE
SIEMENS
APPLE
BLACKBERRY
CANON
COMPAQ
DELL
DURACELL
HP
HTC
INTEL
KODAK
LG
MOTOROLA
NINTENDO
NOKIA
PANASONIC
PHILIPS
SAMSUNG
SONY
TEXAS INSTRUMENTS
XEROX
AMAZON.COM
AOL
eBAY
GOOGLE
YAHOO!
Telecommunications AT&T
Aerospace and Defense BOEING
AUDI
BMW
FERRARI
FORD
HARLEY DAVIDSON
HONDA
HYUNDAI
LEXUS
MERCEDES-BENZ
NISSAN
PORSCHE
TOYOTA
VOLKSWAGEN
Automotive
Transportation
RECLASSIFICATION OF INTERBRAND'S SECTORS
Business Services
Technology
Computer Software
Diversified
Electronics
Internet Services
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APPENDIX 
 
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITIVE POWER IN THE FRESH 
PRODUCE RETAIL INDUSTRY 
(Two Period Model) 
								 
	ܯܽݔ௉ଵ,௉ଶ	ߨ 
								= ℎଵߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ	 − ߬)(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) ൤
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) +
ℎଶ
ߜଶ (ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)൨ −	෍ ௧݂
ଶ
ଵ
				 
ଵܲ ≤ 	ߤ 
ଶܲ ≤ 	ߤ 
 
ℒ = ℎଵߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬)(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) ൤
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) +
ℎଶ
ߜଶ (ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)൨ −	෍ ௧݂
ଶ
ଵ
							
+ 	෍ߣ௧
ଶ
ଵ
(ߤ − ௧ܲ)		 
 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଵܲ =
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) −	
ℎଵ
ߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬) − 	ܴ
ℎଵ
ߜଵ ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) −	ߣଵ ଵܲ
= 0									݂݅	ߣଵ = 0 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଵܲ =
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) −	
ℎଵ
ߜଵ ( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬) − 	ܴ
ℎଵ
ߜଵ ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) = 0		 
(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) −	( ଵܲ − ܿ − ߬) − 	ܴ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) = 0	 
 
ଵܲ =
(ߝ − ܴ ଶܲ) + (1 + ܴ)(ܿ + ߬)	
2  
 
212 
 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = ܴ ൤
ℎଵ
ߜଵ (ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) +
ℎଶ
ߜଶ (ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)൨ − ܴ
ℎଶ
ߜଶ ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) −	ߣ	ଶ ଶܲ
= 0								݂݅	ߣ	ଶ = 0	 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = [ℎଵߜଶ(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + ℎଶߜଵ(ߝ	−	 ଶܲ)] − ℎଶߜଵ( ଶܲ − ܿ − ߬) = 0 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = ℎଵߜଶ(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + ℎଶߜଵߝ	 − ଶܲℎଶߜଵ − ଶܲℎଶߜଵ + ℎଶߜଵ(ܿ + ߬) = 0 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = ߜଶ(ߝ	−	 ଵܲ) + ℎଶߜଵߝ	 + ℎଶߜଵ(ܿ + ߬)
= 2 ଶܲℎଶߜଵ																																					݌݈ݑ݃݅݊݃	 ଵܲ 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = ℎଵߜଶ[ߝ −	(ܿ + ߬)(1 + ܴ) + ܴ ଶܲ] + 2ℎଶߜଵߝ	 + 2ℎଶߜଵ(ܿ + ߬)
= 4 ଶܲℎଶߜଵ 
ߜℒ
ߜ ଶܲ = ߝ(ℎଵߜଶ + 2ℎଶߜଵ) + (ܿ + ߬)[2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ]
= ଶܲ(4ℎଶߜଵ − ܴℎଵߜଶ) 
ଶܲ =
ߝ(ℎଵߜଶ + 2ℎଶߜଵ) + (ܿ + ߬)[2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ]
(4ℎଶߜଵ − ܴℎଵߜଶ) 										ݏ݋	݂݅	 ଶܲ < ߝ 
ߝ(ℎଵߜଶ + 2ℎଶߜଵ) + (ܿ + ߬)[2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ] < ߝ(4ℎଶߜଵ − ܴℎଵߜଶ) 
ߝ[(1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ − 2ℎଶߜଵ] + (ܿ + ߬)[2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ] < 0 
(ߝ − ܿ − 	߬)		(2ℎଶߜଵ − (1 + ܴ)ℎଵߜଶ] > 0 
 
Which yields a contradiction. 
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